预算投标:数字广告中数据驱动的投标算法

IF 1.4 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Dirk Bergemann , Alessandro Bonatti , Nicholas Wu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在数字广告中,拍卖决定了赞助搜索、赞助产品或展示广告的分配。这些关注拍卖中的出价主要是由平台提供的数据驱动的自动竞价算法产生的。我们分析了一系列日益复杂的自动竞价算法的均衡性质。首先,我们考虑了通过预算选择控制自动竞价算法的单个广告主的均衡竞价行为。其次,我们研究了所有投标人使用预算控制的投标算法时的相互作用。最后,我们推导出最大化平台收入的竞价算法,同时确保所有广告商继续参与。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Bidding with budgets: Data-driven bid algorithms in digital advertising
In digital advertising, auctions determine the allocation of sponsored search, sponsored product, or display advertisements. The bids in these auctions for attention are largely generated by auto-bidding algorithms that are driven by platform-provided data.
We analyze the equilibrium properties of a sequence of increasingly sophisticated auto-bidding algorithms. First, we consider the equilibrium bidding behavior of an individual advertiser who controls the auto-bidding algorithm through the choice of their budget. Second, we examine the interaction when all bidders use budget-controlled bidding algorithms. Finally, we derive the bidding algorithm that maximizes the platform revenue while ensuring that all advertisers continue to participate.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.50
自引率
6.70%
发文量
48
审稿时长
77 days
期刊介绍: The IJIO is an international venture that aims at full coverage of theoretical and empirical questions in industrial organization. This includes classic questions of strategic behavior and market structure. The journal also seeks to publish articles dealing with technological change, internal organization of firms, regulation, antitrust and productivity analysis. We recognize the need to allow for diversity of perspectives and research styles in industrial organization and we encourage submissions in theoretical work, empirical work, and case studies. The journal will also occasionally publish symposia on topical issues.
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