Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions最新文献

From the Administrative Presidency to Personalist Consolidation: Trumpism and Executive Control of the Regulatory State 从行政总统到个人巩固：特朗普主义与监管国家的行政控制

IF 3.1 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-04-08 DOI: 10.1111/gove.70127

William G. Resh

{"title":"From the Administrative Presidency to Personalist Consolidation: Trumpism and Executive Control of the Regulatory State","authors":"William G. Resh","doi":"10.1111/gove.70127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70127","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This essay investigates the evolving relationship between Trumpism and the United States regulatory state, focusing on how Donald Trump has reshaped American administrative governance to one of personalist consolidation. Drawing on scholarship of the administrative presidency, I argue that Trumpism represents a strategic fusion of structural deregulation in sectors like environmental protection, energy, and finance with robust state intervention in domains tied to a right-wing populist definition of national sovereignty. Trumpism reflects a personalist style of governance rooted in the exploitation of institutional tools of the administrative presidency that have developed across both Democratic and Republican administrations over the past century. By situating Trump within the broader institutional evolution of executive power, I highlight how his manipulation of the regulatory state entrenches executive dominance and preserves an illiberal reform in governance through electoral legitimation paired with the erosion of liberal-democratic accountability standards in administration.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147715126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

When the Regulatory State Meets Populism: Regulatory Agencies in Mexico 当监管国家遇到民粹主义：墨西哥的监管机构

IF 3.1 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-04-07 DOI: 10.1111/gove.70118

Mauricio I. Dussauge-Laguna, Martin Lodge, Daniel Daza-Vázquez

{"title":"When the Regulatory State Meets Populism: Regulatory Agencies in Mexico","authors":"Mauricio I. Dussauge-Laguna, Martin Lodge, Daniel Daza-Vázquez","doi":"10.1111/gove.70118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70118","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper focuses on two questions: what kind of strategies of de-institutionalization of the regulatory state have been chosen, and to what extent can they be linked to an explicit ‘populist’ agenda guided by a ‘will of the people’- based justification that cuts across different regulatory domains? Applied to the case of Mexico, this article looks at how a populist President (Andrés Manuel López Obrador, or AMLO), within one single period in office (from 2018 to 2024), sought to de-institutionalize regulatory agencies that were said to have been institutionally embedded. Mexico offers an important case for the study of populist leadership. López Obrador has been portrayed as a populist leader because of his repeated claims to be speaking ‘in the name of the people’. However, this particular Presidency has not been associated with the typical ‘right-wing’ authoritarianism (e.g., Brazil's Bolsonaro). Nevertheless, during his presidential term, regulatory agencies were exposed to a range of pressures, ranging from ‘de-delegation’, ‘de-legitimization’, and ‘termination’. This article focuses on eight domains (representing the total universe of domains in which regulatory agencies were prominent). The analysis is based on a variety of sources including documentary analysis of government announcements, media coverage, and statutory changes as well as semi-structured interviews. Our comparative approach is aimed at exploring general populist policymaking patterns in a national case, while seeking to better understand specific variation across policy sectors, as well as institutional agency designs. This piece adds to the literature on regulatory institutions in an era of populist times by setting ‘de-delegation’ strategies in the wider theoretical context of institutional de-legitimization. In particular, it highlights the limited institutional ‘hard-wiring’ of regulatory arrangements.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70118","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147715070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Competition Law and Varieties of Capitalism in the Long Run: The Evolution of Institutional Complementarity, 1890–2010 竞争法与长期资本主义的多样性：制度互补性的演变，1890-2010

IF 3.1 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-04-05 DOI: 10.1111/gove.70128

Chase Foster, Sebastian Kohl

{"title":"Competition Law and Varieties of Capitalism in the Long Run: The Evolution of Institutional Complementarity, 1890–2010","authors":"Chase Foster, Sebastian Kohl","doi":"10.1111/gove.70128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70128","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Competition law has played a central role in shaping different models of industrial capitalism. Drawing on new competition law indicators spanning 1890–2010, this article examines how competition law has evolved alongside capitalist systems and identifies enduring institutional complementarities between legal regimes and political economies. While competition law has become more stringent in most jurisdictions, the evolution of formal rules and enforcement practices varies systematically across capitalist models. Liberal market economies (LMEs) enforce cartel rules more strictly and are more tolerant of monopoly. Coordinated market economies (CMEs), by contrast, are more permissive of interfirm cooperation and impose stricter constraints on dominant firms. These differences are associated with measures of corporatism, suggesting institutional complementarity between competition regimes and producer group coordination. Overall, the findings show that competition law operates not only as a liberalizing instrument, but also as a key institutional site through which capitalist diversity is reinforced amid long-term institutional change.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70128","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147714991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Tracing the Trends of Governance in Governance From 1988 to 2023: Achievements and Future Prospects 《从1988年到2023年的治理：成就与未来展望

IF 3.1 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-03-28 DOI: 10.1111/gove.70125

Kyungdong Kim, Min Han Kim, Brainard Guy Peters

{"title":"Tracing the Trends of Governance in Governance From 1988 to 2023: Achievements and Future Prospects","authors":"Kyungdong Kim, Min Han Kim, Brainard Guy Peters","doi":"10.1111/gove.70125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70125","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study employs both quantitative topic modeling using BERTopic and qualitative thematic analysis to investigate how themes in <i>Governance</i> evolved between 1990 and 2023. During that time <i>Governance</i> has become a leading journal in public administration and public governance, and understanding how those fields of scholarship appear in the journal can say a good deal about the development of those fields. <i>Governance</i> has both reflected and influenced changes in public administration by theoretically and empirically exploring executive politics along with administrative reforms and regulatory governance as well as democratic mechanisms. The analysis reveals four main conceptual dimensions, which are Structure, Mechanisms, Process, and Democracy, as each dimension represents separate yet interconnected academic discourses. These developments together demonstrate a larger intellectual movement in public administration which moves away from structural determinism to embrace detailed analyses of governance procedures and democratic practices while responding to global issues like populism and democratic decline. This research delivers a historical and intellectual evaluation of governance studies as it appears in a major journal, while delineating trajectories that will guide future research agendas in governance, public administration and policy.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147585119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Responsive to What? Explaining the Information Quality of Public Comments on Bureaucratic Policymaking Using a Text-as-Data Approach 对什么有反应？用文本即数据的方法解释官僚决策公众评论的信息质量

IF 3.1 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-03-26 DOI: 10.1111/gove.70122

Adriana Bunea, Sergiu Lipcean, Christian Rauh

{"title":"Responsive to What? Explaining the Information Quality of Public Comments on Bureaucratic Policymaking Using a Text-as-Data Approach","authors":"Adriana Bunea, Sergiu Lipcean, Christian Rauh","doi":"10.1111/gove.70122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70122","url":null,"abstract":"<p>What drives the quality of information that public comments on bureaucratic policymaking provide? We address this question along a text-as-data approach, develop and validate four measures capturing the multidimensional concept of information quality, and apply it to an original dataset covering more than 20,000 public comments across 1036 policy acts issued by the European Commission between 2016 and 2021. We argue that the interplay of information demand and supply and institutional factors matter in particular for varying information quality of public comments. Our results show only mixed evidence regarding the claim that high-quality comments are more likely during the policy formulation stage. Counterintuitively, we find that more informationally dense and syntactically complex EC policy documents generate public comments of higher quality. Regarding policy areas, information quality is unrelated to the age of European policy while more technical fields receive public comments of lower quality on average. Based on developing and validating an innovative empirical strategy, we thus provide novel insights into how the design of public commenting procedures and crafting of policy acts shape the information quality provided through public consultations.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70122","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147615014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A Certain Set of Skills? Pre-Appointment Careers of Danish Ministerial Advisors 有一套特定的技能？丹麦部长级顾问的任命前职业

IF 3.1 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-03-22 DOI: 10.1111/gove.70126

Harald Brønd

{"title":"A Certain Set of Skills? Pre-Appointment Careers of Danish Ministerial Advisors","authors":"Harald Brønd","doi":"10.1111/gove.70126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70126","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Ministerial advisors are politically appointed civil servants who serve at the intersection of politics and public administration. Drawing on the Public Service Bargain (PSB) framework, this article argues that the competencies associated with ministerial advisors reflect a dynamic bargain shaped by broader transformations in the political environment. Using a novel dataset covering the pre-appointment careers of 178 Danish advisors (2001–2024) and applying sequence analysis, the study identifies seven distinct career pathways and traces how their prevalence changes over time. Across all cohorts, ministers consistently recruit advisors with partisan experience, reflecting persistent demand for political-tactical competencies. Over time, journalist backgrounds decline while policy-professional backgrounds, drawn from interest groups, public affairs firms, unions, and private companies, increase. These findings suggest a shift in the competency bargain from media handling toward strategic political coordination within an increasingly professionalized landscape of political influence.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70126","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147567919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Challenging Conventional Wisdom on Administrative Capacity With Open Data: Could ‘Administrative Throughput’ Be the Missing Link Between Administrative Inputs and Outputs? 用开放数据挑战关于行政能力的传统观念：“行政吞吐量”能否成为行政投入与产出之间缺失的一环？

IF 3.1 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-03-19 DOI: 10.1111/gove.70117

Ugo Fratesi, Felipe Livert, Laura Polverari, Cristina Zerbinati

{"title":"Challenging Conventional Wisdom on Administrative Capacity With Open Data: Could ‘Administrative Throughput’ Be the Missing Link Between Administrative Inputs and Outputs?","authors":"Ugo Fratesi, Felipe Livert, Laura Polverari, Cristina Zerbinati","doi":"10.1111/gove.70117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70117","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Despite the popularity of the concept, the measurement and the conceptualization of administrative capacity remain ambiguous, based on proxies, and overlook the local level. Conceptualization is weakened by the conflation of exogenous variables. Quantitative and qualitative perspectives are rarely reconciled, leading to fragmentation and to an overestimation of the effect of administrative capacity on policy performance. We tackle these shortcomings through the elaboration of novel indicators derived from open project data to build new measures of administrative capacity at the municipal level. In so doing, we first demonstrate the feasibility and value of open-data-based indicators to generate much-needed local data on administrative capacity. Further, we show that municipalities with similar resources can exhibit significantly different performance, challenging established assumptions of linearity between inputs and outputs in administrative performance. Finally, we introduce the concept of ‘administrative throughput’ as a possible explanation for the mismatch between administrative inputs and outputs, and provide a first theorization of this concept to allow for a more nuanced understanding of administrative capacity and open new avenues for public administration theory, research and practice.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70117","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147567121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Beyond Democratic Backsliding: Bureaucracy, Elite Dynamics and Administrative Change in Authoritarian Transitions 超越民主倒退：威权转型中的官僚主义、精英动力和行政变革

IF 3.1 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-03-15 DOI: 10.1111/gove.70124

Kutsal Yesilkagit, Johan Christensen

{"title":"Beyond Democratic Backsliding: Bureaucracy, Elite Dynamics and Administrative Change in Authoritarian Transitions","authors":"Kutsal Yesilkagit, Johan Christensen","doi":"10.1111/gove.70124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70124","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines how political and administrative elites shape regime transformations under authoritarian rule, proposing an elite-centered analytical perspective that complements prevailing accounts of “democratic backsliding.” We show how embedding political–administrative relations within a broader elite-theoretical framework clarifies the mechanisms through which elite reconfiguration underwrites institutional erosion. Drawing on classical and contemporary elite theory, we argue that shifts in elite coalitions among politicians, bureaucrats, and economic actors drive regime changes more than institutional erosion or ideological movements. Through comparative historical analysis of interwar Italy and Germany, we illustrate distinct elite-driven pathways to authoritarian consolidation: Mussolini's Italy involved strategic alliances with traditional elites, while Hitler's Germany pursued radical elite replacement. Our findings highlight the critical role of elite realignments in transforming institutions and economic policies, often maintaining a façade of electoral legitimacy. This elite-theoretical approach offers nuanced insights into contemporary shifts toward autocratic governance, emphasizing the importance of analyzing elite networks and interactions to comprehend the deeper mechanics of political transformation. Our findings thus contribute to public administration scholarship by theorizing how elite realignments transform bureaucratic structures and alter the nature of political-administrative relationships under authoritarian conditions.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70124","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147566155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Feeding the Coalition: How Presidents Use State Banks to Buy Legislative Support for Governability 喂养联盟：总统如何利用国有银行购买立法支持治理

IF 3.1 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-03-11 DOI: 10.1111/gove.70119

Rodrigo B. DeMello, Carlos Pereira

{"title":"Feeding the Coalition: How Presidents Use State Banks to Buy Legislative Support for Governability","authors":"Rodrigo B. DeMello, Carlos Pereira","doi":"10.1111/gove.70119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70119","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper develops and tests a theory of how presidents use government agencies to manage legislative coalitions in multiparty presidential systems. We argue that agency decisions—particularly subsidized credit from state-owned development banks—function as retail coalition goods that sustain legislative support. Legislators are more likely to back the president when agency resources benefit subnational politicians who are both partisan allies and vital to their reelection networks. Using a regression discontinuity design based on close mayoral elections in Brazil and loan-level data from the National Development Bank (BNDES), we find that municipalities governed by coalition-aligned mayors receive significantly more favorable loan terms. Linking these data to roll-call votes, we show that legislators become more supportive of the president after loans are granted in their electoral strongholds managed by co-partisan mayors. These findings reveal how distributive agency decisions translate into legislative support, integrating bureaucratic discretion into theories of coalition management.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147565002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

AI Innovations in Public Services: The Case of National Libraries. By Ines Mergel and Carsten Schmidt (eds.), Cham: Springer, 2026. 222 pp. Open Access (ebook) 公共服务中的人工智能创新：以国家图书馆为例。作者：伊内斯·梅格尔和卡斯滕·施密特（编著），Cham: bb10,2026。222页，开放获取（电子书）

IF 3.1 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-03-06 DOI: 10.1111/gove.70121

Salman Bin Habib

引用次数: 0