{"title":"The effectiveness of ’in-market’ and ’out-of-market’ liberalization policies. Evidence from Indian produce markets","authors":"Beáta Itin-Shwartz","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103234","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103234","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Do market liberalization policies result in more efficient markets, increase competition and change market outcomes for the trading parties? In this paper I examine two types of liberalization policies, those aimed at increasing competition and efficiency within the existing regulated market, and those allowing competing channels outside of the regulated system. Studying a marketing channel reform in Indian agricultural produce markets, which consisted of both ‘in-market amendments’ and ‘out-of- market amendments’ adopted in different combinations and timing by the Indian states, I evaluate the effectiveness of the reforms in improving the bargaining power of farmers vis-a-vis the licensed traders in the regulated markets. I find an average 3 % overall increase in prices obtained by farmers following the reform in total, and 12 % for storable crops. While apparently much harder to pass, in-market reforms appears to be driving most of the change while the effect for out-of-market reforms is mostly insignificant.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103234"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145797046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Supply chain disruption and precautionary industrial policy","authors":"Massimo Motta , Michele Polo","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103239","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103239","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The paper analyzes the design of industrial policies to improve the efficiency of a local input when there is a risk of international supply chain disruption. We first establish a case for research subsidies in a monopolistic setting: private investment to improve the inferior technology is lower than the socially optimal one. Then, considering several market environments differing in size, structure and appropriability of the innovation, we analyze private and welfare-maximizing investments and optimal transfers. Subsidies are always optimal with both monopolies and research joint-ventures, whereas under some circumstamces (notably, when there is high appropriability of an innovation and investment costs are sufficiently low) a tax might be optimal under duopoly. Research joint-ventures in an integrated market or a public reseach lab socially outperform the other environments since they benefit from a larger integrated market and a wider circulation of the innovation while preserving competition.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103239"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145747750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is the pursuit of a competition-friendly industrial policy desirable? Evidence from Korea's post-Asian Financial Crisis policy shift","authors":"Namhoon Kwon , Minsoo Park , Won Sung","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103233","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103233","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper evaluates the outcomes of Korea's post-Asian Financial Crisis shift toward competition-friendly industrial policy. In the wake of the 1997 crisis, Korea moved from a strategy of cultivating national champions toward reforms that emphasize market competition, but the efficacy of this approach remains disputed. Using a unique firm-level panel dataset from 2008–2023, we employ a granular bank lending shock identification strategy to isolate the causal impact of policy-directed credit on firm performance. Specifically, we examine how exogenous variations in policy-directed credit influence a firm’s physical investment, R&D expenditure, and total factor productivity (TFP), with industry market concentration as a moderating factor. The results indicate that increased policy-directed credit does not translate into consistent improvements in investment, innovation, or productivity at the firm level. However, its effects are significantly stronger in industries characterized by higher market concentration and export intensity. The evidence also suggests that innovative small firms in these industries exhibit stronger policy effects. These findings call into question the universal desirability of competition-friendly industrial policies. For trade-driven economies like Korea, policy intervention tends to be more effective when it incorporates consideration of industry-specific competitiveness in global markets and the realization of economies of scale. This paper provides nuanced insights and contributes new evidence to the literature on industrial policy and competition.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103233"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145747756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Marc Bourreau , Lukasz Grzybowski , Ángela Muñoz-Acevedo
{"title":"State aid for broadband and crowding out of private investment: Evidence from the French market","authors":"Marc Bourreau , Lukasz Grzybowski , Ángela Muñoz-Acevedo","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103240","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103240","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this paper, we investigate the potential crowding out of private investment by public subsidies in the deployment of broadband fiber networks. We estimate a model of fiber entry using a rich dataset on fiber deployment for more than 34,000 municipalities in mainland France from 2014 to 2019. We then assess whether private investment would have occurred in subsidized municipalities in the absence of state aid. We find that in 36 % of cases, public subsidies were allocated to municipalities where private entry would have occurred within three years. We estimate that about 902 million euros of the total 2203 million euros in total subsidies disbursed by the end of 2019 may have crowded out private investment. However, we also show that the French broadband plan accelerated fiber coverage in subsidized municipalities in the early stages of deployment.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103240"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145797040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Growing bigger or becoming stronger: A response of downstream manufacturing firms to the coal price shock","authors":"Yaru Hou , Panbing Wan , Mian Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103220","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103220","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Fluctuations in energy prices bring about broad implications for the welfare of microeconomic entities. This paper examines the impacts of coal price shock on the performance of downstream coal-dependent manufacturing firms using an exogenous price shock induced by China’s Cleaner Production Standard for the Coal Mining and Processing Industry (CPSC) in 2008. The findings reveal a significant increase in the revenues of manufacturing firms subjected to the rise of coal price. Mechanism analysis shows that incumbent firms primarily enhance their revenues by expanding market share and increasing production, rather than fostering innovation and raising prices. This implies growing bigger rather than becoming stronger might be the main strategy for manufacturing firms to cope with the coal price shock. Further analysis indicates that the increase in revenues nearly offset the increase in energy costs, resulting in no significant change in profits. Additionally, this study finds that manufacturing firms can also mitigate cost increases by adjusting their energy structures, but there is no evidence that advancements in energy-saving technologies achieve the same effect. Our findings highlight the various ways in which manufacturing firms respond to energy price shocks.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103220"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145691276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Patents and the choice of research projects","authors":"Narumi Teshima","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103227","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103227","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines how patent strength affects R<span><math><mo>&</mo></math></span>D competition in a model where two symmetric firms simultaneously choose their research projects. A stronger patent system induces not only greater R<span><math><mo>&</mo></math></span>D investment but also more research duplication. It is shown that there exists a range of patent strength in which increasing patent strength discourages innovation. Moreover, as firms behave more collusively in the post-innovation market, the strongest patent system becomes less likely to maximize the probability of innovation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103227"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145624526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Standard-setting and the incentives to innovate: Evidence from the IEEE patent policy update","authors":"Michela Bonani","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103235","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103235","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates how stricter licensing rules affect firms’ incentives to innovate in standard-related technologies. I study the 2015 patent policy revision by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), which limited SEP holders’ ability to seek injunctions and encouraged royalties based on the smallest salable unit. Using a continuous difference-in-differences approach, I show that the new policy increases standard-related patenting, with the strongest effects among firms furthest from the standards’ technology space. However, the effects differ across firm types. SEP holders reduced their innovation activity, consistent with weaker royalty incentives, while non-SEP firms expanded patenting, benefiting from lower licensing costs and new opportunities to reposition themselves. Although the policy created challenges for SEP owners, my results suggest that the broader increase in innovation among other firms outweighed these declines. These results highlight how patent policy design within standard setting organizations can reallocate innovation incentives across firms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103235"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145747751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Information disclosure and information acquisition in credit markets","authors":"Peter Eccles, Paolo Siciliani","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103219","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103219","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study how information about prior loan applications shapes competition in credit markets. We examine whether credit registers should record applications that did not lead to origination. This design choice has subtle implications when the failed or withdrawn application was submitted to a lender known for superior screening technology. We show that disclosing past applications lowers the rates offered to borrowers relative to a regime without disclosure, but it also weakens lenders' incentives to invest in advanced screening technologies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103219"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145579896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Industrial policy and capacity utilization: Evidence from China’s five-year plans","authors":"Hui Li , Wenzhuo Lu , Xiaochen Xie , Heng Yin","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103237","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103237","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the impact of government industrial policy on firm capacity utilization and resource misallocation. We develop an estimation methodology based on firm cost minimization to determine optimal and actual production capacities. Using China’s 12th Five-Year Plan, initiated in 2011, as a natural experiment, we apply a difference-in-differences estimation method. Our findings show that the policy support for targeted industries was associated with lower capacity utilization rates among Chinese firms. Mechanism analysis indicates that tax incentives fostered more optimistic market expectations, resulting in increased investments and higher production capacity. At the same time, these policies appear to have stimulated additional market entry, which, while promoting competition and technological upgrading, may have also led to smaller market shares per firm and potential resource allocation frictions.<blockquote><div><em>The real question about industrial policy is not whether it should be practiced, but how.</em>— <em>Dani Rodrik</em></div></blockquote></div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103237"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145747753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Incentives for contract designers and contractual design","authors":"Alexander Rodivilov","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103244","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103244","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the optimal provision of incentives for contract designers and the implications for contractual design. A buyer hires an agent to draft a contract for a seller. The buyer-seller contract is incomplete because the ex-ante specified design might not be appropriate ex-post. The degree of contract incompleteness is endogenously determined by the effort exerted by the agent, who can manipulate the buyer’s beliefs because his effort is not observable (moral hazard), and because he is better informed at the outset (adverse selection). We discuss how the asymmetric information generated during the contract drafting stage explains some empirical observations and contracting phenomena in the construction industry and procurement.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103244"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145924920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}