投资公司的审计委员会治理实践：它们提供了实质性的监督吗？

IF 3.3 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2025-04-21 DOI:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107319

J. Gregory Jenkins , Jonathan S. Pyzoha , Mark H. Taylor

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引用次数: 0

摘要

为了研究投资公司独特治理环境下的审计委员会治理实践，我们扩展了公司治理理论，并采用双方法、三阶段研究方法收集数据。我们收集了107个投资公司AC成员的调查数据，并对20个参与投资公司治理的个人进行了38次半结构化访谈，其中包括10个AC成员和10个管理层成员。利用调查数据，我们对治理运营质量（构成和尽职）和治理监督质量（对审计流程、投资公司风险和估值问题的了解）的实证分析表明，与代理理论一致，ac发挥了实质性作用，管理层对这些治理领域的质量没有显著影响。此外，AC主席推动治理运行质量，其他AC成员显著影响监督质量。来自半结构化访谈数据的证据为我们的措施提供了进一步的支持证据。

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Audit committee governance practices at investment companies: Do they provide substantive oversight?

To study audit committee (AC) governance practices within investment companies’ unique governance environment, we extend corporate governance theory and collect data using a dual-method, three stage research approach. We collect data from a survey of 107 investment company AC members and 38 semi-structured interviews with 20 individuals involved in investment company governance, consisting of ten AC members and ten members of management. Using the survey data, our empirical analysis of governance operations quality (composition and diligence) and governance oversight quality (knowledge of the audit process, investment company risks, and valuation issues) indicates that, consistent with agency theory, ACs play a substantive role, and that management does not significantly influence the quality of these governance areas. Furthermore, the AC chair drives governance operations quality, and the other AC members significantly influence oversight quality. Evidence from the semi-structured interview data provide further supporting evidence for our measures.

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来源期刊

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Multiple-

CiteScore

4.80

自引率

2.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Accounting and Public Policy publishes research papers focusing on the intersection between accounting and public policy. Preference is given to papers illuminating through theoretical or empirical analysis, the effects of accounting on public policy and vice-versa. Subjects treated in this journal include the interface of accounting with economics, political science, sociology, or law. The Journal includes a section entitled Accounting Letters. This section publishes short research articles that should not exceed approximately 3,000 words. The objective of this section is to facilitate the rapid dissemination of important accounting research. Accordingly, articles submitted to this section will be reviewed within fours weeks of receipt, revisions will be limited to one, and publication will occur within four months of acceptance.