Journal of Accounting and Public Policy最新文献_第5页

Regulatory fragmentation and internal control weaknesses 监管分散和内部控制薄弱

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-02-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107191

Hongkang Xu

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引用次数: 0

Intraday disclosure timing deviations and their implications for financial reporting 盘中披露时间偏差及其对财务报告的影响

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-01-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107177

Jennifer Wu Tucker , Angie Wang

引用次数: 0

Is the mispricing of bank earnings related to financial regulation uncertainty? 银行盈利的错误定价是否与金融监管的不确定性有关？

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-01-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107180

Tuan Ho , Edward Lee , Gerald J. Lobo , Zhenmei Zhu

引用次数: 0

The mandatory audit partner rotation policy and cost of debt 强制性审计合伙人轮换政策和债务成本

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-01-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107182

Yaohua Qin, He Xiao

引用次数: 0

CEO turnovers due to poor industry performances: An examination of the boards’ retention criteria 因行业表现不佳导致的首席执行官更替：对董事会留任标准的研究

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-01-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107178

Lin Li , Peter Lam , Wilson H.S. Tong , Justin Law

引用次数: 0

Media coverage and debt financing choice 媒体报道与债务融资选择

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-01-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107181

C.S. Agnes Cheng , Liangliang Jiang , Wei-Ling Song

引用次数: 0

Minority shareholders and tax avoidance 小股东和避税

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-01-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107179

Antonio De Vito

引用次数: 0

Managerial overconfidence and classification shifting 管理者过度自信与分类转移

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107176

Heeick Choi , Huiqi Gan , SangHyun Suh

{"title":"Managerial overconfidence and classification shifting","authors":"Heeick Choi , Huiqi Gan , SangHyun Suh","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107176","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>This study examines whether overconfident CEOs engage in classification shifting. We find that managerial overconfidence is related to an increase in unexpected core earnings via reclassifying recurring expenses as special items. This finding is robust to controlling for firms’ propensity to engage in accruals management and real earnings management, using a subsample of non-zero income-decreasing special items, employing alternative measures of overconfidence, and controlling for CEO and firm fixed effects. We further find that overconfident CEOs are more likely to engage in classification shifting when the incentives are stronger, i.e., when CEOs want to meet or beat analyst forecasts, when CEOs’ pay is highly sensitive to core earnings, and when CEOs have low managerial ability. Overconfident CEOs are also more likely to engage in classification shifting when there are more opportunities for misconduct, i.e., when financial statement comparability is low and when the CEO can use opportunistic special items to misclassify expenses. Overall, we find that overconfident CEOs are </span><em>intentionally</em>, rather than unintentionally, engaging in classification shifting to boost core earnings.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"43 ","pages":"Article 107176"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139100594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

How do investors perceive corporate general counsel? The role of monitoring and advising demand 投资者如何看待公司总法律顾问？监督和建议需求的作用

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107175

Zhihong Chen , Yun Ke , Ke Wang

引用次数: 0

Local peers and corporate reporting behavior 当地同行和企业报告行为

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2023-12-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107174

Jere R. Francis , Nargess M. Golshan , Inder K. Khurana

{"title":"Local peers and corporate reporting behavior","authors":"Jere R. Francis , Nargess M. Golshan , Inder K. Khurana","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107174","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107174","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We find that firms exhibit greater earnings similarity when compared to industry peers in the same city, as the number of local peers increases. This is due to the potential adverse consequences of underperforming relative to local peers. As the number of local peers increases, there is increased local competition, which creates pressure to perform as well as competitors. Firms respond to this pressure by exhibiting earnings similarity to meet market expectations and to take advantage of external financing and growth opportunities. However, we show that this mimicking behavior creates a false similarity and is achieved by firms reporting higher levels of unexpected accruals. This is consistent with the idea that mimicking allows firms to maintain their relative performance with local rivals. These results continue to hold for a sample of firms that move to a location with a higher number of local peers than their initial location. We also find that firms in cities with more peers have a greater likelihood of earnings misstatements. In cross-sectional analyses, the adverse effect of more local peers on earnings quality is stronger for firms with greater market attention, where external financing dependence is higher, and among firms in locations with more growth opportunities. Overall, our evidence points to geographic proximity as a key mechanism in a firm’s reporting behavior in that firms mimic to produce a false similarity in earnings that is achieved through accruals management.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"43 ","pages":"Article 107174"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139027903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0