Journal of Accounting and Public Policy最新文献

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Accounting comparability and customer concentration 会计可比性和客户集中度
IF 3.3 3区 管理学
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-09-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107244
{"title":"Accounting comparability and customer concentration","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107244","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107244","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study examines the relationship between accounting comparability and customer concentration. Higher accounting comparability enhances customers’ ability to evaluate suppliers’ performance against their industry peers. This allows suppliers to attract more customers, hence reducing their customer concentration. We find a negative association between accounting comparability and customer concentration. This relation is stronger for firms with better profitability, higher information asymmetry, and more innovations. By establishing a link between accounting comparability and customer concentration, our study provides additional evidence about the consequences of accounting comparability and is helpful to both academics and practitioners.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S027842542400067X/pdfft?md5=520ad3b091047a63752197b98ca3909a&pid=1-s2.0-S027842542400067X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142232080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The impact of stock market liberalization on management forecast precision–Evidence from Mainland-Hong Kong Stock Connect Programs in China 股票市场自由化对管理层预测精确度的影响--来自中国内地与香港股票联通计划的证据
IF 3.3 3区 管理学
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-09-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107243
{"title":"The impact of stock market liberalization on management forecast precision–Evidence from Mainland-Hong Kong Stock Connect Programs in China","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107243","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107243","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study examines the effects of stock market liberalization, specifically through the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect and the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect initiatives (jointly referred to as MHKSCPs), on the precision of management forecasts and the underlying mechanisms. We find that post MHKSCPs, management forecasts become less precise for bad news and more precise for good news, leading to an overall decrease in precision. The channels include litigation risk and media/analyst attention. The results are particularly pronounced in firms without foreign investors, within industries with higher proprietary costs, or in smaller firms. Moreover, there is a decrease in the information content of management forecasts, management forecast optimism, and financial report readability post MHKSCPs.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142168068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Performance comparison and incentive contracts 绩效比较和奖励合同
IF 3.3 3区 管理学
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-08-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107239
{"title":"Performance comparison and incentive contracts","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107239","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107239","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Workers use publicly observable performance information to evaluate their and their peers' status, thereby feeling superior or inferior. We analyze how such performance comparison affects optimal incentive contracts. In our model, a principal employs agents who may gain or lose utility by comparing their performance signals. We establish the following results. First, the optimal contract of each agent is based only on his own performance signal and muted compared to the setting with no performance comparison. Second, agents' performance comparison has a nontrivial effect on the principal's expected payment. Third, in the labor market where the principal cannot observe agents' sensitivity to performance comparison, she can attract the most desirable agents under some reasonable assumptions. We discuss the practical implications of these results.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142083609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Corporate governance and tax avoidance: Evidence from governance reform 公司治理与避税:治理改革的证据
IF 3.3 3区 管理学
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-08-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107232
{"title":"Corporate governance and tax avoidance: Evidence from governance reform","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107232","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107232","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We explore the association between corporate governance and tax avoidance in Mexico, a developing economy where the primary agency concern is between firm insiders and minority owners. The Mexican setting aligns with other non-U.S. settings and thus findings apply to a broad set of countries. We exploit governance reforms in Mexico and use a hand-collected governance index to show that improved corporate governance pushes tax avoidance toward a new equilibrium. In particular, we find evidence that Mexican firms with stronger governance engage in less tax avoidance and that our results are concentrated in family-owned firms and non-cross-listed firms, both of which have naturally weaker governance. Our findings suggest these governance reforms are effective in reducing tax avoidance, and we identify board independence and audit committees as mechanisms responsible for the decrease in tax avoidance.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141997310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Quality choices in corporate social responsibility reporting under heterogeneous investor preferences 异质投资者偏好下的企业社会责任报告质量选择
IF 3.3 3区 管理学
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-08-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107228
{"title":"Quality choices in corporate social responsibility reporting under heterogeneous investor preferences","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107228","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107228","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure practices vary widely across firms, prompting the need to elucidate the theoretical foundation determining the quality of firms' CSR reporting. This study develops a model of quality choice in CSR reporting under heterogeneous investor preferences by directly extending the model of Friedman and Heinle (2016). In the model of this study, a firm determines the quality of CSR reporting by incurring costs and disseminates CSR information to investors. The model demonstrates that when CSR reporting quality is endogenized, the firm's choice of CSR reporting quality reflects the firm's targeted information users in a market with heterogeneous investor preferences. The firm targeting socially responsible (SR) investors chooses high-quality CSR reporting to incorporate SR investors' valuation of its CSR performance into its share price. The study's findings indicate that firms' incentives for strategic shareholder composition undermine the effectiveness of CSR regulations and standard-setting.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278425424000516/pdfft?md5=f5aacc2e3fe9b78fb07ae2eecf811dd6&pid=1-s2.0-S0278425424000516-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141991422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Firm-level political risk and income smoothing 公司层面的政治风险和收入平滑
IF 3.3 3区 管理学
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107229
Taejin Jung , Daniel G. Yang
{"title":"Firm-level political risk and income smoothing","authors":"Taejin Jung ,&nbsp;Daniel G. Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107229","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The political cost hypothesis of positive accounting theory predicts that managers make accounting choices to minimize potential wealth transfers in the political process. Using a firm-level measure of political risk based on managers’ discussion of political topics in conference calls, we find that political risk is positively associated with income smoothing, consistent with managers reducing earnings variability to reduce stakeholder attention. This relation is stronger for firms more dependent on government purchases and firms under more stringent tax-related scrutiny. On the other hand, the relation is attenuated when firms incur more political lobbying expenses. Lastly, we do not find that increased investor demand for high-quality accounting information during periods of high economic policy uncertainty is the mechanism underlying our evidence. Our paper contributes to a better understanding of the role of political factors in managers’ accounting choices.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141542538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The impact of chief audit executive turnover in Taiwan 台湾首席审计执行官更替的影响
IF 3.3 3区 管理学
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107230
{"title":"The impact of chief audit executive turnover in Taiwan","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107230","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107230","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study adds to the emerging body of research showing the importance of internal audit to improve corporate governance and firm performance. Specifically, we test how the market reacts to the announcement of a turnover to the head of internal audit (i.e., the chief audit executive (CAE)). We find negative cumulative abnormal returns in the days surrounding the announcement of a CAE turnover and that the market holds a relatively negative perception of CAE turnover regardless of the reasons for the turnover event. We then study two reasons for why the market would react negatively to the CAE turnover and find that CAE turnovers are associated with lower financial reporting quality (i.e., greater likelihood of misstatements, higher abnormal and positive discretionary accruals) and lower operating performance (i.e., return on assets, return on equity, and Tobin’s Q). We find evidence of both decreased financial reporting quality and firm performance following CAE turnovers. The financial reporting changes are largely temporary, only having an influence for one period after the turnover event. The firm performance effects are also temporary, but last for 2 to 5 years after the CAE turnover. Finally, in additional analyses we also find that CAE turnover is positively associated with external audit fees.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141729215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Could financial education be a universal social policy? A simulation of potential influences on inequality levels 金融教育能否成为一项普遍的社会政策?模拟对不平等程度的潜在影响
IF 3.3 3区 管理学
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107231
{"title":"Could financial education be a universal social policy? A simulation of potential influences on inequality levels","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107231","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107231","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Financial vulnerability is a concern of policymakers around the world. Based on previous literature, providing financial education may reduce financial vulnerabilities with reasonable positive effects on income and wealth. However, how these potential effects on income and wealth may affect inequality is unknown a priori. This paper looks at Italy in examining how a marginal change in a household’s financial literacy level might affect household income (wealth) inequality levels, both at the mean value and along with the distribution. Using data from the 2016 wave of the Bank of Italy Survey of Households Income and Wealth (SHIW), which includes the Big Three questions that are widely used as a measure of financial literacy, we show a noteworthy shift if financial literacy were improved among as few as 10 % of the survey respondents. If one of every 10 Italians who had no correct answers on the financial literacy questions in the survey were replaced with respondents reporting two correct answers out of three, the mean value of the household equivalized disposable income would rise by 0.8 %, or €160 per year. If one of every 10 respondents reporting no correct answers were replaced by respondents who could answer all three questions correctly, it would jump by +1.5 %, or €285 per year. To achieve the same results through lump sum payments to households would cost Italy as much as €7.3 billion annually. Our preliminary cost analysis supports mandatory financial education in schools. Heterogeneous analysis reveals that an increase in financial literacy levels can also be associated with a reduction of inequality levels among the most vulnerable groups.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278425424000541/pdfft?md5=dee7ed170d3f7dd438d79f6bf5b19917&pid=1-s2.0-S0278425424000541-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141736425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Use of comment letters for mergers and acquisitions in a setting with weak investor protection: The Chinese experience 在投资者保护薄弱的环境中使用意见函进行并购:中国经验
IF 3.6 3区 管理学
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-06-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107227
Kefu Lyu , Huiying Wu , Sammy Xiaoyan Ying , Jiaxing You
{"title":"Use of comment letters for mergers and acquisitions in a setting with weak investor protection: The Chinese experience","authors":"Kefu Lyu ,&nbsp;Huiying Wu ,&nbsp;Sammy Xiaoyan Ying ,&nbsp;Jiaxing You","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107227","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107227","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We adopt a principal–principal perspective to examine whether comment letters for mergers and acquisitions (M&amp;A) protect shareholders, particularly minority shareholders, of acquiring firms in China, where investor protection is weak. This public enforcement tool has several features: (i) regulators provide detailed comments on various matters, (ii) various stakeholders are called upon to respond, and (iii) failure to adequately address the comments to the satisfaction of regulators results in M&amp;A applications being rejected. Our main results show that M&amp;A comment letters affect the outcome of M&amp;A transactions by reducing acquisition premium and improving the fulfillment of performance commitment. Furthermore, this effect is more pronounced when the principal–principal conflict is more severe, as indicated by a greater divergence between cash flow rights and control rights, along with weaker monitoring by multiple large shareholders. Our results suggest that M&amp;A comment letters, if used appropriately, effectively enhance investor protection in less developed economies. We contribute to the literature by providing new evidence of the effects of M&amp;A comment letters in settings with weak investor protection.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141429243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do public disclosures of investments in tax planning attract monitoring by tax authorities? 公开披露税务筹划投资是否会引起税务机关的监督?
IF 3.6 3区 管理学
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-06-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107224
Eric T. Rapley , Pradeep Sapkota , James Stekelberg
{"title":"Do public disclosures of investments in tax planning attract monitoring by tax authorities?","authors":"Eric T. Rapley ,&nbsp;Pradeep Sapkota ,&nbsp;James Stekelberg","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107224","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107224","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Given the returns to investments in tax planning documented by prior studies, we predict that disclosures of investments in tax planning required by the SEC could inform tax authorities about the benefits of examining particular firms. Consistent with this notion, we find that the amount of tax non-audit services fees a firm reports in the current year is significantly associated with multiple measures of tax authority monitoring over the subsequent years. This result is stronger among firms with greater bargaining power who may be able to demand more aggressive tax planning advice from their auditors. Additionally, we find that our results are concentrated within non-audit fees related to tax planning, rather than tax compliance. Our findings contribute to research on tax enforcement and auditor-provided tax services, and have practical implications for firms considering purchasing tax services from their auditors and corporate stakeholders assessing firms’ potential exposure to tax enforcement. Further, our study has public policy implications by providing evidence of an unintended consequence of SEC disclosure requirements.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141323603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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