A model of mobile app and ad platform markets

IF 1.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Yusuke Zennyo
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The mobile application (app) economy comprises two distinct platform markets through which app developers generate revenue: app platform and ad platform markets. When developers monetize their apps by charging users (or through in-app advertising), they must pay commissions to the app platform (or ad platform). Both platform markets are interconnected, as developers choose which market to use for monetization (paid or ad-funded). The model shows that app and ad platforms are substitutes for app developers. Thus, an imbalance between app and ad commissions induces some developers to choose inefficient business models. For example, if the app commission is lower than the ad commission, some ad-friendly developers may choose the paid business model even though they could generate a greater surplus from advertising from a social welfare perspective. This finding highlights the benefits of distinct platforms setting similar commissions. The model is also used to evaluate the impact of a non-price strategy implemented by the app platform to limit the ability of app developers to monetize through advertising. The analysis shows that the app platform can use this non-price strategy to increase its demand at the expense of the ad platform.
移动应用程序和广告平台市场模型
移动应用(app)经济包括两个不同的平台市场,app 开发商通过这两个市场获得收入:app 平台和广告平台市场。当开发者通过向用户收费(或通过应用内广告)来实现应用货币化时,他们必须向应用平台(或广告平台)支付佣金。这两个平台市场是相互关联的,因为开发者会选择使用哪个市场来实现货币化(付费或广告资助)。该模型表明,应用程序和广告平台是应用程序开发商的替代品。因此,应用佣金和广告佣金之间的不平衡会诱使一些开发者选择低效的商业模式。例如,如果应用程序佣金低于广告佣金,一些对广告友好的开发者可能会选择付费商业模式,即使从社会福利的角度来看,他们可以从广告中获得更大的盈余。这一发现凸显了不同平台设置类似佣金的好处。该模型还用于评估应用程序平台为限制应用程序开发者通过广告盈利的能力而实施的非价格策略的影响。分析表明,应用程序平台可以利用这种非价格策略来增加其需求,从而牺牲广告平台的利益。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.50
自引率
6.70%
发文量
48
审稿时长
77 days
期刊介绍: The IJIO is an international venture that aims at full coverage of theoretical and empirical questions in industrial organization. This includes classic questions of strategic behavior and market structure. The journal also seeks to publish articles dealing with technological change, internal organization of firms, regulation, antitrust and productivity analysis. We recognize the need to allow for diversity of perspectives and research styles in industrial organization and we encourage submissions in theoretical work, empirical work, and case studies. The journal will also occasionally publish symposia on topical issues.
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