{"title":"Political Instrumentalism and Epistemic Communities in Global Governance a Network Analysis of the International Organization for Migration","authors":"Corina Lacatus","doi":"10.1111/gove.70002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70002","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Global governance systems, including international organizations (IOs), turn to academic experts to achieve a variety of policy-related outcomes. Existing scholarship offers valuable insights into the two main functions of expertise for international organizations–instrumental and symbolic. I draw on network analysis to propose a third function–political instrumentalism–where IOs use experts' degree of connectedness to other actors to exert influence in politicized areas of policymaking and in domestic contexts in which they are less well-networked. To this end, IOs foster epistemic communities through networks that have the characteristics of small-world and scale-free networks. I illustrate this with a descriptive network analysis of the International Organization for Migration's work in migrant health. Analyzing data from IOM documentation (2016–2022), I find that IOM fosters a complex (small world and scale-free) network through an epistemic community in which academics and researchers hold powerful positions. These positions in the network can help to serve political instrumental purposes to expand IOM's influence and visibility in domestic environments in a highly politicized area of policymaking–migrant health.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143380602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Understanding Micro-Level Budgeting Behavior: How Cognitive Biases Shape Politicians' Budget Preferences","authors":"Tom Overmans, Stephan Grimmelikhuijsen","doi":"10.1111/gove.70004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70004","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Decades of research emphasized collective behaviors in public budgeting, yet individual budget preferences remain underexplored. This paper argues that both well-known and lesser-known cognitive biases distort politicians' budget judgment, resulting in biased preferences. To test this, we conducted five preregistered experiments examining the impact of five biases—anchoring, herding, mental accounting, availability bias, and loss aversion—on budget preferences. Using data from 1825 municipal budgeters in The Netherlands, we reveal significant effects of anchoring, adherence to irrelevant budget labels (mental accounting), and overspending on items that attract media attention (availability bias) or emphasize gains (loss aversion). We also find that presenting decision information through infographics holds potential for improving judgment and mitigating biases in preferences. These findings challenge the view that budgeting is purely political, highlighting the role of cognitive factors in suboptimal budget decisions. We emphasize the need for further research into biases and debiasing mechanisms to advance budget decision-making.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143370095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Patronage at Work: Public Jobs and Political Services in Argentina. By Virginia Oliveros, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. 280 pp. $29.99 (paperback) ISBN: 9781009082525","authors":"Sarah Brierley","doi":"10.1111/gove.70003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143362479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Eva Thomann, Giuliana Ioannidis, Tiziano Zgaga, Frederic Schwarz
{"title":"Explaining Public Sector Corruption: The Hexagon Model","authors":"Eva Thomann, Giuliana Ioannidis, Tiziano Zgaga, Frederic Schwarz","doi":"10.1111/gove.70000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70000","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Different disciplines ask why public sector corruption occurs, addressing diverse phenomena. However, how different approaches and factors at micro, meso, or macro levels relate to each other in causally complex, context-dependent ways is seldom theorized. This article develops an integrated “Corruption Hexagon” model with six dimensions. The analytically relevant context provides a not directly causal background that influences the interplay of the pressure to act corruptly, the opportunity to benefit from corruption, the capability to exploit the opportunity, the supply of corruption, and the rationalization of one's corrupt behavior. Using secondary data from 23 European countries, we operationalize the Hexagon to explain differences in procurement-related corruption risks. Results corroborate the Hexagon's expectations: whereas the circumstances enable corruption, their interplay with personal characteristics or rationalization triggers corruption. The Hexagon offers a flexible, context-dependent, complexity-informed model for cumulative research integrating different methods and theoretical assumptions about the agency underlying corruption.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70000","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143119544","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Political Judgment Above Transparency? Results From a Mixed Method Study About Politicians' Close Cooperation With Interest Organizations","authors":"Joel Martinsson","doi":"10.1111/gove.12912","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12912","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In what ways, if at all, does transparency influence how politicians cooperate with interest organizations? While there are convincing normative arguments stressing the importance of transparency in politics, empirical evidence for how transparency in practice affects how politicians reason regarding cooperating with interest organizations is scarce. In this article, I address this gap by conducting a mixed method survey experiment with 1659 Swedish politicians. The findings indicate that a lack of transparency, as explored in this study, diminishes politicians' willingness to closely cooperate with interest organizations by submitting policy proposals drafted by these organizations. However, the central concern for most politicians, in both the transparent and untransparent conditions, was whether they had exercised independent political judgment rather than blindly accepted the interest organization's suggestion. These results contribute to the literature by showing how a specific form of transparency influences cooperation between politicians and interest groups, while also offering theoretical insights into the critical role of political judgment in this cooperation.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.12912","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143117742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Between Merit and Patronage: Hybrid Appointments of Top Civil Service","authors":"Ari Mamshae","doi":"10.1111/gove.12914","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12914","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This article examines the complex balancing of political loyalty and meritocratic competence in the appointment of top civil servants—a pivotal aspect of public administration that is particularly relevant in developing contexts. Focusing on the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq, this study aims to unravel how merit and patronage converge in the appointment processes of director generals (DGs). To this end, the article develops an analytical framework that conceptualizes “hybrid appointments” as a process in which merit-based and patronage considerations are intricately interwoven. The article uses a mixed-method research design, combining elite interviews with senior politicians and a quantitative analysis of original biographical data on top civil servants. It shows how politicians weigh merit-based qualifications alongside political considerations in the appointment process, rather than substituting loyalty for competence. This finding challenges the traditional dichotomous understanding of merit versus patronage appointments, advancing our understanding of how top civil service appointments function in developing contexts.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143117580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nicole Bolleyer, Adam Eick, Milka Ivanovska Hadjievska, Leonhard Grevesmühl
{"title":"When Do Liberal Governments Restrict Civil Society?","authors":"Nicole Bolleyer, Adam Eick, Milka Ivanovska Hadjievska, Leonhard Grevesmühl","doi":"10.1111/gove.12913","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12913","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Liberal democracies increasingly restrict civil society organizations (CSOs), a trend frequently linked to illiberal governments. But when do ideologically liberal governments resort to such restrictions? Linking research on state traditions, party ideology and crisis governance, we theorize factors enhancing liberal governments' propensity to adopt normatively contentious CSO restrictions. Distinguishing formal-legal restrictions on CSO voice from those on CSO existence, we show that nearly 90 such restrictions were adopted by 17 cabinets in France and the United Kingdom over the last 2 decades. In line with theoretical expectations, restrictions on CSO existence are more prominent in statist France, while governments in the United Kingdom tend to restrict CSO voice. More right-wing governments adopt more CSO restrictions, while restrictions go up with government crisis pressure. Overall, understanding how liberal governments use CSO restrictions requires considering contextual opportunity structures and ideological dispositions in conjunction.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.12913","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143114572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Award citation: The Charles H. Levine Memorial Book Prize, 2024","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/gove.12883","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12883","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143114139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Commodifying Public Utilities: EU's New Governance Prescriptions for Rail and Water","authors":"Darragh Golden, Imre Szabó, Roland Erne","doi":"10.1111/gove.12909","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12909","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the mid-2000s, the Single Market Program and European Monetary Union lost momentum, as public services advocates increasingly succeeded in tempering attempts to liberalize public utilities through legislative amendments and Court of Justice rulings. After the 2008 crisis, however, the EU's shift to a new economic governance (NEG) regime provided EU executives with a new tool to advance their objectives. Unlike EU directives, <i>country-specific</i> NEG prescriptions require neither the approval of the European Parliament nor their transposition into law, making it more difficult for social forces to contest them. Our analysis of NEG prescriptions for public utilities in two sectors (rail and water) and four countries (Germany, Ireland, Italy, Romania) across 10 years (2009–2019) shows that the shift to NEG provided EU executives with new extra-parliamentarian and extra-juridical tools that allowed them to revive their stalled commodification agenda; at the price of accentuating the EU's democratic and justice deficits.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.12909","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143114140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Symphony of Evolution: Unraveling Infrastructure Public–Private Partnerships Collaboration Networks Through Participant Characteristics","authors":"Guangdong Wu, Kejia Zhou, Zhibin Hu, Ge Wang, Bingsheng Liu, Wei Zhang","doi":"10.1111/gove.12911","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12911","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Using collaborative governance theory and stochastic actor-oriented models (SAOMs), this study examines the co-evolution of networks and participant characteristics in 1505 infrastructure PPP projects involving 3225 participants across 35 large and medium-sized Chinese cities. The results show that collaborative networks are highly structured and exhibit small-world characteristics. Furthermore, in the evolving landscape of China's PPPs, the collaboration network has shifted into three governance patterns: government-SOEs (State-owned enterprises) driven, SOEs-consulting driven, and SOEs dominant. In addition, results reveal that network evolution is promoted by transitive triads, the similarity of organizational size, and geographic proximity, while it is hindered by outdegree, similarities of organizational age and type. The findings provide insights for partner selection and the involvement of governments in public service delivery and the development of governance strategies.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142851510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}