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International Journal of Industrial Organization最新文献

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Umbrella pricing and cartel size 伞形定价和卡特尔规模
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-10-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103032
Stefan Napel, Dominik Welter
{"title":"Umbrella pricing and cartel size","authors":"Stefan Napel,&nbsp;Dominik Welter","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103032","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>It is generally assumed that bigger scale and scope of private antitrust enforcement promotes effective competition. This has motivated several North American and European courts to uphold redress claims not only from clients of a detected cartel but also plaintiffs who were exposed to ‘umbrella pricing’, i.e. equilibrium price increases by non-colluding competitors. The paper shows that the presumed deterrence effects of obliging infringing firms to compensate aggrieved customers of non-infringing firms can be dominated by adverse cartel size effects: liability for umbrella damages primarily constrains small partial cartels. It thereby improves the comparative profitability and stability of large ones. More encompassing cartels can form, prices rise, and welfare falls.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"137043805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Single monopoly profits, vertical mergers, and downstream foreclosure 单一垄断利润、垂直兼并和下游止赎
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-10-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103031
Matthias Hunold, Jannika Schad
{"title":"Single monopoly profits, vertical mergers, and downstream foreclosure","authors":"Matthias Hunold,&nbsp;Jannika Schad","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103031","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103031","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We review the Chicago school's <em>single monopoly profit</em> theory whereby an upstream monopolist cannot increase its profits through vertical integration as it anyway has sufficient market power. In our model the dominant supplier has full bargaining power, uses observable two-part tariffs, and is only constrained by a less efficient source (such as in-house production). We show that, by vertically integrating with a downstream incumbent, the supplier can profitably commit to pricing more aggressively if a downstream entrant refuses its supply contract. This can foreclose the downstream market. The anti-competitive effects arise from the seemingly pro-competitive elimination of double marginalization.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136054061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Empirical analysis of network effects in nonlinear pricing data 非线性定价数据中的网络效应实证分析
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-09-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103030
Liang Chen , Yao Luo
{"title":"Empirical analysis of network effects in nonlinear pricing data","authors":"Liang Chen ,&nbsp;Yao Luo","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103030","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>Network effects, i.e., an agent's utility may depend on other agents' choices, appear in many contracting situations. Empirically assessing them faces two challenges: an endogeneity problem in contract choice and a reflection problem in network effects. This paper proposes a nonparametric approach to tackle both challenges by exploiting restriction conditions from both demand and supply sides. We illustrate our methodology in the yellow pages advertising </span>industry. Using advertising purchases and nonlinear price schedules from seven directories in Toronto, we find positive network effects, which account for a substantial portion of the publisher's profit and businesses' surpluses. We finally conduct counterfactuals to assess the overall and distributional welfare effects of the nonlinear pricing scheme relative to an alternative linear pricing scheme with and without network effects.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49737047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Let's lock them in: Collusion under consumer switching costs 让我们锁定他们:消费者转换成本下的合谋
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-09-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103018
Niklas Fourberg
{"title":"Let's lock them in: Collusion under consumer switching costs","authors":"Niklas Fourberg","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103018","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>Consumer switching costs reduce the price elasticity of existing customers while increasing competition for new ones, creating an “invest-and-harvest” incentive for firms. This paper examines the effect of this dual pricing incentive on firm behavior in a laboratory experiment both with and without switching costs and the ability to communicate. I find that switching costs reduce the </span>price level for new consumers, while the price level for existing consumers is unaffected and the “harvesting” effect is comparatively muted. Markets with switching costs are more competitive and less tacitly collusive. Moreover, switching costs provide a focal point for price setting in the form of a minimum marginal cost mark-up, which is frequently chosen in tacit market sharing outcomes. The results have implications for antitrust policy.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49737099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 21
Bank-platform competition in the credit market 信贷市场中的银行-平台竞争
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-09-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103029
Sara Biancini , Marianne Verdier
{"title":"Bank-platform competition in the credit market","authors":"Sara Biancini ,&nbsp;Marianne Verdier","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103029","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We analyze the equilibrium in the credit market when a bank and a lending platform compete to offer credit to borrowers. The platform does not manage deposit accounts, but acts as an intermediary between the borrower and investor, offering a risky contract such that the investor is only reimbursed if the borrower is successful. We show that the platform business model of financial intermediation may generate unexpected effects in the credit market. In particular, investor participation in the platform sometimes decreases when the platform attracts better-quality borrowers. When it competes with the platform, depending on the respective distributions of borrower and investor types, the bank may expand the supply of credit to low-quality borrowers, or restrict it to high-quality borrowers. Bank-platform competition expands the total supply of credit, but has an ambiguous impact on borrower surplus, because some borrowers may have higher repayments.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49723143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Deceptive advertising, regulation and naive consumers 欺骗性广告、监管和天真的消费者
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-09-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103026
Aastha Gupta
{"title":"Deceptive advertising, regulation and naive consumers","authors":"Aastha Gupta","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103026","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In markets where buyers have incomplete information about product quality, consumer sophistication strengthens the case for stronger regulation of deceptive advertising by firms. In a model where a fraction of buyers are naive (i.e., cannot update beliefs based on market signals and believe all advertising claims) and they stand to gain from receiving reliable information about product quality, I show that the socially optimal level of penalty is (a) substantially higher than the penalty required to merely avoid deception by firms and (b) increasing in the proportion of sophisticated buyers. The optimal penalty for false advertising not only discourages deception but also reduces prices by eliminating signaling distortion. Moreover, a low level of penalty is worse than no penalty from a social welfare standpoint.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49723141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Labor Market Power and Between-Firm Wage (In)Equality 劳动力市场力量与企业间工资平等
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-09-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103005
Matthias Mertens
{"title":"Labor Market Power and Between-Firm Wage (In)Equality","authors":"Matthias Mertens","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I study how labor market power affects firm wage differences using German manufacturing sector firm-level data (1995-2016). In past decades, labor market power increasingly <em>moderated</em> rising between-firm wage differences. This is because high-paying firms possess high and increasing labor market power and pay wages below competitive levels, whereas low-wage firms pay competitive or even above competitive wages. Over time, large, high-wage, high-productivity firms generate increasingly large labor market rents while charging comparably low product markups. This provides novel insights on why such top firms are profitable and successful. Using micro-aggregated data covering most economic sectors, I validate key results for multiple European countries.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49723140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Supply chain disruptions and sourcing strategies 供应链中断和采购策略
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103004
Julia Cajal-Grossi , Davide Del Prete , Rocco Macchiavello
{"title":"Supply chain disruptions and sourcing strategies","authors":"Julia Cajal-Grossi ,&nbsp;Davide Del Prete ,&nbsp;Rocco Macchiavello","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Supply chain disruptions have recently been at the center of both academic and policy debates. After reviewing some of the emerging literature on supply chain disruptions, we discuss the role of buyers' sourcing strategies in mediating responses to such shocks. We focus on two dimensions of a buyer's sourcing strategy: <em>relationality</em> (the extent to which the buyer concentrates its sourcing in a few core suppliers) and <em>just-in-time</em>. On the one hand, theoretical models of sourcing suggest that these are complementary practices and their adoption should be positively correlated in the data. On the other hand, the two dimensions have opposing implications for supply-chain resilience to shocks. We borrow an empirical proxy for a buyer's <em>relationality</em> from <span>Cajal-Grossi et al. (2023)</span> and introduce a new proxy for a buyer's adoption of <em>just-in-time</em> inventory systems. Using data from the apparel global value chain we compute the two proxies and present three results: (a) the variation in both <em>relationality</em> and <em>just-in-time</em> is mostly explained by across-buyer variation, rather than product or country variation, (b) consistent with the theoretical analysis in <span>Taylor and Wiggins (1997)</span>, <em>relationality</em> and <em>just-in-time</em> are highly correlated with each other across buyers, (c) at the onset of the global Covid-19 pandemic, buyers' overall sourced values declined relatively less for <em>relational</em> buyers but not for buyers with <em>just-in-time</em> inventory systems.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48546070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Partial secrecy in vertical contracting 垂直合同中的部分保密
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102955
Jihwan Do , Jeanine Miklós-Thal
{"title":"Partial secrecy in vertical contracting","authors":"Jihwan Do ,&nbsp;Jeanine Miklós-Thal","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102955","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102955","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper introduces a notion of partial secrecy in bilateral contracting games between one upstream firm and several competing downstream firms. The supplier’s offer quantities are subject to trembles, and each downstream firm observes a noisy signal about the offer received by its competitor before deciding whether to accept its offer. A downstream firm’s belief about its competitor’s quantity is determined endogenously as a weighted average of the competitor’s expected equilibrium quantity and the signal about the actual quantity that the competitor was offered. The degree of contract secrecy is captured by the weight that this belief puts on the competitor’s expected equilibrium quantity. We find that a higher degree of secrecy implies a more competitive equilibrium outcome, both in a game with simultaneous offers and in a dynamic game with alternating offers similar to the one in Do and Miklós-Thal (2022, “Opportunism in Vertical Contracting: A Dynamic Perspective,” CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16951).</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49736117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Multi-product firm price and variety response to firm-specific cost shocks 多产品企业价格和品种对企业特定成本冲击的响应
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102984
Alexis Antoniades , Sofronis Clerides , Mingzhi Xu
{"title":"Multi-product firm price and variety response to firm-specific cost shocks","authors":"Alexis Antoniades ,&nbsp;Sofronis Clerides ,&nbsp;Mingzhi Xu","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102984","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102984","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A large literature studies how prices respond to changes in market conditions. More recent work examines firm adjustments along the product quality and variety channels. We present a theoretical model of heterogeneous, multi-product firms to characterize the response of firms to idiosyncratic cost shocks along the price and variety channels. The model delivers rich implications and interesting trade-offs between the two channels. Large firms respond to a cost increase by raising both prices and scope. Relative to smaller firms, they respond more through scope than prices. Availability of the variety channel eases pressures to absorb cost changes and increases pass-through.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48328400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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