Journal of Accounting and Public Policy最新文献

Attention to corporate disclosure and earnings Management: Evidence from downloads of SEC filings 对公司信息披露和收益管理的关注：从美国证券交易委员会文件下载中获得的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107264

引用次数: 0

Government spending and CEO equity incentives: Evidence from changes in U.S. Senate committee chairs 政府支出与 CEO 股权激励：来自美国参议院委员会主席变动的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-10-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107263

{"title":"Government spending and CEO equity incentives: Evidence from changes in U.S. Senate committee chairs","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107263","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107263","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the impact of government spending on CEO equity incentives. Using changes in U.S. Senate committee chairs as a source of exogenous variation in state-level federal government spending, we find that firms headquartered in a state whose senator becomes a committee chair significantly reduce the convexity of their CEOs’ option-based pay, as captured by portfolio vega. This effect is more pronounced for firms with greater reliance on the government, more geographically concentrated operations, and in states with tighter local labor markets. We further find that in response to a government spending shock, firms actively adjust CEOs’ risk-taking incentives by decreasing CEO vega from annual option grants and decreasing both the number and value of CEOs’ option grants. Additionally, we document a shift in the compensation structure towards increased fixed salary and higher bonus compensation, accompanied by a shorter pay duration. Finally, we show that following the increase in government spending, firms receive more procurement contracts, experience reduced performance volatility, and those providing CEOs with less convex payoffs show lower R&D investment. Overall, our findings suggest that the positive shock to government spending due to a new committee chair reduces a firm’s desired level of risk-taking, which discourages offering risk-taking equity incentives to the CEO.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142527591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Window dressing on bank problem loans: Evidence from natural disaster responses 银行问题贷款的橱窗设计：自然灾害应对的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-10-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107262

引用次数: 0

Does company reputation matter for voluntary disclosure quality? evidence from management earnings forecasts 公司声誉对自愿披露质量有影响吗？

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-10-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107259

引用次数: 0

An unintended consequence of raising public environmental awareness: Evidence from the release of the environmental documentary “Under the Dome” on earnings management 提高公众环境意识的意外后果：环保纪录片《穹顶之下》的上映对收益管理的影响

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-10-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107260

{"title":"An unintended consequence of raising public environmental awareness: Evidence from the release of the environmental documentary “Under the Dome” on earnings management","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107260","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107260","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Raising public environmental awareness provides many benefits. However, using an exogenous shock—the unexpected release of the environmental documentary “Under the Dome” in China—we find that raising environmental awareness may have the unintended consequence of distorting firms’ financial reporting behavior. Our difference-in-differences analyses suggest that relative to control firms, polluting firms manage earnings downwards following the release of this documentary. This finding is not driven by underlying performance changes and is robust to a battery of identification tests. We also find that this relation is more pronounced when the treatment firms are located in areas receiving more environmental complaints, areas with higher indices of PM2.5, and areas that are closer to the local environmental protection bureaus. Further, post-event downward earnings management by the treatment firms is associated with higher government subsidies on environmental protection investments, a lower likelihood of receiving government sanctions over environmental violations, and less severe sanctions, all of which indicate real benefits (incentives) for polluting firms to manipulate earnings.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142420803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Managing conflicts of interest in the financial media: Evidence from a natural experiment in China 管理财经媒体中的利益冲突：来自中国自然实验的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-10-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107261

{"title":"Managing conflicts of interest in the financial media: Evidence from a natural experiment in China","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107261","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107261","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the effect of media regulation aimed at curbing the media’s conflict of interest on news reporting quality and its capital market consequences. Exploiting the large-scale merger and revocation of local reporter stations of Chinese central media outlets as a shock, we document a significant improvement in news reporting quality following the regulation of reporter stations in the province where the firms are located. Cross-sectional analyses show that the effect is stronger when the reporters are ex ante more susceptible to conflicts of interest (i.e., when covering a less transparent firm or stationed farther away from the headquarters, or when the media has closer business relations with the firm). Additionally, after the regulation, the coverage of the treated media is more effective in exposing and raising regulatory awareness of financial fraud, reducing accounting information manipulation, and enhancing market efficiency, consistent with an improvement in firm information environment when covered by media with greater editorial independence. The paper contributes to the research on media in the capital market, and has important practical implications for the healthy development of media outlets.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142420802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The AOCI filter removal and bank lending in times of stress 取消 AOCI 过滤器与压力时期的银行贷款

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107258

{"title":"The AOCI filter removal and bank lending in times of stress","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107258","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107258","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the extent to which the regulatory accumulated other comprehensive income filter removal affects banks’ lending behavior in times of stress. Using the Covid-19 crisis as an exogenous shock to the liquidity of banks’ securities holdings in a difference-in-differences framework, we find that banks subject to the AOCI filter removal reduce loan growth more (or increase loan growth less), relative to unaffected banks, during the pandemic. Further results show that the effect is more pronounced among affected banks with relatively higher (lower) ex-ante holdings of held-to-maturity (available-for-sale) securities and those with a higher proportion of the most liquid securities booked in HTM rather than AFS, ex-ante, consistent with banks’ filter-induced HTM securities holdings, the prevailing market frictions in the wake of the crisis, and the binding HTM tainting rules potentially constraining credit growth. We also find that affected banks reduce the growth in repo borrowing more (or increase repo growth less) during the pandemic, in line with the filter removal potentially limiting banks’ ability to obtain repo funding in times of stress and/or dampening their willingness to source such facilities. Overall, our results suggest that marking banks’ regulatory capital to the market could suppress credit supply at a time when it is most needed.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142420801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Do auditors care about firm-level political risk? 审计师关心公司层面的政治风险吗？

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-09-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107240

引用次数: 0

Clawback provisions and insider trading profits 退还条款和内幕交易利润

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-09-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107242

引用次数: 0

The impact of investment banks going public on underwriting behavior: Evidence from IPO clients’ earnings management 投资银行上市对承销行为的影响：来自 IPO 客户收益管理的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-09-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107241

{"title":"The impact of investment banks going public on underwriting behavior: Evidence from IPO clients’ earnings management","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107241","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107241","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study examines the economic incentive theory, positing that listed investment banks facing significant economic pressure are likely to compromise their underwriting quality to meet client demands. Analyzing Chinese IPO firms from 2006 to 2020, we observe that those underwritten by listed investment banks demonstrate more substantial earnings management compared to those underwritten by privately held banks. This tendency is more evident in scenarios where investment banks have stronger economic incentives, weaker corporate governance, and increased performance pressure. We also find that IPO firms underwritten by listed investment banks are likelier to pass the IPO screening by the China Securities Regulatory Commission and secure higher IPO prices through pronounced earnings management. Additionally, these firms show poorer post-IPO accounting performance and stock returns. Our findings suggest that the public listing of investment banks can compromise the impartiality and quality of their services as gatekeepers in the capital market, particularly in emerging markets with limited shareholder rights protection. These results underscore the need for investors, stakeholders and regulators to be vigilant about the potential compromise to the independence of investment banks following their public listings.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142233856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0