Journal of Accounting and Public Policy最新文献

Earnings management upon a sovereign downgrade: International evidence 主权评级下调后的盈余管理：国际证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2025-05-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107324

Yupeng Lin , Bohui Zhang , Zilong Zhang

引用次数: 0

Creditor governance and mandatory information disclosure quality 债权人治理与强制性信息披露质量

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2025-05-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107314

Yuqi Gu , Bo Ouyang , Jian Zhou

引用次数: 0

Press freedom and stock price crash risk 新闻自由与股价崩盘风险

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2025-05-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107323

Zhiyang Hui , Yizhe Dong , Haoyu Li

{"title":"Press freedom and stock price crash risk","authors":"Zhiyang Hui , Yizhe Dong , Haoyu Li","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107323","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107323","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the impact of press freedom, an important institutional factor, on stock price crash risk. Using a large international sample of firms across 52 economies between 2002 and 2021, we find that firms in economies with higher degrees of press freedom are associated with lower levels of future stock price crash risk. Our analysis further shows that press freedom helps to deter the hoarding of bad news by increasing the intensity of reporting, extending the reporting period, and broadening local media coverage. Firms operating in economies with press freedom demonstrate stronger corporate governance and lower levels of firm-specific and long-term overvaluation, which are likely mechanisms through which press freedom mitigates crash risk. The negative impact of press freedom on crash risk is weakened by corruption but strengthened for firms facing higher short interest and less analyst coverage. Additional tests reveal that this negative relationship is driven by a collective influence from multiple dimensions of press freedom. Our results survive a battery of robustness checks. In sum, our findings suggest that press freedom enhances the stability of the global stock market by discouraging the concealment of negative information.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"51 ","pages":"Article 107323"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143888138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Personal liability and independent directors: Evidence from China 个人责任与独立董事：来自中国的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2025-05-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107325

Haiyue Liu, Yile Wang, Zhimin Yi, Zihan Liu

{"title":"Personal liability and independent directors: Evidence from China","authors":"Haiyue Liu, Yile Wang, Zhimin Yi, Zihan Liu","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107325","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107325","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The debate over strengthening independent directors’ personal liability to enhance their governance role continues, with concerns it may lead to increased resignations. Existing research has left gaps in understanding the legislative effects of increasing this responsibility and its heterogeneity across different contexts, especially in rapidly growing emerging markets. Our study bridges this gap by investigating how increased personal liability influences independent director turnover and corporate governance efficiency following the amendment of China’s Securities Law. We argue that these amendments signify the end of lax penalties for independent directors, thereby boosting corporate governance. Using a dataset of Chinese listed firms spanning 2017 to 2021, we observe a significant increase in independent director resignations post-amendments. This effect is more prominent in firms with higher litigation risk, more opaque information, higher internal corruption, and lower independent director remuneration. Independent directors who are weakly independent, are frequently absent, use proxy voting, hold multiple independent directorships, live far from the firms they serve, or have academic backgrounds are more likely to resign when facing increased personal liability. Further analysis reveals that the resignation of independent directors who are weakly independent, live far from the firm, and hold multiple independent directorships after the amendment is positively associated with stock returns. Additionally, the increased personal liability introduced by the amendment improves corporate governance efficiency. These findings provide new insights into governance reforms in emerging markets and the general role of diligent independent directors.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"51 ","pages":"Article 107325"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143921795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The information content of managers' climate risk disclosure: Evidence from conference calls 管理者气候风险披露的信息内容：来自电话会议的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2025-05-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107321

Brian Bratten , Sung-Yuan (Mark) Cheng

{"title":"The information content of managers' climate risk disclosure: Evidence from conference calls","authors":"Brian Bratten , Sung-Yuan (Mark) Cheng","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107321","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107321","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We explore the determinants of voluntary disclosures about climate risks made by managers during earnings conference calls, and examine whether these disclosures provide decision-useful information to investors. Using a sample of more than 70,000 conference-call transcripts from 2005-2020 with over 6,000 disclosures related to climate risk events, we find that disclosure is more common for smaller firms with higher but more volatile performance. We also show that firms often bundle climate risk disclosures with bad news about earnings in conference calls that are longer and have a more negative tone. Controlling for earnings news and firm fixed effects, we find a negative stock price reaction to climate risk disclosures in conference calls, but we also find that these disclosures are positively associated with abnormal trading volume, suggesting investors have different beliefs about how to incorporate them. Finally, we find that the negative stock price reaction to bad news about earnings is less pronounced when managers provide climate risk disclosures. Overall, our results provide evidence on when managers make climate risk disclosures in conference calls and how investors react, and are consistent with regulators' proposals for more specific guidance on the form and content of such disclosures.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"51 ","pages":"Article 107321"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143903879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

How does auditor planning materiality affect audit pricing of fair values and external valuation? 审计师计划的重要性如何影响公允价值和外部估值的审计定价？

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2025-05-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107318

Selvin S. Prasad , Divesh S. Sharma , Vineeta D. Sharma

{"title":"How does auditor planning materiality affect audit pricing of fair values and external valuation?","authors":"Selvin S. Prasad , Divesh S. Sharma , Vineeta D. Sharma","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107318","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107318","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In response to regulatory calls for research on materiality judgements and regulators discovering shortcomings in the audit of fair values, we provide the first empirical evidence on the impact of auditor planning materiality for fair value assets on the audit. Auditing standards require auditors to plan the audit considering the materiality of accounts based on both qualitative (i.e., nature of the account) and quantitative thresholds. The inherently risky, complex, and subjective nature of fair value assets render them a prime candidate to examine how auditor materiality judgments affect the audit. We also consider how external valuation of fair value assets affects the audit. We situate our study in the Australian real estate industry because fair value assets comprise the majority of assets in this industry. Using extensive hand-collected data spanning 2010 to 2020, our findings show that fair values below the quantitative materiality threshold of 10% are not related to audit fees. However, when fair value asset accounts are at least at the 10% threshold, they are positively associated with audit fees. In addition, we find that external valuation of fair value assets reduces the impact of material fair values on audit fees. Taken together, a primary implication of our results for regulators and policy makers, the audit profession, and literature is that auditors appear to be emphasizing quantitative materiality over qualitative materiality considerations even for accounts where qualitative considerations are warranted. Moreover, auditors also are relying on external valuations in their audit of material fair value assets, which raises implications for relying on the work of non-auditor specialists.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"51 ","pages":"Article 107318"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143903880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Accounting for wrongdoing. The financial consequences of bank misconduct 为不法行为负责。银行不当行为的财务后果

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2025-04-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107317

Jose Fernandez de Bilbao , Isabel Catalina Figuerola-Ferretti , Ioannis Paraskevopoulos , Álvaro Santos

{"title":"Accounting for wrongdoing. The financial consequences of bank misconduct","authors":"Jose Fernandez de Bilbao , Isabel Catalina Figuerola-Ferretti , Ioannis Paraskevopoulos , Álvaro Santos","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107317","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107317","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the determinants influencing banks’ decisions to disclose P&L misconduct-related charges and assesses the extent to which these P&L charges can predict future misconduct penalty announcements. Previous research has largely focused on the penalty announcements as the primary indicator for the financial consequences of bank misconduct. However, the P&L impact of misconduct is influenced by accounting rules that drive banks to disclose a provision or cost ahead of the announcement of a future penalty. Using a sample of hand collected data for Global Systemically Important Banks, we establish that disclosure of misconduct provisions is primarily determined by accounting standards. We also demonstrate that misconduct provisions are accrued prior to a penalty being announced and provide advance indication of the amount of forthcoming penalties. While misconduct provisions, when available, could be considered the optimal measure of misconduct, the empirical evidence shows that their disclosure is limited. On the other hand, banks often make known their misconduct-related P&L costs on their quarterly financial documents. These disclosures are frequent, comprehensive and pervasive across different accounting standards, with expected penalty size as the primary determinant of their disclosure. P&L misconduct costs also share the forward-looking nature of provisions. This implies that, when P&L misconduct related costs are disclosed, markets react accordingly, anticipating a future penalty. Our research provides the first analysis of the accounting elements of bank misconduct, the interaction between misconduct disclosures and penalty announcements and the influence of these disclosures on stock returns.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"51 ","pages":"Article 107317"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143881579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Are climate scenario analysis disclosures valued by investors? 气候情景分析披露是否受到投资者的重视？

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2025-04-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107313

Tongqing Ding , Jonathan Jona , Brad Potter , Naomi Soderstrom

引用次数: 0

Audit committee governance practices at investment companies: Do they provide substantive oversight? 投资公司的审计委员会治理实践：它们提供了实质性的监督吗？

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2025-04-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107319

J. Gregory Jenkins , Jonathan S. Pyzoha , Mark H. Taylor

{"title":"Audit committee governance practices at investment companies: Do they provide substantive oversight?","authors":"J. Gregory Jenkins , Jonathan S. Pyzoha , Mark H. Taylor","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107319","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107319","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>To study audit committee (AC) governance practices within investment companies’ unique governance environment, we extend corporate governance theory and collect data using a dual-method, three stage research approach. We collect data from a survey of 107 investment company AC members and 38 semi-structured interviews with 20 individuals involved in investment company governance, consisting of ten AC members and ten members of management. Using the survey data, our empirical analysis of governance operations quality (composition and diligence) and governance oversight quality (knowledge of the audit process, investment company risks, and valuation issues) indicates that, consistent with agency theory, ACs play a substantive role, and that management does not significantly influence the quality of these governance areas. Furthermore, the AC chair drives governance operations quality, and the other AC members significantly influence oversight quality. Evidence from the semi-structured interview data provide further supporting evidence for our measures.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"51 ","pages":"Article 107319"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143851370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The spillover effects of accounting scandals in business groups 企业集团会计丑闻的溢出效应

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2025-04-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107315

Guilong Cai , Rui Ge , Jeffrey Pittman , Leon Zolotoy

引用次数: 0