Journal of Accounting and Public Policy最新文献_第8页

Political grammars of justification and cost-benefit analysis in SEC rulemaking 证交会规则制定中的正当性政治语法与成本效益分析

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107148

Lisa Baudot , Dana Wallace

{"title":"Political grammars of justification and cost-benefit analysis in SEC rulemaking","authors":"Lisa Baudot , Dana Wallace","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107148","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107148","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We investigate how financial regulators justify rulemaking decisions on socially oriented disclosure rules through evidence-based policymaking (EBPM) mechanisms. To do so, we analyze the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) justifications within the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) it performs when promulgating the conflict minerals disclosure rule mandated by the U.S. Congress. We use a grammatical approach to analyze the SEC’s justificatory discourse wherein a grammar represents implicit rules that actors follow to be recognized as acting appropriately. We find that six key justifications comprise the SEC’s CBA discourse. These justifications reflect public, natural, and realist grammars that connect the SEC’s justifications in a way that aims to legitimize SEC decisions. Specifically, the SEC’s public grammar suggests that the Congressional mandate increases benefits to society and to market participants and increases costs to issuers. The SEC’s discretionary rulemaking, however, reflects a realist grammar that primarily justifies decreased costs to issuers. The SEC’s realist grammar is buffered by a natural grammar in which the SEC supports its justifications by mobilizing constituent comment letters regarding the rule’s costs while paying less attention to evidence consistent with the rule’s benefits. Overall, our evidence indicates regulators employ CBA, a purportedly objective, evidence-based endeavor, to justify tradeoffs between social and financial objectives when regulating social mandates, suggesting the political nature of EBPM mechanisms.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135389957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Partner-Level internal control opinion shopping and its economic consequences: Evidence from “SOX 404” in an emerging market 合伙人层面的内部控制意见购买及其经济后果:来自新兴市场“SOX 404”的证据

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2022.107056

Yingwen Guo , Yingjie Guo , Phyllis Lai Lan Mo , Xu Zhang

{"title":"Partner-Level internal control opinion shopping and its economic consequences: Evidence from “SOX 404” in an emerging market","authors":"Yingwen Guo , Yingjie Guo , Phyllis Lai Lan Mo , Xu Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2022.107056","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2022.107056","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study examines whether firms engage in internal control opinion shopping (ICOS) at audit partner level and its economic consequences. Based on the Chinese setting where the identities of audit partners are publicly disclosed and the requirements for internal control reporting are akin to SOX 404, we do find that firms successfully engage in ICOS at partner level. Furthermore, partner-level ICOS is associated with lower earnings quality and more tunneling activities. However, it seems that investors are not able to perceive the ICOS behavior, as evidenced by the indistinguishable market reactions to earnings announcements between ICOS firms and their counterparts. Moreover, successful partner-level ICOS firms do not remedy their internal control weaknesses in a timely manner and are more likely to receive sanctions from regulators. Further analyses suggest that firms engaged in partner-level ICOS are more likely to be charged with higher audit fees and firms whose CEOs are about to retire in the near future are more likely to conduct ICOS. This study fills the gap in the literature by investigating the outcomes of and market reactions to opinion shopping in the context of internal controls.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42766518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Auditors’ sensitivity to business risk under business risk auditing 商业风险审计中审计师对商业风险的敏感性

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107113

Huihui Shen , Liansheng Wu , Jason Zezhong Xiao

引用次数: 0

Editorial for the special issue on auditing and public policy in China 《中国审计与公共政策》特刊社论

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107154

Bingxuan Lin , Liansheng Wu , Jason Zezhong Xiao

引用次数: 0

Local happiness and corporate financial misconduct: Does happiness reduce organizational opportunistic behavior? 地方幸福感与企业财务不当行为:幸福感会减少组织机会主义行为吗?

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107157

Feiyang Cheng , Jing Liao , Xutang Liu , Ahmet Sensoy , Shouyu Yao

引用次数: 0

Resisting institutionalized corruption: The case of public audit in Nigeria 抵制制度化腐败：尼日利亚公共审计案例

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2022.107052

Zayyad Abdul-Baki , Ahmed Diab , Abdulraheem Olayiwola Kadir

{"title":"Resisting institutionalized corruption: The case of public audit in Nigeria","authors":"Zayyad Abdul-Baki , Ahmed Diab , Abdulraheem Olayiwola Kadir","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2022.107052","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2022.107052","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In a highly corrupt environment such as Nigeria, accounting practices have been permeated by corruption in the wider society. As such, several studies on the relationship between accounting and corruption have unveiled a symbiotic association between accountants and corruption. Contrary to this popular viewpoint, this study shows that there are instances of resistance to corruption by accountants in such environments. This study adopts a multiple case study approach. We used two case studies to demonstrate the consistency of the Auditors-General for the Federation (AuGFs) in resisting institutionalized corruption and one case study to show that AuGFs’ resistance is not commonplace in Nigeria. Data were gathered from interviews, videos, and documents. We found that AuGFs resist corruption through the disclosure of accounting irregularities in their audit reports despite the severe consequences associated with exposing corrupt practices in Nigeria. However, they hide this resistance through a number of strategies to sustain the resistance and avert possible repercussions of corruption disclosure. Prior studies of accounting and corruption in developing countries often find accountants enabling corrupt practices through their silence or through active participation in such practices. However, this study shows how accountants also resist corruption in a highly corrupt developing country, which is rare in the literature.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43366806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

How does establishing a branch office affect audit quality? Evidence from China 设立分支机构如何影响审计质量？来自中国的证据

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2022.107049

Qihui Gong , Huilong Liu , Jing Xie , Lingling Zhang

{"title":"How does establishing a branch office affect audit quality? Evidence from China","authors":"Qihui Gong , Huilong Liu , Jing Xie , Lingling Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2022.107049","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2022.107049","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Establishing a branch office may improve audit quality for an audit firm’s existing clients in the same region as the newly established branch by relieving time and financial resource constraints (i.e., the input channel) and reducing information asymmetry between auditors and clients (i.e., the information channel). Conversely, it may reduce audit quality by undermining audit independence (i.e., the audit independence channel). We test these conjectures using data on Chinese listed firms from 2001 to 2019 and the propensity score matching–difference-in-differences method. Our results show that establishing a branch office improves audit quality, and they remain robust to a series of alternative measures for audit quality. Further analyses indicate that the positive effect of establishing a branch office on audit quality is primarily achieved through the information channel. In addition, we find a knowledge transfer effect from the newly established branch to non-local branches within an audit firm. Moreover, establishing a branch office can benefit both auditors and clients because it leads to the provision of higher quality audit services in less time without audit fee increases compared with the situation without the branch office. Our study contributes to the related literature and is of interest to regulators and practitioners.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49667111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The impact of TCJA on CEO compensation TCJA对CEO薪酬的影响

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107136

LeAnn Luna , Kathleen Schuchard , Danielle Stanley

引用次数: 0

Executive compensation horizon incentives, performance targets, and auditor risk assessment 高管薪酬水平激励、绩效目标和审计师风险评估

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107121

Qiyuan (Rachel) Peng , Padmakumar Sivadasan , Rui-Zhong (R.Z.) Zhang

引用次数: 0

Enforcement and disclosure 强制执行和披露

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107131

Benedikt Franke , Dirk Simons

{"title":"Enforcement and disclosure","authors":"Benedikt Franke , Dirk Simons","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107131","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107131","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Absent sufficient enforcement, disclosure regulations are often seen as inconsequential. However, enforcement could have unintended effects on firms' incentives to disclose information voluntarily. We develop a model to analyze the impact of enforcement on firms' mandatory and voluntary disclosure behavior. The model can accommodate different disclosure and enforcement regimes depending on its parameters, ranging from voluntary disclosure under stochastic information endowment to disclosure under an enforcement regime with punitive damages. In the generalized version, low-value firms disclose under a mandatory disclosure rule, medium-value firms do not disclose (some legally, some illegally), and high-value firms disclose voluntarily. Stronger enforcement does indeed increase the number of firms complying with the regulation. However, it also crowds out voluntary disclosure by making separation less attractive, resulting in a decrease in transparency overall. Nevertheless, stronger enforcement does still lead to positive capital market effects, such as lower mispricing. When we endogenize disclosure regulation, i.e., determine the rule according to firms' preferences, there exists a unique standard where no majority prefers a marginal change to the regulation, and that increases in enforcement.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41915739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0