{"title":"投资者如何看待公司总法律顾问?监督和建议需求的作用","authors":"Zhihong Chen , Yun Ke , Ke Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107175","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We find that firms with a general counsel (GC) in top management (GC firms) have a higher ex-ante cost of equity implied in stock prices and analysts’ earnings forecasts. Lead-lag changes analysis shows that the cost of equity increases after, but not before, the appointment of GCs to top management. Cross-sectional analyses suggest that the cost of equity difference between GC and non-GC firms and the cost of equity increase following the appointment of GCs to top management are more pronounced for firms with greater monitoring demand and less pronounced for firms with greater advising demand. We also observe negative market reactions to proxy statements that reveal the appointment of a GC to top management. Finally, our falsification tests find no evidence that investors react to the addition of Chief Marketing Officers, Chief Operating Officers, or Chief Financial Officers to top management. Overall, our results suggest that investors’ perceptions of including GCs in top management depend on the firm’s demand for monitoring and advising.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"How do investors perceive corporate general counsel? The role of monitoring and advising demand\",\"authors\":\"Zhihong Chen , Yun Ke , Ke Wang\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107175\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>We find that firms with a general counsel (GC) in top management (GC firms) have a higher ex-ante cost of equity implied in stock prices and analysts’ earnings forecasts. Lead-lag changes analysis shows that the cost of equity increases after, but not before, the appointment of GCs to top management. Cross-sectional analyses suggest that the cost of equity difference between GC and non-GC firms and the cost of equity increase following the appointment of GCs to top management are more pronounced for firms with greater monitoring demand and less pronounced for firms with greater advising demand. We also observe negative market reactions to proxy statements that reveal the appointment of a GC to top management. Finally, our falsification tests find no evidence that investors react to the addition of Chief Marketing Officers, Chief Operating Officers, or Chief Financial Officers to top management. Overall, our results suggest that investors’ perceptions of including GCs in top management depend on the firm’s demand for monitoring and advising.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48070,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S027842542300145X\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S027842542300145X","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
How do investors perceive corporate general counsel? The role of monitoring and advising demand
We find that firms with a general counsel (GC) in top management (GC firms) have a higher ex-ante cost of equity implied in stock prices and analysts’ earnings forecasts. Lead-lag changes analysis shows that the cost of equity increases after, but not before, the appointment of GCs to top management. Cross-sectional analyses suggest that the cost of equity difference between GC and non-GC firms and the cost of equity increase following the appointment of GCs to top management are more pronounced for firms with greater monitoring demand and less pronounced for firms with greater advising demand. We also observe negative market reactions to proxy statements that reveal the appointment of a GC to top management. Finally, our falsification tests find no evidence that investors react to the addition of Chief Marketing Officers, Chief Operating Officers, or Chief Financial Officers to top management. Overall, our results suggest that investors’ perceptions of including GCs in top management depend on the firm’s demand for monitoring and advising.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Accounting and Public Policy publishes research papers focusing on the intersection between accounting and public policy. Preference is given to papers illuminating through theoretical or empirical analysis, the effects of accounting on public policy and vice-versa. Subjects treated in this journal include the interface of accounting with economics, political science, sociology, or law. The Journal includes a section entitled Accounting Letters. This section publishes short research articles that should not exceed approximately 3,000 words. The objective of this section is to facilitate the rapid dissemination of important accounting research. Accordingly, articles submitted to this section will be reviewed within fours weeks of receipt, revisions will be limited to one, and publication will occur within four months of acceptance.