Journal of Accounting and Public Policy最新文献_第4页

How does mandated sustainability disclosure about conflict minerals affect supply chain finance? 强制性的冲突矿产可持续性披露如何影响供应链金融？

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107275

Jia Guo , Jeffrey Ng , Andy C.L. Yeung , Janus Jian Zhang

{"title":"How does mandated sustainability disclosure about conflict minerals affect supply chain finance?","authors":"Jia Guo , Jeffrey Ng , Andy C.L. Yeung , Janus Jian Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107275","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107275","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We use the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, which mandated that firms disclose the use of conflict minerals in their supply chain, to investigate whether and how conflict minerals disclosure (CMD) impacts the trade credit that a firm receives from its suppliers. Using a large sample of U.S. firms from 2014 to 2016, we find that firms that provide more-specific, rather than less-specific, CMD receive 6.45% more trade credit. This finding is consistent with more-specific CMD enhancing firms’ supply chain visibility, as well as reducing suppliers’ adverse selection concerns about lending to socially irresponsible firms. Consistent with the enhanced supply chain visibility channel, we find that the positive association is more pronounced for firms with more product market competition or financial constraints. In keeping with the reduced adverse selection channel, we find a more pronounced positive association for firms with weaker monitoring by non-supplier stakeholders. Finally, we find that firms with more-specific CMD provide less downstream trade credit, suggesting that the reputational benefit gained from disclosing socially responsible sourcing enables these firms to rely less on trade credit to attract or capture customers. Overall, our paper offers novel insight into how mandated sustainability disclosures, specifically CMD, affect supply chain finance.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"49 ","pages":"Article 107275"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143171549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Options trading and corporate debt structure 期权交易与公司债务结构

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107274

Jie (Jay) Cao , Michael Hertzel , Jie (Jessica) Xu , Xintong (Eunice) Zhan

引用次数: 0

The role of public auditing in delegated governance 公共审计在委托治理中的作用

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107281

Stephan Leixnering , Markus A. Höllerer , Tobias Polzer , Michael Schiffinger

{"title":"The role of public auditing in delegated governance","authors":"Stephan Leixnering , Markus A. Höllerer , Tobias Polzer , Michael Schiffinger","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107281","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107281","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Delegated governance is a defining feature of modern public sectors around the globe. In such settings, a variety of decentralized providers delivers public services while the accountability for service delivery remains with the administration. The management of relationships with providers has thus become a critical administrative task. The central position occupied by public audit institutions in these relationships has so far been poorly understood and largely under-researched. Our work unpacks how administrative units react to audits that identify performance and coordination issues in service delivery. Investigating delegated governance in the City of Vienna, our findings demonstrate that administrative units respond in two ways: by undertaking authoritative measures, and, to a lesser extent, by reaching out for dialogue with providers. We therefore suggest that audits not only strengthen administrative accountability but also improve relationship management in settings of delegated governance, filling the vacuum of control and communication between administrative units and service providers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"49 ","pages":"Article 107281"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143099686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Corrigendum to “Loss aversion and financial reporting: A possible explanation for the prevalence of discontinuities in reported earnings” [J. Account. Public Policy 41(6) (2022) 106992] “损失厌恶与财务报告：报告盈余不连续性普遍存在的可能解释”[J]。帐户。公共政策41(6)(2022)106992]

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107276

Leonidas Enrique de la Rosa, Nikolaj Niebuhr Lambertsen

引用次数: 0

Corporate sustainability reporting 企业可持续发展报告

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107280

Richard Barker

引用次数: 0

Blockchain adoption and corporate financial reporting quality bbb采用与公司财务报告质量

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-11-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107265

Ke Liao , Le Lin , Yukun Sun

{"title":"Blockchain adoption and corporate financial reporting quality","authors":"Ke Liao , Le Lin , Yukun Sun","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107265","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107265","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the impact of blockchain technology on corporate financial reporting quality based on the staggered implementation of blockchain-based e-invoice systems by provincial and municipal governments in China since 2018. Using a difference-in-differences approach with a sample of listed firms in China from 2016 to 2022, we find that the accrual quality and earnings informativeness improve post-adoption. This treatment effect is more pronounced for firms with more complex operations and those located in technologically advanced and market-oriented environments, but is similar across firms with varying earnings management incentives. Blockchain adoption is associated with fewer error-related accounting restatements, but not with non-error-related restatements or corporate tax avoidance. Furthermore, blockchain adoption is associated with increased stock liquidity, improved analyst forecast consensus, and lower cost of equity. Overall, our results suggest that the blockchain adoption improves corporate financial reporting quality by enhancing accounting function efficiency rather than deterring potential manipulations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"49 ","pages":"Article 107265"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142744392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Crowding-out or Calling-out? The influence of mandatory industry-related firm-specific information disclosure on analyst reports 挤出还是叫停？与行业相关的强制性公司特定信息披露对分析师报告的影响

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-11-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107266

Hui Liu , Yaxin Song , Long Zhang , Yuhuan Wang

{"title":"Crowding-out or Calling-out? The influence of mandatory industry-related firm-specific information disclosure on analyst reports","authors":"Hui Liu , Yaxin Song , Long Zhang , Yuhuan Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107266","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107266","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>To improve the information environment, the Chinese stock exchanges issued mandatory industry-related firm-specific information disclosure (<em>IFID</em>) guidelines for various industries in batches from 2013 to 2021. Utilizing the staggered implementation of <em>IFID</em> guidelines, we apply a staggered difference-in-difference method to assess analysts’ reactions to mandatory <em>IFID</em>. Our analysis, which employs text analysis and machine learning techniques, reveals that mandatory <em>IFID</em> stimulates more industry-related firm-specific information in analyst reports, supporting the calling-out effect of <em>IFID</em> on analyst reports. Furthermore, we document that <em>IFID</em> significantly reduces the text similarity of industry-related information across different analyst reports for the same firm, suggesting that analysts engage in more personalized, in-depth industry-related analyses rather than simply replicating the firm’s disclosed information post-<em>IFID</em>. Additionally, <em>IFID</em> prompts analysts to conduct more on-site visits to gather private information and produce more comprehensive industry-related insights. We also explore various factors that may influence the effectiveness of <em>IFID</em> at the industry, firm, and analyst levels. The heterogeneity test results show that the calling-out effect of <em>IFID</em> on analyst reports is strengthened by lower industry competition, better firm transparency, and higher analyst specialization. Overall, our study demonstrates that mandatory <em>IFID</em> in China improves the information environment by directly compelling listed firms to disclose more industry-related operating information and indirectly encouraging analysts to produce more differentiated and insightful analyses.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"49 ","pages":"Article 107266"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142704221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Consolidation in national accounts: Implications for municipal enterprises 国民账户的合并：对市政企业的影响

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107257

Christina Dargenidou , Marta De Vicente-Lama , Beatriz García Osma

引用次数: 0

Attention to corporate disclosure and earnings Management: Evidence from downloads of SEC filings 对公司信息披露和收益管理的关注：从美国证券交易委员会文件下载中获得的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107264

Jiao Jing , Jeffrey Ng

引用次数: 0

Government spending and CEO equity incentives: Evidence from changes in U.S. Senate committee chairs 政府支出与 CEO 股权激励：来自美国参议院委员会主席变动的证据

IF 3.3 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-10-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107263

Xuejun Jiang , Jeong-Bon Kim , Louise Yi Lu , Yangxin Yu

{"title":"Government spending and CEO equity incentives: Evidence from changes in U.S. Senate committee chairs","authors":"Xuejun Jiang , Jeong-Bon Kim , Louise Yi Lu , Yangxin Yu","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107263","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107263","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the impact of government spending on CEO equity incentives. Using changes in U.S. Senate committee chairs as a source of exogenous variation in state-level federal government spending, we find that firms headquartered in a state whose senator becomes a committee chair significantly reduce the convexity of their CEOs’ option-based pay, as captured by portfolio vega. This effect is more pronounced for firms with greater reliance on the government, more geographically concentrated operations, and in states with tighter local labor markets. We further find that in response to a government spending shock, firms actively adjust CEOs’ risk-taking incentives by decreasing CEO vega from annual option grants and decreasing both the number and value of CEOs’ option grants. Additionally, we document a shift in the compensation structure towards increased fixed salary and higher bonus compensation, accompanied by a shorter pay duration. Finally, we show that following the increase in government spending, firms receive more procurement contracts, experience reduced performance volatility, and those providing CEOs with less convex payoffs show lower R&D investment. Overall, our findings suggest that the positive shock to government spending due to a new committee chair reduces a firm’s desired level of risk-taking, which discourages offering risk-taking equity incentives to the CEO.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"48 ","pages":"Article 107263"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142527591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0