{"title":"Disclosure policy for relative performance indicators under product market competition","authors":"Jumpei Hamamura","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107354","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study presents an optimal disclosure policy for relative performance indicators (RPIs) in quantity competition with asymmetric marginal costs. Our analysis shows that an asymmetric equilibrium arises under the specific economic environment, where a cost-efficient firm discloses information, while a cost-inefficient firm does not. Additionally, we evaluate the welfare effects of disclosure policies. Consequently, we find that the regulator should enforce non-disclosure for cost-inefficient firms in moderately-sized markets, as their behavior negatively impacts social welfare, even if they disclose the weight.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"53 ","pages":"Article 107354"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2000,"publicationDate":"2025-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278425425000730","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This study presents an optimal disclosure policy for relative performance indicators (RPIs) in quantity competition with asymmetric marginal costs. Our analysis shows that an asymmetric equilibrium arises under the specific economic environment, where a cost-efficient firm discloses information, while a cost-inefficient firm does not. Additionally, we evaluate the welfare effects of disclosure policies. Consequently, we find that the regulator should enforce non-disclosure for cost-inefficient firms in moderately-sized markets, as their behavior negatively impacts social welfare, even if they disclose the weight.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Accounting and Public Policy publishes research papers focusing on the intersection between accounting and public policy. Preference is given to papers illuminating through theoretical or empirical analysis, the effects of accounting on public policy and vice-versa. Subjects treated in this journal include the interface of accounting with economics, political science, sociology, or law. The Journal includes a section entitled Accounting Letters. This section publishes short research articles that should not exceed approximately 3,000 words. The objective of this section is to facilitate the rapid dissemination of important accounting research. Accordingly, articles submitted to this section will be reviewed within fours weeks of receipt, revisions will be limited to one, and publication will occur within four months of acceptance.