Collecting and selling consumer information: Selling mechanisms matter

IF 1.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2025-07-24 DOI:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103185

David Bounie , Antoine Dubus , Patrick Waelbroeck

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This article analyzes how take-it-or-leave-it offers (TIOLI) and auctions impact the selling strategy of a data intermediary, the price of information and the amount of consumer data collected. TIOLI leads to a higher consumer surplus compared to auctions, but encourages the intermediary to collect more consumer information than auctions, which is detrimental to consumer privacy. We discuss regulatory measures to protect at the same time consumer surplus and privacy.

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收集和销售消费者信息：销售机制很重要

本文分析了要么接受要么放弃（TIOLI）和拍卖如何影响数据中介的销售策略、信息的价格和所收集的消费者数据的数量。与拍卖相比，TIOLI导致更高的消费者剩余，但鼓励中介收集比拍卖更多的消费者信息，这不利于消费者隐私。我们讨论了同时保护消费者剩余和隐私的监管措施。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

International Journal of Industrial Organization ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.50

自引率

6.70%

发文量

审稿时长

77 days

期刊介绍： The IJIO is an international venture that aims at full coverage of theoretical and empirical questions in industrial organization. This includes classic questions of strategic behavior and market structure. The journal also seeks to publish articles dealing with technological change, internal organization of firms, regulation, antitrust and productivity analysis. We recognize the need to allow for diversity of perspectives and research styles in industrial organization and we encourage submissions in theoretical work, empirical work, and case studies. The journal will also occasionally publish symposia on topical issues.