On the design of price caps as sanctions

IF 1.7 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-08-30 DOI:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103099

引用次数: 0

Abstract

A ceiling has been imposed on the price at which Russian producers can sell oil. The price cap is intended to reduce Russian government tax revenue without increasing the world price of oil excessively. We show that such price caps can have counterintuitive effects. A price cap can induce sanctioned producers to increase their output, thereby increasing their revenue. This increased output can also reduce the world price of the homogeneous product supplied by sanctioned and non-sanctioned producers. The welfare-maximizing price cap, which is often well below the unrestricted world price, can increase welfare substantially.

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关于设计作为制裁手段的价格上限

俄罗斯生产商出售石油的价格被设定了上限。价格上限旨在减少俄罗斯政府的税收，同时又不会过度提高世界石油价格。我们的研究表明，这种价格上限可能会产生反直觉的效果。价格上限可以促使受制裁的生产商提高产量，从而增加收入。产出的增加也会降低受制裁和非受制裁生产商供应的同质产品的世界价格。福利最大化的价格上限往往远低于不受限制的世界价格，可以大幅提高福利。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

International Journal of Industrial Organization ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.50

自引率

6.70%

发文量

审稿时长

77 days

期刊介绍： The IJIO is an international venture that aims at full coverage of theoretical and empirical questions in industrial organization. This includes classic questions of strategic behavior and market structure. The journal also seeks to publish articles dealing with technological change, internal organization of firms, regulation, antitrust and productivity analysis. We recognize the need to allow for diversity of perspectives and research styles in industrial organization and we encourage submissions in theoretical work, empirical work, and case studies. The journal will also occasionally publish symposia on topical issues.