Disclosure policy for relative performance indicators under product market competition

IF 2.2 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Jumpei Hamamura
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This study presents an optimal disclosure policy for relative performance indicators (RPIs) in quantity competition with asymmetric marginal costs. Our analysis shows that an asymmetric equilibrium arises under the specific economic environment, where a cost-efficient firm discloses information, while a cost-inefficient firm does not. Additionally, we evaluate the welfare effects of disclosure policies. Consequently, we find that the regulator should enforce non-disclosure for cost-inefficient firms in moderately-sized markets, as their behavior negatively impacts social welfare, even if they disclose the weight.
产品市场竞争下的相关绩效指标披露政策
本文研究了边际成本不对称的数量竞争中相对绩效指标(rpi)的最优披露策略。我们的分析表明,在特定的经济环境下,成本效率高的企业披露信息,而成本效率低的企业不披露信息,会产生不对称均衡。此外,我们评估了披露政策的福利效应。因此,我们发现监管机构应该对中等规模市场中成本效率低下的企业强制执行不披露,因为即使它们披露了权重,它们的行为也会对社会福利产生负面影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.80
自引率
2.80%
发文量
75
期刊介绍: The Journal of Accounting and Public Policy publishes research papers focusing on the intersection between accounting and public policy. Preference is given to papers illuminating through theoretical or empirical analysis, the effects of accounting on public policy and vice-versa. Subjects treated in this journal include the interface of accounting with economics, political science, sociology, or law. The Journal includes a section entitled Accounting Letters. This section publishes short research articles that should not exceed approximately 3,000 words. The objective of this section is to facilitate the rapid dissemination of important accounting research. Accordingly, articles submitted to this section will be reviewed within fours weeks of receipt, revisions will be limited to one, and publication will occur within four months of acceptance.
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