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International Journal of Industrial Organization最新文献

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Complex pricing and consumer-side attention
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2025-01-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103142
Christian Fischer-Thöne , Alexander Rasch , Tobias Wenzel
{"title":"Complex pricing and consumer-side attention","authors":"Christian Fischer-Thöne ,&nbsp;Alexander Rasch ,&nbsp;Tobias Wenzel","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103142","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103142","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper analyzes a market in which two horizontally differentiated firms compete by setting menus of two-part tariffs, and some consumers are not informed about the linear per-unit price component. We consider two regulatory interventions that limit firms' ability to price discriminate: (i) diminishing the range of contracts by reducing the number of two-part tariffs offered (which prohibits inter-group price discrimination); and (ii) reducing tariff complexity by abolishing linear fees (which prohibits inter-group and intra-group price discrimination). We characterize the effects of these interventions on firm profits and consumer welfare, and we identify conditions for the optimal regulatory policy. Our results provide insights for the evaluation of policy interventions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"99 ","pages":"Article 103142"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143141236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Platform design and innovation incentives: Evidence from the product rating system on Apple's App Store
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2025-01-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103133
Benjamin T. Leyden
{"title":"Platform design and innovation incentives: Evidence from the product rating system on Apple's App Store","authors":"Benjamin T. Leyden","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103133","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103133","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I study how the aggregation of product ratings on digital platforms affects the strategic behavior of third-party firms. Leveraging an unexpected and exogenous change in the rating system on Apple's App Store marketplace, I find that for nearly a decade, the manner in which the App Store aggregated customer ratings discouraged product updating by developers. Additionally, developers who were more reliant on the rating system were more responsive to the incentives created by this policy. Last, I provide suggestive evidence that the policy led to a decrease in developer effort on the platform.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"99 ","pages":"Article 103133"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143141235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Personalized content, engagement, and monetization in a mobile puzzle game
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103128
Louis-Daniel Pape , Christian Helmers , Alessandro Iaria , Stefan Wagner , Julian Runge
{"title":"Personalized content, engagement, and monetization in a mobile puzzle game","authors":"Louis-Daniel Pape ,&nbsp;Christian Helmers ,&nbsp;Alessandro Iaria ,&nbsp;Stefan Wagner ,&nbsp;Julian Runge","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103128","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103128","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Digital technologies have reduced the cost of collecting detailed information on consumer characteristics and behavior. Despite the large literature on the consequences of using these data to personalize prices, little is known about content personalization. Using detailed player-level data from a mobile puzzle game and a novel structural model of player behavior, we investigate the effects on revenue of personalizing game difficulty using observable player characteristics. Our results show that, while average difficulty across players is successfully set by the game developer to maximize revenue, personalization can further increase revenue by 71%. Personalized difficulty leads to an overall increase in player engagement and, consequently, revenue generation in the form of in-app purchases. Although the largest relative increase in revenue comes from the smallest spenders, most of the absolute increase in revenue comes from a further increase in spending by the largest spenders.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"98 ","pages":"Article 103128"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143150590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Industrial organization and The Rise of Market Power
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103131
Nathan H. Miller
{"title":"Industrial organization and The Rise of Market Power","authors":"Nathan H. Miller","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103131","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103131","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article addresses developments in the literature on <em>The Rise of Market Power</em>. First, it summarizes research about the result of <span><span>De Loecker et al. (2020)</span></span> that the sales-weighted average markup has increased in the United States. Second, it summarizes and evaluates a set of industry studies that examine market power over long time horizons in specific settings. A theme that emerges from these industry studies is that technological advancements matter a great deal for the evolution of economic outcomes. By contrast, the studies do not point to weak antitrust enforcement as contributing to greater market power. The article concludes by outlining directions for future research.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"98 ","pages":"Article 103131"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143150587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Complementary bidding and cartel detection: Evidence from Nordic asphalt markets
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103129
Aapo Aaltio , Riku Buri , Antto Jokelainen , Johan Lundberg
{"title":"Complementary bidding and cartel detection: Evidence from Nordic asphalt markets","authors":"Aapo Aaltio ,&nbsp;Riku Buri ,&nbsp;Antto Jokelainen ,&nbsp;Johan Lundberg","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103129","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103129","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A key challenge in cartel enforcement is identifying collusive agreements. We study two major Nordic procurement cartels that operated in the asphalt paving market. We find evidence that during the cartel period bids were clustered and the winning bid was isolated. We implement two cartel detection methods that exploit variation in the distribution of bids. The method developed by <span><span>Clark et al. (forthcoming)</span></span> correctly rejects competitive bidding for the cartel period in both markets. The method suggested by <span><span>Huber and Imhof (2019)</span></span> achieves a high prediction rate in one of the markets but not in the market where the cartel had a more modest impact on bid distribution. Our results suggest that statistical screening methods with low data requirements can be useful for competition authorities in detecting collusive agreements.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"98 ","pages":"Article 103129"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143150588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal equity split under unobservable investments
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103132
Lihua Tan , Zhaojun Yang
{"title":"Optimal equity split under unobservable investments","authors":"Lihua Tan ,&nbsp;Zhaojun Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103132","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103132","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the optimal equity split between a penniless entrepreneur (E) and a deep-pocketed venture capitalist (V) cooperating in a two-stage investment project. The first-stage investment explores project profitability, and the final success probability is a function of V's unobservable investment amount, E's and V's private effort like the Cobb-Douglas production function. We show that if project profitability is good enough, the optimal equity split and the welfare loss rate arising from moral hazard are explicitly determined by the project inputs' output elasticities, independent of project profitability and inputs' costs. If project profitability is not contractible, we propose a new renegotiation mechanism. The renegotiation is profitable only when V's participation constraint is not met. We identify the thresholds determining whether E should abandon the project, whether E should go ahead without any changes, and whether E should increase V's equity or roll back cash to V. We show that the initial wealth transferred from V to E can be appropriated upon renegotiation to realize a Pareto improvement; our model provides a novel explanation why internal financing is preferred.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"98 ","pages":"Article 103132"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143150586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Chips in on a merger: The Arm-Nvidia case
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103130
Helena Perrone
{"title":"Chips in on a merger: The Arm-Nvidia case","authors":"Helena Perrone","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103130","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103130","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper analyzes the Nvidia-Arm vertical merger through the lens of the recent literature in Industrial Organization. It explores potential competitive concerns surrounding market foreclosure, technological access, and exclusionary behavior, considering the dynamic semiconductor industry's intricacies. Although limited public information is available due to the parties halting the merger during phase two, I propose four theories of competitive effects addressing issues such as vertical foreclosure in dynamic markets, stifling of innovation due to hold-up concerns, and the ecosystem effects of the merger. This discussion sheds light on the potential impact of this merger in the semiconductor industry on competition in innovative high tech markets such as CPUs, datacenters, gaming consoles, and assisted driving.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"98 ","pages":"Article 103130"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143150585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A model of mobile app and ad platform markets 移动应用程序和广告平台市场模型
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-11-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103117
Yusuke Zennyo
{"title":"A model of mobile app and ad platform markets","authors":"Yusuke Zennyo","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103117","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103117","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The mobile application (app) economy comprises two distinct platform markets through which app developers generate revenue: app platform and ad platform markets. When developers monetize their apps by charging users (or through in-app advertising), they must pay commissions to the app platform (or ad platform). Both platform markets are interconnected, as developers choose which market to use for monetization (paid or ad-funded). The model shows that app and ad platforms are substitutes for app developers. Thus, an imbalance between app and ad commissions induces some developers to choose inefficient business models. For example, if the app commission is lower than the ad commission, some ad-friendly developers may choose the paid business model even though they could generate a greater surplus from advertising from a social welfare perspective. This finding highlights the benefits of distinct platforms setting similar commissions. The model is also used to evaluate the impact of a non-price strategy implemented by the app platform to limit the ability of app developers to monetize through advertising. The analysis shows that the app platform can use this non-price strategy to increase its demand at the expense of the ad platform.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"97 ","pages":"Article 103117"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142661687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Post and hold regulation and competitive conduct: Evidence from the U.S. beer industry 事后监管与竞争行为：美国啤酒业的证据
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-10-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103116
Philip G. Gayle , Adeel Faheem
{"title":"Post and hold regulation and competitive conduct: Evidence from the U.S. beer industry","authors":"Philip G. Gayle ,&nbsp;Adeel Faheem","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103116","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103116","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The literature argues that Post and Hold (pH) laws facilitate tacit collusive price-setting behavior among suppliers of alcoholic beverages. Yet there is no explicit empirical test of this claim. We specify and estimate a structural model designed to identify the extent to which pH laws induce tacit collusive price-setting behavior among beer suppliers. Our estimates reveal evidence of pH law-induced collusive behavior that causes higher prices and lower consumption. Furthermore, we find that an alcohol content tax as a replacement for pH regulation yields the highest surplus to consumers compared to a sales tax or the pH regulation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"97 ","pages":"Article 103116"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142578205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
VAT pass-through and competition: Evidence from the Greek islands 增值税转嫁与竞争：希腊岛屿的证据
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-10-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103110
Lydia Dimitrakopoulou , Christos Genakos , Themistoklis Kampouris , Stella Papadokonstantaki
{"title":"VAT pass-through and competition: Evidence from the Greek islands","authors":"Lydia Dimitrakopoulou ,&nbsp;Christos Genakos ,&nbsp;Themistoklis Kampouris ,&nbsp;Stella Papadokonstantaki","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103110","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103110","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine how competition affects VAT pass-through in isolated oligopolistic markets as defined by the Greek islands. Using daily gasoline prices and a difference-in-differences methodology, we investigate how changes in VAT rates are passed through to consumers in islands with different market structure. We show that pass-through increases with competition, going from 50% in monopoly to around 80% in more competitive markets, but remains incomplete. We also discover a rapid rate of adjustment for VAT changes, as well as a positive relationship between competition and the rate of price adjustment. Finally, we document higher pass-through for products with more inelastic demand.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"97 ","pages":"Article 103110"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142560615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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