算法合谋:真实还是虚假?

IF 1.7 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102973

Emilio Calvano , Giacomo Calzolari , Vincenzo Denicolò , Sergio Pastorello

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引用次数: 1

摘要

强化学习定价算法有时会收敛到超竞争性价格，即使在共谋不可能被设计或不可能成为均衡结果的市场中也是如此。我们分析了什么时候会出现这种虚假的串通，以及什么时候算法会学习真正的串通策略，重点关注探索速度和模式的作用。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Algorithmic collusion: Genuine or spurious?

Reinforcement-learning pricing algorithms sometimes converge to supra-competitive prices even in markets where collusion is impossible by design or cannot be an equilibrium outcome. We analyze when such spurious collusion may arise, and when instead the algorithms learn genuinely collusive strategies, focusing on the role of the rate and mode of exploration.

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来源期刊

International Journal of Industrial Organization ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.50

自引率

6.70%

发文量

审稿时长

77 days

期刊介绍： The IJIO is an international venture that aims at full coverage of theoretical and empirical questions in industrial organization. This includes classic questions of strategic behavior and market structure. The journal also seeks to publish articles dealing with technological change, internal organization of firms, regulation, antitrust and productivity analysis. We recognize the need to allow for diversity of perspectives and research styles in industrial organization and we encourage submissions in theoretical work, empirical work, and case studies. The journal will also occasionally publish symposia on topical issues.