Journal of Accounting and Public Policy最新文献_第2页

Do auditors care about firm-level political risk? 审计师关心公司层面的政治风险吗？

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-09-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107240

Chen Ma , Tu Xu , Jian Zhou , Siqi Fan

引用次数: 0

Clawback provisions and insider trading profits 退还条款和内幕交易利润

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-09-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107242

Jeong Hwan Joo , Hangsoo Kyung

引用次数: 0

The impact of investment banks going public on underwriting behavior: Evidence from IPO clients’ earnings management 投资银行上市对承销行为的影响：来自 IPO 客户收益管理的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-09-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107241

Jun Huang , Ting Li , Gary Gang Tian , Tianshu Zhang

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引用次数: 0

Accounting comparability and customer concentration 会计可比性和客户集中度

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-09-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107244

Justin Chircop , Nhat Q. Nguyen , Tri T. Nguyen

引用次数: 0

The impact of stock market liberalization on management forecast precision–Evidence from Mainland-Hong Kong Stock Connect Programs in China 股票市场自由化对管理层预测精确度的影响--来自中国内地与香港股票联通计划的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-09-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107243

Renhui Fu , Fang Gao , Yi Zhao

引用次数: 0

Performance comparison and incentive contracts 绩效比较和奖励合同

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-08-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107239

Jumpei Hamamura , Eiji Ohashi

引用次数: 0

Corporate governance and tax avoidance: Evidence from governance reform 公司治理与避税：治理改革的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-08-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107232

Jon N. Kerr , Richard Price , Francisco J. Román , Miles A. Romney

引用次数: 0

Quality choices in corporate social responsibility reporting under heterogeneous investor preferences 异质投资者偏好下的企业社会责任报告质量选择

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-08-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107228

Akihiro Noda

{"title":"Quality choices in corporate social responsibility reporting under heterogeneous investor preferences","authors":"Akihiro Noda","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107228","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107228","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure practices vary widely across firms, prompting the need to elucidate the theoretical foundation determining the quality of firms' CSR reporting. This study develops a model of quality choice in CSR reporting under heterogeneous investor preferences by directly extending the model of Friedman and Heinle (2016). In the model of this study, a firm determines the quality of CSR reporting by incurring costs and disseminates CSR information to investors. The model demonstrates that when CSR reporting quality is endogenized, the firm's choice of CSR reporting quality reflects the firm's targeted information users in a market with heterogeneous investor preferences. The firm targeting socially responsible (SR) investors chooses high-quality CSR reporting to incorporate SR investors' valuation of its CSR performance into its share price. The study's findings indicate that firms' incentives for strategic shareholder composition undermine the effectiveness of CSR regulations and standard-setting.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"47 ","pages":"Article 107228"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278425424000516/pdfft?md5=f5aacc2e3fe9b78fb07ae2eecf811dd6&pid=1-s2.0-S0278425424000516-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141991422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Firm-level political risk and income smoothing 公司层面的政治风险和收入平滑

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107229

Taejin Jung , Daniel G. Yang

引用次数: 0

The impact of chief audit executive turnover in Taiwan 台湾首席审计执行官更替的影响

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107230

Kenneth L. Bills , Hua-Wei Huang , Yi-Hung Lin , David A. Wood

{"title":"The impact of chief audit executive turnover in Taiwan","authors":"Kenneth L. Bills , Hua-Wei Huang , Yi-Hung Lin , David A. Wood","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107230","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107230","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study adds to the emerging body of research showing the importance of internal audit to improve corporate governance and firm performance. Specifically, we test how the market reacts to the announcement of a turnover to the head of internal audit (i.e., the chief audit executive (CAE)). We find negative cumulative abnormal returns in the days surrounding the announcement of a CAE turnover and that the market holds a relatively negative perception of CAE turnover regardless of the reasons for the turnover event. We then study two reasons for why the market would react negatively to the CAE turnover and find that CAE turnovers are associated with lower financial reporting quality (i.e., greater likelihood of misstatements, higher abnormal and positive discretionary accruals) and lower operating performance (i.e., return on assets, return on equity, and Tobin’s Q). We find evidence of both decreased financial reporting quality and firm performance following CAE turnovers. The financial reporting changes are largely temporary, only having an influence for one period after the turnover event. The firm performance effects are also temporary, but last for 2 to 5 years after the CAE turnover. Finally, in additional analyses we also find that CAE turnover is positively associated with external audit fees.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"46 ","pages":"Article 107230"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141729215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0