Ethics of accounting information manipulation in local government: opportunism or selfishness?

IF 2.2 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2025-09-02 DOI:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107356

Jan van Helden , Tjerk Budding , Enrico Guarini , Anna Francesca Pattaro

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Abstract

This paper addresses the ethics of accounting information manipulation (AIM) within the political domain, with a particular focus on local government—an area that remains under-researched. We developed a theoretical framework distinguishing two key contingencies influencing AIM: (1) the tension between pursuing organizational or personal interests and providing neutral accounting information, and (2) the extent of information asymmetry. These dimensions define four AIM archetypes. In addition, we draw on Information Manipulation Theory (IMT) to assess the ethical aspects of each archetype. To investigate these aspects, the study employs real-life constructs (RLCs)—short cases designed to present AIM dilemmas and stimulate ethical reflection during interviews. Consistent with prior research, our findings indicate that AIM motivated by personal gain generally attracts stronger disapproval than AIM aimed at advancing organizational goals. Furthermore, manipulation that compromises the integrity of financial representation is considered less acceptable than manipulation that merely limits the amount of disclosed information.

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地方政府会计信息操纵的伦理：机会主义还是自私？

本文讨论了政治领域内会计信息操纵（AIM）的伦理问题，特别关注地方政府——这是一个研究不足的领域。我们开发了一个理论框架来区分影响AIM的两个关键偶然事件：(1)追求组织或个人利益与提供中立会计信息之间的紧张关系，以及(2)信息不对称的程度。这些维度定义了四个AIM原型。此外，我们利用信息操纵理论（IMT）来评估每个原型的伦理方面。为了调查这些方面，该研究采用了现实生活结构（rlc）——旨在呈现AIM困境并在访谈中激发道德反思的简短案例。与先前的研究一致，我们的研究结果表明，以个人利益为动机的AIM通常比以推进组织目标为目的的AIM更容易受到反对。此外，损害财务陈述完整性的操纵被认为比仅仅限制披露信息数量的操纵更不可接受。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Multiple-

CiteScore

4.80

自引率

2.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Accounting and Public Policy publishes research papers focusing on the intersection between accounting and public policy. Preference is given to papers illuminating through theoretical or empirical analysis, the effects of accounting on public policy and vice-versa. Subjects treated in this journal include the interface of accounting with economics, political science, sociology, or law. The Journal includes a section entitled Accounting Letters. This section publishes short research articles that should not exceed approximately 3,000 words. The objective of this section is to facilitate the rapid dissemination of important accounting research. Accordingly, articles submitted to this section will be reviewed within fours weeks of receipt, revisions will be limited to one, and publication will occur within four months of acceptance.