{"title":"Correction to “Legislative Hearings and Presidential Cabinet Management”","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/gove.70071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70071","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Lee, D. S. <i>Governance</i>. 2025; 38(3):1–13.</p><p>On page 1, the author's affiliation “Graduate School of Governance and Department of Public Administration, Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul, South Korea” and the contact information “<span>[email protected]</span>” was incorrect. The correct affiliation and contact information should be: “Department of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University, Seoul, South Korea” and “<span>[email protected]</span>”.</p><p>We apologize for this error.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70071","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145316875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Muhammad Nadir Shabbir, Kainat Iftikhar, Duong Thuy Linh
{"title":"Autocracy, Inc.: The Dictators Who Want to Run the World July 23, 2024 By Anne Applebaum, Doubleday, 2024. 224 pp. ISBN: 978-0-385-54993-6","authors":"Muhammad Nadir Shabbir, Kainat Iftikhar, Duong Thuy Linh","doi":"10.1111/gove.70073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70073","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145316874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Representative Bureaucracy Buffering Adverse Policy Climates: Examining Immigrant Families' Participation in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program","authors":"Jiaqi Liang, Sanghee Park, Agustina Laurito","doi":"10.1111/gove.70075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70075","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study explores the role of representative bureaucracy in buffering the impact of adverse policy environments on immigrants' access to public benefits. Specifically, we examine whether and to what extent a more representative government workforce influences immigrant families' participation in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and moderates the impact of unfavorable immigrant policy climates. Analyzing data on 49 states from 2006 to 2016, we find that a government workforce with higher Hispanic and Asian representation within the public welfare area is associated with increased SNAP participation among U.S.-born children with immigrant parents. This link is contingent on states' immigrant policy climates. Higher shares of Hispanic and Asian public administrators are associated with higher SNAP participation in states with a more unwelcoming policy environment. However, there is no similar association between the levels of Black employees and SNAP participation, regardless of the policy climate.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70075","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145316906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Authoritarian Elasticity: How Autocracies May Effectively Mobilize for Crisis Management","authors":"Yuge Wang, Rongbin Han","doi":"10.1111/gove.70074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70074","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Current studies on authoritarian resilience have yet to fully explain how autocracies can effectively cope with crises that threaten regime survival. To fill the gap, we introduce the concept of “authoritarian elasticity” to theorize how an autocracy may dramatically transform, expand, and repurpose its institutions for crisis management, fine-tune its response to crisis development, and scale back mobilization when conditions permit to sustain the crisis management mode for an extended time. We argue, the agile institutional maneuvering capacity, which differs from the long-term institutional adaptability highlighted in the current literature, explains not only how an autocracy can swiftly mobilize its resources during a crisis, but more importantly why such exhaustive mobilization may last longer than one would normally expect. We illustrate our theory empirically by examining how China elastically mobilized its Grid Management System during different phases of the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70074","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145316681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Digitalization and Domestic Revenue Mobilization: Governmental Responsiveness and Capabilities Matter","authors":"Seungho Lee","doi":"10.1111/gove.70076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70076","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Although previous research has highlighted digitalization as a potential avenue for enhancing domestic revenue mobilization—a critical component for the sustainable economic and political development of nations—the relationship between digitalization and domestic revenue mobilization remains underexplored. This paper contributes to the current literature by investigating how the relationship between digitalization and the government's capacity to tax is influenced by governmental responsiveness and capabilities, an element largely disregarded in prior analyses. Empirical results from a time-series cross-sectional dataset that includes up to 159 countries spanning from 2004 to 2021 demonstrate that a high level of digitalization does not automatically result in an increased non-resource tax revenue-to-GDP ratio. However, when digitalization is combined with robust governmental responsiveness and capabilities—specifically regarding Voice and Accountability or Regulatory Quality—it substantially enhances domestic revenue mobilization. This study also reveals that the interaction effects are more pronounced in the low–to–middle segments of digitalization and among low- and middle-income countries. These findings underscore the need to bolster institutional frameworks in conjunction with digitalization endeavors to ensure the sustained success of domestic revenue mobilization.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145272717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Comparing Refugee Dispersal Policies: Varieties of Responsibility-Sharing in Europe","authors":"Walter Bartl, Philipp Lutz","doi":"10.1111/gove.70072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70072","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many European countries are concerned about the asymmetric distribution of refugees within their territory. In response, they have developed policies to spatially disperse asylum seekers. Yet, we lack a comprehensive understanding of such refugee dispersal policies (RDPs). This article fills that gap with two contributions. First, we conceptualize RDPs as systems of subnational responsibility-sharing in asylum governance, defined along five policy attributes and three ideal types. Second, we introduce a novel dataset covering the dispersal policies of 32 European countries and develop an index of policy restrictiveness. We show that dispersal is widespread but varies in formality and design. Most countries adopt a negotiated model combining binding spatial allocation, material incentives, and discretionary dispersal criteria. Restrictiveness is higher in states with high past arrivals and strong local autonomy. Our findings offer new insights into the spatial governance of asylum and the institutional design of responsibility-sharing mechanisms.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70072","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145272267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Historical Persistence of Meritocratic Selection on Citizen Compliance","authors":"Hanchen Jiang, Hongtao Yi, Dongcheng Zhang","doi":"10.1111/gove.70070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70070","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The persistent influence of historical bureaucratic institutions on various contemporary socio-economic outcomes is well documented, yet the extent to which these institutions shape current citizen-state interactions remains underexplored. This study focuses on the persistent effect of a cultural factor shaped by a historical meritocratic institution (ancient China's imperial examination) on citizen compliance with social distancing policies during the first wave of COVID-19 in China. Based on historical archives and digital mobility data, we find that human mobility decreased significantly more in cities with more achievers in the examination after the unexpected lockdown, the Wuhan Lockdown, in China. This effect is implemented through channels of current education level and bureaucracy-oriented value. Further analysis based on survey data shows that this effect is reflected in citizens' obedience to the central government, rather than to local governments. These findings offer a new explanation for the geographic variation in citizen compliance and highlight the persistent positive effect of meritocratic selection on contemporary citizen-government interactions.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145271893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Learning From the Past? EU Industrial Policy Challenges","authors":"Dimitri Zurstrassen","doi":"10.1111/gove.70068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70068","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The European Union's current pursuit of strategic autonomy and technological sovereignty through industrial policy initiatives occurs amid intensifying US-China competition, prompting new policy instruments and rhetoric that many scholars interpret as fundamental transformation in EU economic governance. However, historical analysis reveals striking parallels with the 1970s–1980s, when Europe confronted US technological dominance and Japanese competition. Drawing on historical institutionalist theory, extensive archival research, and seven interviews with key policymakers from the European Commission, this paper demonstrates how four interconnected structural constraints have maintained the EU's decentralized industrial policy governance across both periods. These constraints create what we term the “Competence Paradox”: external competitive pressures simultaneously create functional demands for centralized coordination while activating national sovereignty protection mechanisms that prevent such centralization. This analysis challenges interpretations of strategic autonomy as institutional transformation, revealing instead how external pressures generate innovation through institutional layering rather than governance transformation.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70068","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145271748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When Nature Strikes: Which Regimes Exploit Natural Disasters for Fiscal Expansion?","authors":"Mads Dagnis Jensen, Suen Wang","doi":"10.1111/gove.70060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70060","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study examines how different types of regimes use performance-based legitimation after severe natural disasters. While prior research has evaluated emergency relief, broader fiscal responses remain understudied. Drawing on legitimation theory, we argue that all regimes seek to secure legitimacy, but hybrid regimes are more likely to expand public spending to ensure their political survival. Analyzing data from 166 countries from 1960 to 2018, we find significant post-disaster fiscal expansion in hybrid regimes (particularly those with weaker opposition and higher fiscal capacity), but not democracies or autocracies. We investigate three case studies that largely support these findings: the 1985 Algarrobo earthquake (Chile under autocracy), the 1974 Hurricane Fifi-Orlene (Honduras under a hybrid regime), and the 1999 İzmit earthquake (Turkey during democracy).</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70060","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145224062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Asya Zhelyazkova, Thijs Lindner, Tim Heinkelmann-Wild, Agnieszka Kanas
{"title":"Shifting the Blame or Defending Implementation: How Do Explanations for Compliance Shape the Legitimacy of Contested EU Policies?","authors":"Asya Zhelyazkova, Thijs Lindner, Tim Heinkelmann-Wild, Agnieszka Kanas","doi":"10.1111/gove.70065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70065","url":null,"abstract":"<p>As European Union (EU) policymaking becomes increasingly politicized, national and local authorities face pressure to justify compliance with contested EU rules. This study examines how different explanations for compliance affect citizens' perceptions of legitimacy. We distinguish between blame-shifting and defending strategies communicated by national and municipal authorities. Our expectations and findings challenge the popular view that blaming the EU is the most credible approach. In policy implementation, national governments are often perceived as primarily responsible, making their blame-shifting attempts less persuasive. Instead, we expect and find that defending compliance by claiming responsibility increases perceived legitimacy. Municipal authorities, however, can more credibly deny responsibility for externally mandated policies because of their distance from the EU decision-making process. These results advance research on elite communication and the legitimacy of EU policies, offering new insights into how governments can reconcile public responsiveness with supranational obligations in an era of contested EU governance.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70065","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145224457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}