{"title":"How package size changes affect food inflation: evidence from scanner data","authors":"Christian Rojas , Edward Jaenicke , Elina T. Page","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2026.103261","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2026.103261","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In recent years, increased attention has been paid to how changes in product size-especially downsizing-affect measured inflation. Despite anecdotal examples and widespread media coverage, there is limited empirical evidence on the broader role of package size reductions in inflation measurement. This paper quantifies how changes in package size among packaged food products influence measured inflation and investigates the mechanisms behind these size changes. Using U.S. retail scanner data from 2012 to 2019, we document that the average package size (measured in grams per UPC) declined by 14.6% over the period. We show that these size reductions are not the result of downsizing in the conventional sense-i.e., shrinking of the same product-but are instead driven almost entirely by product turnover: newly introduced products tend to be smaller than the products they replace. To isolate the impact of package size on food inflation, we compute two hedonic price indices: one that adjusts for size and other attributes and a counterpart that omits size. We find that when size is omitted from the hedonic model, annual inflation is understated each year. As a result, over the entire period, accumulated inflation would be 3.7 percentage points lower if size changes were not accounted for. Finally, we explore heterogeneity in size reductions. We find they are more pronounced among products purchased by high-income households, in states without unit pricing regulations, in sugary products, and in non-bulky goods. This suggests that product shrinkage may result from consumer inattention and market segmentation strategies. We benchmark our findings against official inflation statistics and methodological practices to highlight key similarities and differences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"105 ","pages":"Article 103261"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146079220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Examining the recidivism-productivity growth nexus: Evidence from anti-cartel enforcement in the US","authors":"Panagiotis Fotis , Michael Polemis","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2026.103267","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2026.103267","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Antitrust policy is one of the most challenging issues in modern industrial organisation. Despite numerous studies investigating the relationship between cartel activity and productivity, there has been no systematic analysis of how cartel recidivism affects productivity growth within an industry. This paper aims to fill this gap by quantifying the relationship between cartel recidivism and productivity growth. For this reason, we have used data drawn from US manufacturing cartel cases over the period 1966-2016. In particular, we focus on firms that repeatedly engage in cartel activity (“true recidivists”) and their impact on industry-level productivity growth.. Our empirical analysis employs classical econometric techniques (OLS) alongside quantile regression methods. Our primary finding indicates a robust negative relationship between recidivism and productivity growth in nearly all empirical specifications. By contrast, in non-colluding markets, the absence of multiple and single offenders is positively associated with productivity growth. Finally, we find that higher recidivism rates are associated with patterns consistent with lower observed effectiveness of anti-cartel enforcement. These findings suggest an important link between cartel recidivism, competition policy effectiveness, and productivity growth.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"105 ","pages":"Article 103267"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146173130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Entry rules and fairness in regulated professions: A quasi-Experimental study of a bar exam reform","authors":"Paolo Buonanno , Mario Pagliero , Marcello Puca","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2026.103270","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2026.103270","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Occupational licensing at the local market level often coexists with labor mobility across local markets. This study examines the legal profession, specifically how a district-specific bar exam impacts occupational licensing and labor mobility across districts. Licensing regulation brings unintended consequences: extreme heterogeneity across districts in licensing exam difficulty, unfair admission procedures, and inefficient mobility of exam candidates and workers. We leverage a policy change in the grading procedure of the exam, transitioning from grading within the local district to grading in a randomly assigned different district, and find that exam fairness is substantially restored following this reform. A theoretical model of occupational licensing, labor mobility, and strategic interaction among licensing boards supports our findings. This study provides the first evidence of regulatory competition driven by such interactions. Understanding how to regulate these uneven standards in bar exams can help inform the regulation of other professions where fairness and efficiency in professional licensure are critical issues.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"105 ","pages":"Article 103270"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146173131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Menu costs and asymmetric price adjustment","authors":"Tore Ellingsen , Richard Friberg , John Hassler","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2026.103259","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2026.103259","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study optimal price setting by a monopolist in an infinite horizon model with stochastic costs, moderate inflation, and costly price adjustment. For realistic parameters, chosen to generate observed frequencies of price changes, the model can account for several aggregate regularities. In particular, price reductions are larger but less frequent than price increases, and prices respond considerably faster to cost increases than to cost decreases. The latter asymmetry is more pronounced when input prices are less volatile, as documented by Pelzman (2000).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"105 ","pages":"Article 103259"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146024407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Did profits cause inflation?","authors":"Christopher Conlon","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2026.103257","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2026.103257","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A popular narrative has attributed the post-COVID rise in inflation to a rise in corporate profits. The literature in industrial organization offers three reasons for price increases: greater demand, greater marginal costs, and softening of competition (conduct). I argue that only sensible interpretation of the “Profits-Inflation” hypothesis is that a change in firm conduct was the primary cause of inflation. However, I also find that most of the evidence cited in favor of the “Profits-Inflation” hypothesis, such as elevated profit margins or capital share of income, is unable to distinguish between increased demand and a change in the nature of competition.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"105 ","pages":"Article 103257"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146024408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Christian Bontemps , Gianmaria Martini , Flavio Porta
{"title":"The effects of LCC subsidies on the tourism industry","authors":"Christian Bontemps , Gianmaria Martini , Flavio Porta","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103242","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103242","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies the relationship between aviation, tourist flows, and subsidies to Low–Cost Carriers (LCCs), a policy tool used by many national and local governments to stimulate tourist arrivals. To evaluate this policy’s impact, we estimate a two–stage empirical model. In the first stage, we estimate a structural model applied to air transport; in the second stage, we estimate the link between passenger flows and regional tourism flows. In this way, we use exogenous aviation shocks (subsidies to LCCs) to analyze the causal effect on tourist arrivals. This model is estimated using data on aviation and tourist flows from European to Italian regions during 2016–2018. Counterfactual analyses consider different regimes for implementing the policy, i.e., a subsidy adopted by a benevolent central planner and/or by sub–national institutions. Our simulations show that subsidies to LCCs are effective in stimulating tourism and that a centralized regime is more effective than a decentralized one. In fact, the latter generates externalities in regions that do not implement the subsidy, making the decentralized policy economically suboptimal.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103242"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145839500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Industrial policy in China: Its development and ongoing transformation","authors":"Xiao Fu , Ping Lin , Gaofen Ye","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103229","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103229","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>China’s industrial policy has evolved significantly since the 1980s, serving as a key driver for its technological catch-up and transition from a planned to market economy. Although government-backed sectors have achieved notable economic successes, these policies have also led to negative effects, including overcapacity, ineffective innovation support, and repeated investments ignoring comparative advantages. Recent central government decisions emphasize allowing market mechanisms to play a decisive role in resource allocation and prohibit local authorities from creating discriminatory policies. Looking ahead, China is expected to better coordinate industrial and competition policies, while developing strategic emerging industries and strengthening supply chain resilience through independent innovation and high-standard opening-up measures.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103229"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145797044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Information disclosure in expert's market with diagnostic uncertainty","authors":"Lin Zhao","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103210","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103210","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines a market where consumers rely on the diagnostic skills of the expert to make purchasing decisions while uncertain about the expert's skill levels. Low-skilled expert may diagnose a serious problem to be minor. Imperfect information can incentivize the low-skilled expert to overtreat consumers by recommending more costly treatments than their diagnoses warrant. We find that the frequency of overtreatment can be non-monotonic in market beliefs regarding diagnostic skill. Information disclosure regarding expert's ability can improve social welfare. Optimal amount of information disclosure can exhibit a non-monotonic relationship with the low-skilled expert's diagnosing precision: Perfect disclosure is optimal when the low-skilled expert's diagnostic errors occur either very frequently or very rarely. However, partial disclosure may be optimal in intermediate cases. Our findings remain robust when the low-skilled expert symmetrically misdiagnoses minor and serious problems.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103210"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145537067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Outsourcing without cost advantages","authors":"Chrysovalantou Milliou","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103245","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103245","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper explores why competing firms outsource to an external common supplier that does not have a cost advantage relative to them in input production. The supplier, through its contract offers, manages to generate asymmetry, to alter product market competition, and to extract profits from the competing firms. Two-part tariffs and sequential contracting are both crucial for the emergence of outsourcing. The supplier purposefully avoids industry profit maximization to enlarge its profits share. Both consumer and total welfare benefit from the presence of an otherwise redundant supplier in the market.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103245"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Technology spillovers from Sino-foreign auto joint ventures to indigenous brands","authors":"Jing Liang , Larry D. Qiu , Junji Xiao","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103232","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103232","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper employs a structural model to examine the impact of technology spillovers from Sino-Foreign joint ventures (JVs) on indigenous brands, measured by cost reductions for the latter. Technology spillovers can occur by sharing common upstream suppliers (vertical spillover) or production experiences (horizontal spillover). We find that spillovers account for 57.11 % of the cost reduction for indigenous brands affiliated with JVs, but JVs do not directly have significant spillovers on independent indigenous brands. Furthermore, affiliated indigenous brands act as conduits for indirect spillovers from JVs to independent indigenous brands, which accounts for 15.68 % of the cost reductions for the latter. Welfare analysis reveals that the technology spillovers benefit consumers but reduce JV profits.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103232"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145747754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}