{"title":"Could financial education be a universal social policy? A simulation of potential influences on inequality levels","authors":"Giovanni Gallo , Alessia Sconti","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107231","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107231","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Financial vulnerability is a concern of policymakers around the world. Based on previous literature, providing financial education may reduce financial vulnerabilities with reasonable positive effects on income and wealth. However, how these potential effects on income and wealth may affect inequality is unknown a priori. This paper looks at Italy in examining how a marginal change in a household’s financial literacy level might affect household income (wealth) inequality levels, both at the mean value and along with the distribution. Using data from the 2016 wave of the Bank of Italy Survey of Households Income and Wealth (SHIW), which includes the Big Three questions that are widely used as a measure of financial literacy, we show a noteworthy shift if financial literacy were improved among as few as 10 % of the survey respondents. If one of every 10 Italians who had no correct answers on the financial literacy questions in the survey were replaced with respondents reporting two correct answers out of three, the mean value of the household equivalized disposable income would rise by 0.8 %, or €160 per year. If one of every 10 respondents reporting no correct answers were replaced by respondents who could answer all three questions correctly, it would jump by +1.5 %, or €285 per year. To achieve the same results through lump sum payments to households would cost Italy as much as €7.3 billion annually. Our preliminary cost analysis supports mandatory financial education in schools. Heterogeneous analysis reveals that an increase in financial literacy levels can also be associated with a reduction of inequality levels among the most vulnerable groups.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"46 ","pages":"Article 107231"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278425424000541/pdfft?md5=dee7ed170d3f7dd438d79f6bf5b19917&pid=1-s2.0-S0278425424000541-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141736425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Use of comment letters for mergers and acquisitions in a setting with weak investor protection: The Chinese experience","authors":"Kefu Lyu , Huiying Wu , Sammy Xiaoyan Ying , Jiaxing You","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107227","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107227","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We adopt a principal–principal perspective to examine whether comment letters for mergers and acquisitions (M&A) protect shareholders, particularly minority shareholders, of acquiring firms in China, where investor protection is weak. This public enforcement tool has several features: (i) regulators provide detailed comments on various matters, (ii) various stakeholders are called upon to respond, and (iii) failure to adequately address the comments to the satisfaction of regulators results in M&A applications being rejected. Our main results show that M&A comment letters affect the outcome of M&A transactions by reducing acquisition premium and improving the fulfillment of performance commitment. Furthermore, this effect is more pronounced when the principal–principal conflict is more severe, as indicated by a greater divergence between cash flow rights and control rights, along with weaker monitoring by multiple large shareholders. Our results suggest that M&A comment letters, if used appropriately, effectively enhance investor protection in less developed economies. We contribute to the literature by providing new evidence of the effects of M&A comment letters in settings with weak investor protection.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"46 ","pages":"Article 107227"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141429243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Eric T. Rapley , Pradeep Sapkota , James Stekelberg
{"title":"Do public disclosures of investments in tax planning attract monitoring by tax authorities?","authors":"Eric T. Rapley , Pradeep Sapkota , James Stekelberg","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107224","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107224","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Given the returns to investments in tax planning documented by prior studies, we predict that disclosures of investments in tax planning required by the SEC could inform tax authorities about the benefits of examining particular firms. Consistent with this notion, we find that the amount of tax non-audit services fees a firm reports in the current year is significantly associated with multiple measures of tax authority monitoring over the subsequent years. This result is stronger among firms with greater bargaining power who may be able to demand more aggressive tax planning advice from their auditors. Additionally, we find that our results are concentrated within non-audit fees related to tax planning, rather than tax compliance. Our findings contribute to research on tax enforcement and auditor-provided tax services, and have practical implications for firms considering purchasing tax services from their auditors and corporate stakeholders assessing firms’ potential exposure to tax enforcement. Further, our study has public policy implications by providing evidence of an unintended consequence of SEC disclosure requirements.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"46 ","pages":"Article 107224"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141323603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Lawrence A. Gordon , Martin P. Loeb , Lei Zhou , Amanda L. Wilford
{"title":"Empirical evidence on disclosing cyber breaches in an 8-K report: Initial exploratory evidence","authors":"Lawrence A. Gordon , Martin P. Loeb , Lei Zhou , Amanda L. Wilford","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107226","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107226","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The primary objective of this exploratory study is to assess whether 8-K disclosure, compared to alternative disclosure, explains the inconsistent results in prior studies examining the impact of cyber breaches on stock prices. The major finding of this study is that the negative magnitude of the stock price reaction and the duration of the reaction are substantially different for firms disclosing their cyber breaches via an 8-K compared to firms disclosing their breaches via other sources. Our results provide support for the new cybersecurity disclosure rules issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (2023).</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"46 ","pages":"Article 107226"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141323602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Creditor enforcement and accounting quality: A natural experiment","authors":"Siddharth M. Bhambhwani","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107214","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The SARFAESI Act of 2002 strengthened creditor enforcement rights in India by granting banks broad new powers to enforce claims against delinquent secured borrowers. Using a difference-in-differences design, I find that firms with high levels of secured borrowing (i.e., treated firms) exhibit an improvement in accounting quality post-reform. The main findings are especially stronger among smaller firms and firms not affiliated with business groups. I also document significant cross-sectional variation in the main results based on borrowers' financial constraints and banking relationships. These findings are consistent with banks increasing monitoring of borrowers under a stronger creditor rights regime. Overall, this study provides new evidence that stronger creditor rights translate to higher accounting quality.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"46 ","pages":"Article 107214"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141313413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"IFRS 7 adoption and bank risk taking","authors":"Gerald J. Lobo , Chong Wang , Feng (Harry) Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107225","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107225","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine whether and how banks’ risk disclosure relates to their risk taking behavior. Effective from 2007, International Financial Reporting Standards No. 7 (IFRS 7) requires the disclosure of risk arising from financial instruments, which enhances bank risk disclosure. Using a difference-in-differences analysis, we document a significant decrease in bank risk taking following IFRS 7 adoption. This effect is more prominent when accounting rules are more strictly enforced and alternative bank risk constraining means are weak. We also find that after IFRS 7 adoption, banks are more prudent in loan offering that helps reduce risk. Overall, our results are consistent with the market discipline view of bank risk disclosure and underscore IFRS 7′s role in improving financial stability.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"46 ","pages":"Article 107225"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141292233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do U.S. multinationals use income shifting to facilitate and hide corruption?","authors":"Paul Demeré , Jeffrey Gramlich , Yoonsoo Nam","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107213","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We investigate whether U.S. multinational companies use income shifting to facilitate and hide corruption activities by examining whether income shifting responds to corruption pressures. We use enforcement actions under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) as shocks to the costs of direct corruption and find that firms appear to respond to increased costs of direct corruption by shifting income abroad. This corruption-motivated income shifting is more common in industries with greater corruption exposure and among firms with more effective internal controls. We also find evidence that corruption-motivated income shifting acts differently from income shifting for tax avoidance purposes and is difficult for corporate monitors to combat. Overall, our results are consistent with companies using income shifting as an opaque tool for corruption when FCPA enforcement actions curtail more direct forms of corruption.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"46 ","pages":"Article 107213"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141244649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do auditors favor clients with government favoritism?","authors":"Yang Xuan , Xingqiang Yin , Joseph H. Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107215","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Governments often grant privileges to particular industries to achieve targeted development, a practice that can be seen as indicative of government favoritism. It is unknown whether auditors take government favoritism into consideration when forming audit opinions. We examine this research question within the context of China, where government favoritism is evident in policies that favor certain industries (GFI) over others (non-GFI). We find that GFI clients are less likely to receive modified audit opinions than non-GFI clients. We then show regulatory support and mitigated going-concern risk as possible explanations for the main result. Auditors exhibit less conservatism (fewer Type I errors) but greater aggressiveness (more Type II errors) when dealing with GFI clients. We also observe that small audit firms acquire regulatory and economic benefits by issuing clean opinions to GFI clients. Overall, this study suggests that government favoritism is critical when auditors form and express their opinions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"46 ","pages":"Article 107215"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141244648","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Financial information, spillovers, and innovation performance","authors":"Jae B. Kim , Jonghwan (Simon) Kim , KwangJoo Koo","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107212","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We hypothesize that high-quality financial information can, through its spillovers to peer firms’ strategic decision-making, have an adverse effect on the disclosing firm’s innovation performance. Using the degree of disaggregation in financial reports and patent-based measures to proxy for financial information quality and significance of innovative outputs, respectively, we find that the patented inventions of firms with more disaggregated financial reports are less innovative. We also document that the negative association is more pronounced for firms with more intense product market threats, a situation in which the spillover of more detailed information is costlier. We further validate our argument by documenting that disclosures of more and finer information actually help peers increase innovation activities and investments, consistent with the peers’ effective strategic responses to the disclosing firm’s innovation. Overall, the results from the cross-sectional analysis and validation tests confirm the channel through which more disaggregated financial information can lead to a decline in firm innovation performance. This study contributes to the literatures on information spillovers, economic consequences of financial reporting, proprietary costs of disclosures, and innovation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"45 ","pages":"Article 107212"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140900896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"To tell or not to tell? Examining voluntary disclosure of customers’ identities under capital market pressure","authors":"Yue Xu , Guilong Cai , Ting Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107211","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Using China’s short-sell reform as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that firms respond to short-sell pressure by reducing the disclosure of their customers’ identities after controlling for the influence of proprietary costs. The result remains robust after conducting a parallel trends test and a placebo test, and using a propensity score matching approach. Furthermore, non-disclosure becomes more prevalent among firms with highly perceived customer risks and significant discretionary revenues. These findings imply that negative information transmission between economically linked firms and potential agency issues inherent to supplier firms prompt them to withhold customer identity. Finally, a non-disclosing strategy benefits firms by lowering the probability of fraud detection and reducing operating uncertainty. We suggest regulators implement policies to incentivize firms to improve information transparency in the supply chain.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"45 ","pages":"Article 107211"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140632695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}