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Competition with exclusive contracts in vertically related markets: An equilibrium non-existence result 纵向相关市场中的排他性合同竞争：均衡不存在的结果
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103097
Nicolas Schutz
{"title":"Competition with exclusive contracts in vertically related markets: An equilibrium non-existence result","authors":"Nicolas Schutz","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103097","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103097","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I study a model in which two upstream firms compete to supply a homogeneous input to two downstream firms selling differentiated products. Upstream firms offer exclusive, discriminatory, public, two-part tariff contracts to the downstream firms. I show that, under very general conditions, this game does not have a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium. The intuition is that variable parts in such an equilibrium would have to be pairwise-stable; however, with pairwise-stable variable parts, downstream competitive externalities are not internalized, implying that upstream firms can profitably deviate. I contrast this non-existence result with earlier papers that found equilibria in related models.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"96 ","pages":"Article 103097"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718724000523/pdfft?md5=623ed3a84a6ad876a9e31a624e6ab972&pid=1-s2.0-S0167718724000523-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142180065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the design of price caps as sanctions 关于设计作为制裁手段的价格上限
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-08-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103099
Douglas C. Turner, David E.M. Sappington
{"title":"On the design of price caps as sanctions","authors":"Douglas C. Turner,&nbsp;David E.M. Sappington","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103099","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103099","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A ceiling has been imposed on the price at which Russian producers can sell oil. The price cap is intended to reduce Russian government tax revenue without increasing the world price of oil excessively. We show that such price caps can have counterintuitive effects. A price cap can induce sanctioned producers to increase their output, thereby increasing their revenue. This increased output can also reduce the world price of the homogeneous product supplied by sanctioned and non-sanctioned producers. The welfare-maximizing price cap, which is often well below the unrestricted world price, can increase welfare substantially.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"97 ","pages":"Article 103099"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142128826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Multi-market contact, tacit collusion, and decentralized managerial decision-making 多市场接触、默契勾结和分散管理决策
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-08-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103100
Robert Feinberg, Nathan Larson
{"title":"Multi-market contact, tacit collusion, and decentralized managerial decision-making","authors":"Robert Feinberg,&nbsp;Nathan Larson","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103100","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103100","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Competition in a market may be weaker if the same firms also compete against each other in other markets. Conventional explanations for this mutual forbearance depend on centralized firm decision-making, which permits the threat of concerted retaliation across many markets at once. However, in large firms, market-level decisions may be delegated to managers. We show that multi-market contact can still promote tacit collusion in this case, even though each manager cares only about profit in her own market. In our model, the main linkage between markets is informational: in collusive equilibria of a repeated game with noisy monitoring, outcomes in a second market may be evidence about a competitor's incentives in a first market. The model expands the antitrust concerns about multi-market contact to situations in which independent branch-level decision-making appears to be occurring.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"97 ","pages":"Article 103100"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142122417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
First-party selling and self-preferencing 第一方销售和自我推荐
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103098
Florian Dendorfer
{"title":"First-party selling and self-preferencing","authors":"Florian Dendorfer","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103098","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103098","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper, I analyze the welfare effect of a vertically integrated gatekeeper platform selling its own first-party product, i.e., first-party selling, as well as the platform's incentive to favor the first-party product in the product recommendations it makes, i.e., self-preferencing. I find that, irrespective of self-preferencing, both consumer welfare and platform revenue are higher under first-party selling because first-party selling mitigates double marginalization. Additionally, third-party product prices are lower in expected terms under first-party selling, either because the platform reduces the commission fee (with self-preferencing) or downstream competition is fiercer (without self-preferencing). Finally, I show that both consumers and the platform are better off if the platform commits not to engage in self-preferencing.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"97 ","pages":"Article 103098"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718724000535/pdfft?md5=52ac3b4821ab5901c5aad9c4d72a62bd&pid=1-s2.0-S0167718724000535-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142049074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Capacity, volume flexibility, and costs 容量、容量灵活性和成本
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-08-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103096
Anzhou Zhang
{"title":"Capacity, volume flexibility, and costs","authors":"Anzhou Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103096","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103096","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper studies strategic firms' capacity choices in the presence of demand uncertainty and imperfect downside and upside volume flexibility. It provides conditions under which firms' capacity is greater or less than their expected output. It shows under certain conditions, a first-order stochastically dominant demand distribution induces higher capacity, while a mean-preserving spread of a demand distribution induces lower capacity. By endogenizing volume flexibility, it shows that firms' downside flexibility tends to be lower than their upside flexibility. This implies a firm's short-run average cost tends to be asymmetrically U-shaped, namely, the average cost increases more when output falls below capacity (the efficient scale) than when output rises above capacity by an equivalent amount.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"97 ","pages":"Article 103096"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142011684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Multimarket contact and price discrimination 多市场接触和价格歧视
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-07-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103089
Haobin Fan , Matthew S. Lewis
{"title":"Multimarket contact and price discrimination","authors":"Haobin Fan ,&nbsp;Matthew S. Lewis","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103089","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103089","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Theoretical and empirical studies have demonstrated that multimarket contact facilitates tacit collusion and higher prices. In this study, we examine how multimarket contact influences firms' use of price discrimination. First, we demonstrate theoretically that additional coordination can lead firms to increase or reduce price discrimination, depending on underlying market factors. Next, we empirically investigate price differentials in the U.S. airline industry, employing a new instrumental variables approach to isolate the effects of multimarket contact. We find that multimarket contact results in larger differences in fare levels amongst consumers purchasing higher-priced tickets but smaller fare differences amongst those purchasing lower-priced tickets. Consistent with our theoretical model, multimarket contact more strongly influences fares on less concentrated routes. The findings emphasize the importance of accounting for cross-market or network structure as well as within-market structure when modeling market conduct and performance or when evaluating potential merger effects.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"97 ","pages":"Article 103089"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141630651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Shirking with good reputation? Evidence from hotel industry 用良好声誉推卸责任？酒店业的证据
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-07-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103088
Fang-Chang Kuo
{"title":"Shirking with good reputation? Evidence from hotel industry","authors":"Fang-Chang Kuo","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103088","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper investigates the relationship between reputation and investment in quality within the hotel industry. Utilizing a panel dataset of hotel investment expenditures and online consumer ratings, I employ a regression discontinuity design, which leverages TripAdvisor's rating display system to identify the causal relationship between online ratings and hotels' investment decisions. The empirical findings indicate that higher ratings negatively impact investment expenditures, whereas lower ratings tend to stimulate investment. This observed shirking behavior among hotels with better ratings may be ascribed to diminishing marginal returns on investment and reduced competitive pressures.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"97 ","pages":"Article 103088"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141595459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Naked exclusion with heterogeneous buyers 异质买家的裸排他性
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103084
Ying Chen , Jan Zápal
{"title":"Naked exclusion with heterogeneous buyers","authors":"Ying Chen ,&nbsp;Jan Zápal","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103084","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We investigate the effects of buyer heterogeneity in a market where an incumbent firm deters entry when it signs enough exclusionary contracts with buyers. With heterogeneous buyers, several well-known results in exclusionary contracting with homogenous buyers are overturned and novel ones emerge. First, inefficient equilibria exist in which exclusionary contracts are signed but entry still occurs, and the loss of consumer surplus falls on small buyers. Second, sequential contracting may be more pro-competitive than simultaneous contracting in the sense that entry occurs under sequential but not simultaneous contracting. When this happens, sequential contracting Pareto dominates simultaneous contracting. We extend our analysis to consider downstream competition and breach of contract.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 103084"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141483706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Antibacterial resistance and the cost of affecting demand: The case of UK antibiotics 抗菌药耐药性和影响需求的成本：英国抗生素案例
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103082
Farasat A.S. Bokhari , Franco Mariuzzo , Weijie Yan
{"title":"Antibacterial resistance and the cost of affecting demand: The case of UK antibiotics","authors":"Farasat A.S. Bokhari ,&nbsp;Franco Mariuzzo ,&nbsp;Weijie Yan","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103082","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103082","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Consumption of broad-spectrum antibiotics is associated with rising antimicrobial resistance (AMR) levels. The use of broad-spectrum drugs, particularly of cephalosporins, quinolones, and co-amoxiclav contributes the most to the rise in AMR. We use aggregate sales data on antibiotics from the UK to estimate structural demand models and reveal drug substitution patterns. We then simulate alternative tax schemes to evaluate the effectiveness of shifting demand from broad- to narrow-spectrum drugs. Our estimates suggest that these policies can be highly effective in demand management and come at a relatively low cost regarding changes in consumer and producer surplus.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 103082"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718724000377/pdfft?md5=2de0a2ea491692c41128c112c66fb8db&pid=1-s2.0-S0167718724000377-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141411531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The welfare effects of input price discrimination revisited 再论投入品价格歧视的福利效应
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103083
Youping Li , Jianhu Zhang
{"title":"The welfare effects of input price discrimination revisited","authors":"Youping Li ,&nbsp;Jianhu Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103083","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper revisits the welfare effects of input price discrimination in the canonical model in which an upstream monopolist, under linear pricing, sells an intermediate good to downstream Cournot competitors with different marginal costs. By leveling the downstream players, input price discrimination may have a positive output effect, with the magnitude depending on the convexity of final market demand and its rate of change. When demand is linear, concave, or convex with limited and nonincreasing convexity, welfare is reduced compared with uniform pricing. Instead, when there is sufficient and nondecreasing convexity—often observed in constant elasticity demand—price discrimination increases total welfare.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 103083"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141483705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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