James D. Brushwood , Michelle A. Draeger , Eric T. Rapley
{"title":"Cannabis financial statement audits in Canada before and after legalization: A “joint” analysis","authors":"James D. Brushwood , Michelle A. Draeger , Eric T. Rapley","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107153","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107153","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Cannabis has become a multi-billion-dollar worldwide industry and presents accountants with unique challenges and opportunities. This descriptive study examines characteristics of financial statement audits for this budding industry in Canada, one of the first countries to legalize recreational adult use of cannabis. Consistent with cannabis audit clients having higher risk, we find they incur more audit fees before and after legalization than a matched sample of non-cannabis companies. Cannabis companies also pay more non-audit fees before and after legalization, consistent with additional business opportunities for their auditors. The size of cannabis companies grew substantially after Canada’s 2018 legalization, corresponding with increased occurrences of Big 4 cannabis company audits. However, compared to a matched sample of non-cannabis companies and controlling for size, cannabis companies are less (more) likely to be audited by a Big 4 (second-tier) firm. This observation is likely attributed to the reputation risk from being associated with a cannabis client, which is potentially higher for Big 4 firms than second-tier firms.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135762268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Amanda M. Convery , Matt Kaufman , Terry D. Warfield
{"title":"Stakeholder conflict and standard-setting foundation oversight","authors":"Amanda M. Convery , Matt Kaufman , Terry D. Warfield","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107122","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107122","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study examines foundation oversight authority as a distinct tool used to maintain the accounting profession’s delegated authority to set standards. Prior literature traditionally focuses on the standard-setting boards and technical arguments surrounding proposed accounting standards. We examine whether the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) can manage stakeholder conflict and legitimize contentious activity through exercise of its oversight role. The presented case is a qualitative analysis of the FAF’s <em>GASB Scope of Authority</em> project, a rare public exercise of FAF oversight authority, in which the FAF applied its authority despite stakeholder disagreement on the line between oversight and standard setting. We observe the FAF’s oversight of standard setting due process as opposed to the content of proposed standard setting projects. The policy formalizes private consultation at this blurred boundary to safeguard board autonomy and delegated authority. Implications and precedence for the FASB and other contentious accounting issues (e.g., deliberations around ESG reporting) are discussed.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278425423000716/pdfft?md5=28af198166a32c9abbb21f2ec049e229&pid=1-s2.0-S0278425423000716-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135970740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Auditor's professional judgment, audit efficiency and interplay between legal liability and regulatory oversight","authors":"Francois Larmande , Cédric Lesage","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107130","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107130","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper analyzes the impact of two enforcement mechanisms – regulatory oversight (inspection by the Public Accounting Oversight Board – PCAOB) and legal liability – on audit effectiveness and audit efficiency, when auditor's professional judgment is at stake. Professional judgment is a double-edged sword: used wisely, it enables efficient audit performance, but can also be used as an excuse to put in an insufficient effort, leading to an ineffective audit. The model shows that regulatory oversight is better at enforcing audit effectiveness, while legal liability is better at inducing efficiency. Moreover, switching from a pure legal liability regime to a joint regime that includes both enforcement mechanisms is found to improve audit effectiveness, limit auditor's professional judgment, and worsen efficiency. The study provides insights into the effects of the creation of the PCAOB and offers policy implications for regulators.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44778293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The dark side of auditor pay disparity: Evidence from audit adjustments","authors":"Lijing Tong , Lu Xie , Min Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107133","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107133","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>This study examines the relation between auditor pay disparity and audit adjustments, and finds that offices with higher pay disparity are associated with lower magnitudes of audit adjustments. Further analysis suggests that the negative influence on audit adjustment is primarily driven by abnormal pay disparity. These results align with Equity Theory, which posits that pay disparity leads to employees experiencing feelings of resentment and shirking their duties, consequently further harming auditors’ work performance. In additional tests, we find that the association between pay disparity and audit adjustments is more pronounced when auditors bear greater economic pressure in life or when auditors contribute a higher per capita revenue to the office. Moreover, we find that audit offices could relieve the negative effects of pay disparity by providing low-level auditors with higher </span>salary and more opportunities for accumulating human capital. Overall, our study provides important evidence on the role of pay disparity regarding audit outcomes and enriches the literature on auditor compensation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135433950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"China audit research: Achievements, challenges, and opportunities","authors":"Jeffrey Pittman , Zhifeng Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2022.106962","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2022.106962","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48705561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
H. Kent Baker , Satish Kumar , Debidutta Pattnaik , Nitesh Pandey
{"title":"The Journal of Accounting and Public Policy at 40: A bibliometric analysis","authors":"H. Kent Baker , Satish Kumar , Debidutta Pattnaik , Nitesh Pandey","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2022.107003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2022.107003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study provides a retrospective of the <em>Journal of Accounting and Public Policy</em> (<em>JAPP</em>) between 1982 and 2021. It highlights a considerable increase in <em>JAPP’s</em> productivity and academic influence since 1982. For example, a <em>JAPP</em> article, on average, receives more than 37 citations. Also, the journal attracts contributions from 36 nations. Although <em>JAPP</em><span> articles are particularly impactful in accounting and finance, many research domains benefit from </span><em>JAPP</em>’s academic insights. Factors positively associated with <em>JAPP</em> citations include the number of references, article age, authors’ institutional affiliation, number of collaborating countries, and academic content.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42129841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why bigger is not stronger? A perspective on auditor groups and audit quality","authors":"Shengnan Li , Feng Liu , Fan Ye , Michael D. Yu","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107099","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107099","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper examines how the existence of auditor groups in accounting firms affects audit quality, using the unique regulatory and institutional settings of China. We define the auditor group as a cohort of exclusively and mutually cooperative and risk-sharing auditors who co-sign audit reports. Using hand-collected data on individual auditors and audit firms from 2010 to 2013, we identify 1,873 auditor groups and find that large auditor groups provide higher audit quality, measured as the propensity to issue qualified audit opinions. We show that audit quality varies among different auditor groups within audit firms. These findings indicate that the auditor group, rather than the audit firm or office, is the core decision-making and responsibility unit in the market for audit services in China. Our paper speaks to the literature on China’s bigger and stronger policy from a novel perspective of auditor groups inside the audit firm, and points out the importance of considering the internal structure of audit firms to better understand the relationship between audit firm size and audit quality, as suggested in <span>DeAngelo (1981)</span>.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48054686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Auditors’ hometown ties and audit quality","authors":"Yingwen Deng , Ziyi Zhang , Yunjing Liu","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107137","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107137","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We investigate the relationship between hometown ties among the engagement and review auditors and audit quality by utilizing the data of signing auditors’ hometowns in China during 2007–2019. The results show that hometown ties between the engagement and review auditors are negatively associated with audit quality, as hometown ties can impair peer monitoring and reduce team diversity. Through cross-sectional analyses, we observe that this negative association is mitigated when signing auditors are from Big 10 audit firms, when clients are subject to stronger external supervision, and when signing auditor teams have a higher level of diversity. Besides, the additional analysis indicates that investors perceive the compromised audit quality associated with hometown ties and discount the value of firms. The main result holds in robustness tests and when considering potential endogeneity. Our study adds to the existing literature on audit teams and provides practical and policy insights.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135387791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Short-sale constraints and firm investment efficiency: Evidence from a natural experiment","authors":"Zhihong Chen , Siwen Fu , Ke Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107149","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107149","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine the causal effect of relaxing short-sale constraints on firm investment efficiency using the experiment of the SEC Regulation SHO pilot program. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find significant treatment effects of the pilot program on mitigating both underinvestment and overinvestment during the pilot period. These treatment effects disappear after the end of the pilot program. The effect on mitigating underinvestment is stronger for firms with severe financial constraints before the pilot period. The pilot program mitigates underinvestment and alleviates financing constraints more for pilot firms that experienced greater improvement in price efficiency after the pilot program began. The effect of the pilot program on mitigating overinvestment is more pronounced for firms with weaker governance and firms with more severe agency problems before the pilot period. These results suggest that relaxing short-sale constraints mitigates underinvestment through the external financing channel by improving price efficiency that alleviate financial constraints; and mitigates overinvestment through the managerial incentive channel by strengthening the disciplinary role of short sellers that enhances managers’ incentives to take correct actions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135605358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Lacey Donley , Joseph Legoria , Kenneth J. Reichelt , Stephanie Walton
{"title":"Chinese auditor inspection access challenges: The market’s response to integrated US regulatory and legislative action","authors":"Lacey Donley , Joseph Legoria , Kenneth J. Reichelt , Stephanie Walton","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107110","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107110","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine the impact of mounting regulator interest in US-listed Chinese firms facing PCAOB inspection access challenges. Our study provides evidence of the market’s response to five events taking place from 2018 to 2020. Collectively, these events mark the first-ever integrated regulatory and legislative response from the PCAOB, SEC, and US legislature since initiation of the PCAOB’s international inspection program. First, we consider whether the PCAOB’s eighth annual update of inaccessible jurisdictions is newsworthy to investors. Next, we consider investors’ perceptions of audit quality risks and delisting risks among Chinese firms. We find that the market does respond negatively towards cross-listed Chinese firms following PCAOB, SEC, and US legislative action. Results further suggest that market reactions are motivated by investors’ perception of a delisting risk among Chinese firms. This observation is most salient among small Chinese firms having fewer listing alternatives outside of the US.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42698707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}