{"title":"Competition after mergers near review thresholds","authors":"Michael Weichselbaumer","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103066","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103066","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Size thresholds determine whether a national authority reviews a merger and separate national and supranational responsibility. Firms could pursue competition-reducing mergers before they come under any regulatory oversight. Using data on German procurement auctions, I analyse competition effects near review thresholds. Four years after a merger, competition in procurement auctions decreases after mergers that are reviewed by the German national authority, relative to mergers below the threshold. However, when acquiror and target competed in procurement auctions before the merger, competition relatively increases after a German national merger review. Anti-competitive effects after nationally reviewed mergers without pre-merger activity in procurement may get unnoticed by the authority.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"94 ","pages":"Article 103066"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140271107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Platelets, Puppies, and Payment: How Surveys can be Misleading in the Remuneration Debate.","authors":"James Stacey Taylor","doi":"10.1007/s10730-022-09481-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10730-022-09481-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In a recent article (\"The current state of the platelet supply in the US and proposed options to decrease the risk of critical shortages\") published in Transfusion, Stubbs et al. have argued that platelet donors should be paid. Dodd et al. have argued against this proposal, supporting their response with survey data that shows that blood donors (and by extension platelet donors) and potential platelet donors are uninterested in receiving incentives to encourage them to donate. Instead, argue Dodd et al., prospective platelet donors are motivated more by the ease of donation than the prospect of payment. This article defends Stubbs et al. from the criticisms of Dodd et al. It first argues that the preferences that persons state they have in response to survey questions might not reflect the preferences that their actions would reveal they have in actual rather than hypothetical situations. This hypothetical bias is especially likely when persons respond to surveys that ask them about the performance of morally commendable actions (such as platelet donation). This article then argues that the survey that Dodd et al. rely on exhibits serious selection bias with respect to the set of persons it considers to be potential platelet donors.</p>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"9 1","pages":"91-98"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75470332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Entry regulations with implementation lag: Evidence from convenience store markets in Korea","authors":"Seongmin Seo , Sang Soo Park","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103057","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103057","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><em>Seocho</em> County in Korea attempted to advance the interests of incumbent businesses by weakening competition in the convenience store market. To this end, it created a regulation impeding the opening of new convenience stores. Although this regulation intensified proximity restrictions between stores, our findings reveal that the announcement of legislation condemned incumbent businesses to unfavorable survival probabilities. We provided supporting evidence that so-called implementation lags—time lags between the announcement and implementation of policies—and adaptive behaviors of potential store owners may have caused unintended consequences. Our findings imply that policymakers should consider implementation lag and the adaptive behaviors of economic agents.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"93 ","pages":"Article 103057"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718724000122/pdfft?md5=b470d46bfea5fbecec276b928d07e335&pid=1-s2.0-S0167718724000122-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139885140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The role of public external knowledge for firm innovativeness","authors":"María García-Vega , Óscar Vicente-Chirivella","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103056","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Public research organizations (PROs) and universities receive large amounts of public funding for the generation and transmission of knowledge, and companies contract external knowledge from both. An important question for the management of a firm's R&D and for public innovation policies is: What is more beneficial for the generation of firm innovations, external knowledge created by PROs or by universities? In this paper, we assess the impact of external knowledge from PROs versus universities on firm innovativeness. We use information on R&D acquisitions from a panel dataset of more than 10,000 Spanish firms from 2005 to 2014. We show that external knowledge from PROs and universities increases firm innovativeness. Our results suggest that knowledge generated by PROs is more sensitive to the absorptive capacity of the firm than knowledge generated by universities. This has implications for research policy, R&D management, and organizational strategies of firms’ knowledge activities. Firms with low absorptive capacities benefit relatively more from knowledge generated by universities than from knowledge generated by PROs. Moreover, R&D managers should plan both their external and internal R&D if they acquire external R&D from PROs.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"93 ","pages":"Article 103056"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139743486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The effects of franchising on stores, competitors, and consumers","authors":"Jeff Ackermann","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103055","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103055","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Following a corporate acquisition, a casual dining chain sold all of its company-owned stores to franchisees. I exploit this change in franchise status to estimate the effects of franchising. I use a utility-based choice model to predict alcohol sales for all liquor-selling bars and restaurants in Texas over a 10-year period. Using this model, I find that franchising a restaurant increases its revenues by 7 percent. A substantial share of this revenue increase comes at the expense of competing national chains. I also find that franchising a store produces a consumer utility gain equal to the gain that would result from a 2.8-mile reduction in distance from the individual's home to the store.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"93 ","pages":"Article 103055"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139590434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Missing data and the effects of market deregulation: Evidence from Chinese coal power","authors":"Tom Eisenberg","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103054","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103054","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A series of market reforms were introduced in 2002 in the Chinese wholesale coal power sector. The period immediately after extremely volatile for this industry, and it is generally accepted that many of the reforms were not fully enacted. Yet, researchers consistently find that these reforms resulted in efficiency gains for power plants. Using new physical and matched financial data, as opposed to only financial data, I find no evidence that there were efficiency gains at the plant-level. I also find that in the aggregate there were large productivity declines over this period. Any measurable gains in either case are mainly due to input and output price fluctuations.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"93 ","pages":"Article 103054"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139633208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bridging the digital divide in the US","authors":"Augusto Espín, Christian Rojas","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103053","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103053","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The internet plays a vital role in everyday life across the world. The US, however, has seen a slowdown in household broadband adoption since 2010, creating a gap between connected and unconnected households usually referred to as the “digital divide.” While prior studies have documented how the digital divide is related to income, demographics, and geographic location, this paper takes a different approach and focuses on the mechanisms that could help bridge this gap. To this end, we use a two-stage approach. First, we construct a comprehensive and detailed dataset on household internet usage and prices to estimate broadband demand. Second, we employ the estimated income-dependent demand elasticities to assess multiple counterfactuals aimed at evaluating a number of public policy initiatives designed to reduce the digital divide. Central to our analysis are policies recently approved in the 2021 Biden Infrastructure Act. We contrast the effectiveness of the policies on three metrics: a) policy costs, b) reduction of the digital divide, and c) increases in consumer surplus<span>. We find that affordability policies (i.e., subsidies) can have a larger impact on decreasing the gap vis-à-vis infrastructure deployment policies (i.e., increased coverage or greater bandwidth). We discuss how income-varying subsidies can be particularly effective at reducing disparities in broadband access across the income distribution.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"93 ","pages":"Article 103053"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139515068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Innovation incentives in technical standards","authors":"Gastón Llanes","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103046","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103046","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I study the incentives to develop complementary technologies and include them in a technical standard. I find that the standardization process may lead to insufficient or excessive innovation. Patent pools increase innovation incentives, while price caps may increase or decrease them. Although both policies increase user surplus and welfare, price caps dominate (are dominated by) patent pools if the incremental value of technologies is small (large). Preventing the coordination of price caps guarantees that the socially-optimal policy is implemented in equilibrium. However, from innovators' perspective, patent pools are more profitable than price caps. This finding helps explain why patent pools are more prevalent than price caps, even though price caps may imply higher welfare. Cooperative R&D agreements increase innovation and welfare when technologies are highly complementary. The paper's results contribute to the discussion of the effects of recent policy changes in the VITA and IEEE standard-setting organizations.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"93 ","pages":"Article 103046"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139421079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The behavioral additionality of government research grants","authors":"Rainer Widmann","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103045","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103045","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>There are different forms of public support for industrial R&D. Some attempt to increase innovation by prompting firms to undertake more challenging projects than they otherwise would. Access to a dataset from one such program, the Austrian Research Promotion Agency, allows me to examine the effect of research grants on firms' patenting outcomes. My estimates suggest that a government research grant increases the propensity to file a patent application with the European Patent Office by around 12 percentage points. Stronger effects appear for more experienced firms of advanced age. Additional evidence indicates that grants induce experienced firms to develop unconventional patents and patents that draw on knowledge novel to the firm. I interpret the findings in a “exploration vs. exploitation” model, in which grants are targeted at ambitious projects that face internal competition from more conventional projects within firms. The model shows that this mechanism is more salient in experienced firms, leading to a stronger response in behavior for this group of firms.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"93 ","pages":"Article 103045"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718723001145/pdfft?md5=576a34312bce5cacb25d131d124e0ff8&pid=1-s2.0-S0167718723001145-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139078682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Demand forecasting, signal precision, and collusion with hidden actions","authors":"Simon Martin , Alexander Rasch","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103036","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103036","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We analyze how higher demand-forecasting precision affects firms' chances of sustaining supracompetitive profits, depending on whether actions are observable or hidden. We identify a dual role of improving forecasting ability for situations in which actions are hidden. Improved forecasting ability increases the temptation for firms to deviate, reducing profits; at the same time, such ability reduces and eventually eliminates the uncertainty over whether deviations are occurring. Our framework, in which firms decide on prices and promotional activities, reveals a U-shaped relationship between profits and predictive ability. Generally, collusive profits may increase or decrease in signal precision, depending on action observability, highlighting the importance of industry-specific considerations for regulatory interventions and competition policy.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"92 ","pages":"Article 103036"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138685979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}