人力资源高管和CEO薪酬

IF 2.2 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2025-09-10 DOI:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107358

Natalie Kyung Won Kim , Sewon Kwon , Jae Yong Shin

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们以2006年至2017年标准普尔（s&p；P） 1500家公司为样本，研究了高级人力资源高管在CEO薪酬决策中的作用。我们的研究结果表明，任命一名高级人力资源主管与更高的首席执行官薪酬和任命高管中更高的首席执行官薪酬（CPS）有关。我们还调查了年度奖金计划中使用的收入的事后调整，作为人力资源高管影响首席执行官薪酬的渠道。我们的研究结果表明，拥有高级人力资源主管的公司会做出更多这样的调整，并且更倾向于CEO进行向上调整。这些影响在增选的人力资源主管——那些在CEO之后被聘用的人身上尤其明显。总体而言，我们的研究结果与设定CEO薪酬的租金提取观点是一致的。

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Top human resources executives and CEO compensation

We examine the role of top HR executives in CEO compensation decisions using a sample of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 1500 firms from 2006 to 2017. Our findings show that appointing a top HR executive is associated with higher CEO compensation and a higher CEO pay slice (CPS) among named executive officers. We also investigate ex post adjustments to the earnings used in annual bonus plans as a channel through which top HR executives influence CEO compensation. Our findings indicate that firms with a top HR executive make more such adjustments and are more likely to favor the CEO with upward adjustments. These effects are especially pronounced for co-opted HR executives—those hired after the CEO. Overall, our results are consistent with a rent extraction perspective in setting CEO compensation.

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来源期刊

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Multiple-

CiteScore

4.80

自引率

2.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Accounting and Public Policy publishes research papers focusing on the intersection between accounting and public policy. Preference is given to papers illuminating through theoretical or empirical analysis, the effects of accounting on public policy and vice-versa. Subjects treated in this journal include the interface of accounting with economics, political science, sociology, or law. The Journal includes a section entitled Accounting Letters. This section publishes short research articles that should not exceed approximately 3,000 words. The objective of this section is to facilitate the rapid dissemination of important accounting research. Accordingly, articles submitted to this section will be reviewed within fours weeks of receipt, revisions will be limited to one, and publication will occur within four months of acceptance.