Monitoring incentives and tax planning – Evidence from State-Owned enterprises

IF 3.3 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Eva Eberhartinger , David M.P. Samuel
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This study examines the association between state owners’ monitoring incentives and the tax planning activities of state-owned enterprises. We distinguish between state owners that directly benefit from state-owned enterprises’ income tax payments and those that do not. In our empirical tests, we exploit the variation of state ownership in Germany, making our findings generalizable to other market economies. Our results indicate that state ownership is not associated with less tax planning unless the state owner directly benefits from higher tax payments. We also provide evidence that this effect translates to higher tax revenues at the municipality level. Our results are robust to various specifications and suggest that shareholders’ monitoring incentives are a determinant of a firm’s tax planning activities.
监督激励与税收筹划——来自国有企业的证据
本研究考察了国有业主监督激励与国有企业税收筹划活动之间的关系。我们区分了直接受益于国有企业所得税的国有所有者和不直接受益于国有企业所得税的国有所有者。在我们的实证检验中,我们利用了德国国家所有权的变化,使我们的发现可以推广到其他市场经济体。我们的研究结果表明,除非国有所有者直接受益于较高的税收,否则国有所有权与较少的税收筹划无关。我们还提供证据表明,这种影响转化为更高的税收收入在市政一级。我们的结果对各种规格都是稳健的,并表明股东的监督激励是公司税收筹划活动的决定因素。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.80
自引率
2.80%
发文量
75
期刊介绍: The Journal of Accounting and Public Policy publishes research papers focusing on the intersection between accounting and public policy. Preference is given to papers illuminating through theoretical or empirical analysis, the effects of accounting on public policy and vice-versa. Subjects treated in this journal include the interface of accounting with economics, political science, sociology, or law. The Journal includes a section entitled Accounting Letters. This section publishes short research articles that should not exceed approximately 3,000 words. The objective of this section is to facilitate the rapid dissemination of important accounting research. Accordingly, articles submitted to this section will be reviewed within fours weeks of receipt, revisions will be limited to one, and publication will occur within four months of acceptance.
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