{"title":"Lost green leaders: Is China's green financial regulation efficient?","authors":"Wen Wang , Qi Pan , Xiaoming Xie","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103189","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103189","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine China's Green Credit Policy, a green finance instrument that incentivizes firms' environmental performance through conditional financial support. Using firm-level longitudinal data and a difference-in-differences design, we find that while regulated enterprises experienced a 2.3% annual increase in the ratio of green to total patents, their average patent citations decreased by 0.079 per year. Low-quality green innovations, despite securing financial support, caused negative spillover effects by crowding out other innovations and realigning green innovators. Analyzing the policy's effects across firms at varying distances from the green technology frontier, we identify misalignment and inefficiency in green credit allocation. Firms with stronger green innovation capabilities experienced a more pronounced decline in both the quantity and quality of their green innovations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"103 ","pages":"Article 103189"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144865990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Collecting and selling consumer information: Selling mechanisms matter","authors":"David Bounie , Antoine Dubus , Patrick Waelbroeck","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103185","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103185","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article analyzes how take-it-or-leave-it offers (TIOLI) and auctions impact the selling strategy of a data intermediary, the price of information and the amount of consumer data collected. TIOLI leads to a higher consumer surplus compared to auctions, but encourages the intermediary to collect more consumer information than auctions, which is detrimental to consumer privacy. We discuss regulatory measures to protect at the same time consumer surplus and privacy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"103 ","pages":"Article 103185"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144826969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Extreme high temperatures, firm dynamics and heterogeneity, and aggregate productivity: The case of Chinese manufacturing","authors":"Xiangyu Shi , Xin Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103176","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103176","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate how extreme (high) temperatures impact firm dynamics—specifically entry, exit, and aggregate productivity—in China's manufacturing sectors. While existing studies primarily focus on the effects of extreme temperatures on incumbent firms (intensive margin), we examine their influence on firm entry and exit (extensive margin) and the resulting implications for aggregate productivity. Extreme temperatures reduce the productivity of incumbent firms (productivity effects) but also select for higher-productivity firms to survive (selection effects). Leveraging a unique dataset containing registration information for the universe of firms, we document a novel general equilibrium mechanism: resources released by the exit of low-productivity firms are reallocated to higher-productivity firms. As a result, the combined effects on aggregate productivity are muted, challenging the prevailing consensus that extreme temperatures universally worsen productivity and economic outcomes. Using a heterogeneous firm framework à la <span><span>Melitz (2003)</span></span>, we quantify these effects, providing valuable insights into the role of firm dynamics in shaping effective climate policies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"101 ","pages":"Article 103176"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144306990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Unlevel playing field? Machine learning meets state aid regulation","authors":"Guglielmo Barone , Marco Letta","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103175","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103175","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The regulation of State Aid is crucial for a well-functioning European Union Single Market. However, both non-compliance of Member States and subsidies from abroad can jeopardize the level playing field. This paper uses machine learning techniques applied to financial statements data to detect potentially distortive public subsidies to companies in the European Union Single Market. We achieve high out-of-sample predictive accuracy and use the machine predictions to flag suspect cases of hidden recipients and explore the characteristics of these firms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"101 ","pages":"Article 103175"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144306937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Should competition monopolise merger policy?","authors":"John Vickers","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103174","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103174","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The paper contains a critical discussion of views that the remit of merger policy should be broadened beyond competition, to include, for example, goals relating to the environment, industrial competitiveness, or the public interest generally. It is argued that widening the remit of merger policy is unlikely to promote such objectives effectively, but that it risks weakening commitment and the accountability of policy, and may lead to re-politicisation. Competition should therefore continue to dominate merger policy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"101 ","pages":"Article 103174"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144272471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How does COVID-19 affect intertemporal price discrimination and price dispersion? Evidence from the airline industry","authors":"Alberto A. Gaggero , Alexander Luttmann","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103171","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103171","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study provides empirical evidence documenting how COVID-19 affects intertemporal pricing and price dispersion in the U.S. domestic airline market. Studying a unique panel of 43 million fares collected before and after the outbreak of the pandemic, we find that airlines discounted fares by an average of 57% in the first five months of the pandemic relative to the five months that immediately preceded the pandemic. We also find that flight-level prices increased at a lower rate, particularly in the last week to departure. As a consequence, flight-level price dispersion decreased. These findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions arising from models of stochastic peak-load pricing and intertemporal price discrimination.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"101 ","pages":"Article 103171"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144147356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ruizhi Pang , Xuping Zhang , Matthew Leisten , Zhongqi Deng
{"title":"The equilibrium effects of environmental regulation on heterogeneous competing firms: Theory and evidence from Chinese manufacturing","authors":"Ruizhi Pang , Xuping Zhang , Matthew Leisten , Zhongqi Deng","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103161","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103161","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Environmental regulation has the potential to reshape market competition, thereby influencing the market power of regulated firms and potentially impacting social welfare. We show that in certain scenarios, both high-pollution and low-pollution firms may respond to environmental regulation by reducing overall output, thereby increasing price-marginal cost markups. This approach allows them to transfer some of the regulatory costs onto consumers. However, well-designed and appropriately implemented environmental regulations can still increase social welfare. Our empirical analysis of Chinese manufacturing firms supports this assertion, indicating that environmental regulations in China lead to an increase in markups while simultaneously reducing the welfare losses caused by markups.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"100 ","pages":"Article 103161"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143814963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The role of antitrust policy on the composition of mergers: Further reflections on “stealth consolidation”","authors":"John W. Mayo, Robert Press","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103162","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103162","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Did a 2000 legislatively-mandated increase in the reporting thresholds for proposed mergers lead firms to endogenously undertake mergers that now lie below the threshold, with the aim of avoiding regulatory scrutiny? Recent research finds support for this behavior, dubbing this activity “stealth consolidation.” We extend this exploration in new directions logically implied by the theory. Our empirical findings are inconsistent with the theory of stealth consolidations, and suggest that more research is necessary to explain the evolving composition of mergers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"101 ","pages":"Article 103162"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143941111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Carbon emission trading and green transition in China: The perspective of input-output networks, firm dynamics, and heterogeneity","authors":"Xiangyu Shi , Chang Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103159","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103159","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We (re)evaluate the general-equilibrium effects of (environmental) policies from the perspectives of input-output networks and firm dynamics and heterogeneity. Using China's carbon emission trading system (ETS) as an example, we find that ETS leads to more patent applications, especially the ones associated with low-carbon technologies in the target sectors, showing a trend of clean growth and green transition of the macroeconomy. The effects are mostly muted at the firm level due to selection effects, whereby only larger firms are significantly and positively affected. Meanwhile, larger firms occupy a small share in number but a large share of aggregate outcomes, contributing to the discrepancy between the negligible effects of ETS at the individual firm and large effects at the aggregate sector levels. The effects also diffuse in input-output networks, leading to more patents in upstream/downstream sectors, through the channels of demand/supply changes and knowledge spillovers. We build and estimate the first firm dynamics model with input-output linkages and regulatory policies in the literature and conduct policy experiments. ETS's effects are amplified given input-output networks.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"100 ","pages":"Article 103159"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143760325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Optimal auctions with sequential arrival: Allowing for re-auction and resale","authors":"Xiaoshu Xu","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103158","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103158","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The sequential arrival of bidders is a crucial aspect of real-world auctions, providing the auctioneer with incentives for re-auctioning and bidders with opportunities for resale. This paper investigates the optimality of sequential auctions, focusing on scenarios where the auctioneer can re-auction items and tap into potential future resale demand. Specifically, when bidders arrive in two batches, the auctioneer first conducts an English auction for the initial batch. If unsuccessful, the item is re-auctioned to both batches of bidders; otherwise, the winner can opt to resell to current and future bidders. I characterize the optimal sequential English auctions, noting that the auctioneer's belief about the value distribution of the first batch is necessarily limited after the initial auction fails. The findings demonstrate that, on the optimal reserve price path, the first batch always retains a positive winning probability in the re-auction. Furthermore, I identify conditions under which resale does not occur in equilibrium due to a high optimal reserve price in the initial auction. Thus, when the auctioneer can set optimal reserve prices and access resale demand, resale can be implicitly prohibited. These results provide important policy implications for auctions in both the private and public sectors.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"100 ","pages":"Article 103158"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143684041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}