{"title":"预算投标:数字广告中数据驱动的投标算法","authors":"Dirk Bergemann , Alessandro Bonatti , Nicholas Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103172","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In digital advertising, auctions determine the allocation of sponsored search, sponsored product, or display advertisements. The bids in these auctions for attention are largely generated by auto-bidding algorithms that are driven by platform-provided data.</div><div>We analyze the equilibrium properties of a sequence of increasingly sophisticated auto-bidding algorithms. First, we consider the equilibrium bidding behavior of an individual advertiser who controls the auto-bidding algorithm through the choice of their budget. Second, we examine the interaction when all bidders use budget-controlled bidding algorithms. Finally, we derive the bidding algorithm that maximizes the platform revenue while ensuring that all advertisers continue to participate.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"102 ","pages":"Article 103172"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Bidding with budgets: Data-driven bid algorithms in digital advertising\",\"authors\":\"Dirk Bergemann , Alessandro Bonatti , Nicholas Wu\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103172\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>In digital advertising, auctions determine the allocation of sponsored search, sponsored product, or display advertisements. The bids in these auctions for attention are largely generated by auto-bidding algorithms that are driven by platform-provided data.</div><div>We analyze the equilibrium properties of a sequence of increasingly sophisticated auto-bidding algorithms. First, we consider the equilibrium bidding behavior of an individual advertiser who controls the auto-bidding algorithm through the choice of their budget. Second, we examine the interaction when all bidders use budget-controlled bidding algorithms. Finally, we derive the bidding algorithm that maximizes the platform revenue while ensuring that all advertisers continue to participate.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48127,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal of Industrial Organization\",\"volume\":\"102 \",\"pages\":\"Article 103172\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal of Industrial Organization\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718725000384\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718725000384","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Bidding with budgets: Data-driven bid algorithms in digital advertising
In digital advertising, auctions determine the allocation of sponsored search, sponsored product, or display advertisements. The bids in these auctions for attention are largely generated by auto-bidding algorithms that are driven by platform-provided data.
We analyze the equilibrium properties of a sequence of increasingly sophisticated auto-bidding algorithms. First, we consider the equilibrium bidding behavior of an individual advertiser who controls the auto-bidding algorithm through the choice of their budget. Second, we examine the interaction when all bidders use budget-controlled bidding algorithms. Finally, we derive the bidding algorithm that maximizes the platform revenue while ensuring that all advertisers continue to participate.
期刊介绍:
The IJIO is an international venture that aims at full coverage of theoretical and empirical questions in industrial organization. This includes classic questions of strategic behavior and market structure. The journal also seeks to publish articles dealing with technological change, internal organization of firms, regulation, antitrust and productivity analysis. We recognize the need to allow for diversity of perspectives and research styles in industrial organization and we encourage submissions in theoretical work, empirical work, and case studies. The journal will also occasionally publish symposia on topical issues.