Fabrizio Di Mascio, Giulio Francisci, Martino Maggetti, Alessandro Natalini
{"title":"Regulatory Agencies Under Mutating Populism in Office: Insights From Italy (1990–2025)","authors":"Fabrizio Di Mascio, Giulio Francisci, Martino Maggetti, Alessandro Natalini","doi":"10.1111/gove.70156","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70156","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Our paper builds a bridge between the emerging strand of research on public administration under populist rule and the established literature on delegation to independent regulatory authorities (IRAs). We focus on Italy, a critical case in Western Europe, which between 2001 and 2025 experienced six coalition governments dominated or strongly influenced by populist parties of different ideological orientations. Findings highlight that delegation to IRAs is remarkably resilient once institutionalized, even under sustained political contestation. Despite repeated populist participation in government since the early 2000s, Italian IRAs have not been subject to systematic de-delegation or statutory retrenchment. However, the preservation of formal independence has not implied the absence of means for political control. Our analysis shows that populist governments have systematically relied on political appointments. Interestingly, political appointments have not been driven by partisan loyalty or overt politicization. Instead, the intervention of populist parties has operated along a different dimension of political control that has received less attention in delegation theory: the specialization of appointees. Populist governments have displayed a preference for appointing IRAs' board members with lower levels of domain-specific specialization, privileging generalist profiles over specialists.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70156","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149206137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rethinking Multilevel Governance. By Arthur Benz. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2024. 208 pp. ISBN: 978-1-03-530628-2","authors":"Miguel Matos Torres","doi":"10.1111/gove.70158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70158","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149205676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Taming the Careerists: The Politics of Foreign Policy Implementation. By Minju Kim, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2026. 224 pp. $100 (hardback); $33 (ebook). ISBN: 9781009789721","authors":"Youngjoon Lee","doi":"10.1111/gove.70155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70155","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.0,"publicationDate":"2026-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149048290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Digital Co-Production of Public Services: Citizens, Challenges and Cases. By Taco Brandsen, Ina Radtke, A. Paula Rodriguez Müller, and Trui Steen (Eds.), Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2026. 204 pp. Open Access (ebook)","authors":"Syed Zain Abbas","doi":"10.1111/gove.70153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70153","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.0,"publicationDate":"2026-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148994560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dead Ends and Policy Change in Chinese Experimental Governance","authors":"Vincent Brussee","doi":"10.1111/gove.70154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70154","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Not all policy change is expansive, yet non-expansive trajectories remain underexamined. This article introduces the concept of dead ends: a stage of the policy process in which initiatives cease to develop or be implemented in their existing form, structuring subsequent policy change such as rollback, redirection, or termination. To examine such trajectories, the article combines large-scale analysis of 27,103 policy experiments announced in the People's Republic of China between 2013 and 2018 with qualitative case studies. The findings suggest that a substantial majority—up to 90%—of experiments reach dead ends. These dead ends are associated with leadership turnover, policy complexity, and misalignment with bureaucratic incentives and socio-economic conditions. Altogether, the article provides new frameworks for understanding alternative directions of policy change. In doing so, it also sheds new light on the adaptive capacity and structural constraints of China's governance system.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.0,"publicationDate":"2026-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70154","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148942506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why Some Critical Junctures Lead Nowhere: Exploring Dynamic and Static Policy Paths","authors":"Katrine Skagen","doi":"10.1111/gove.70152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70152","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Some critical junctures fail to cause significant change in practice. Inspired by historical institutionalism, this article develops the concept of dynamic and static policy paths to explain why some critical junctures do not lead to change, while others do. Combining insights from policy process literature and policy implementation, it conceptualizes critical junctures through four elements: framing, targets, instruments, and actors/institutions. Based on two case studies, the article argues that the importance of framing and targets has been overexaggerated, and that a dynamic path will not occur unless there is also a significant change in instruments and actors/institutions. In Denmark, a climate policy agreement created a new policy direction for agriculture in which climate policy is a key component. In Norway, a climate policy agreement did not change the trajectory of sectoral policy and climate policy development has remained stagnant. Thus, differences in the critical junctures led to different policy paths.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.0,"publicationDate":"2026-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70152","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148943731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Social Norms, State Punishment, and Motivation Crowding in Anti-Corruption Messaging: Experimental Evidence From China","authors":"Feng Yang, Lin Zhu","doi":"10.1111/gove.70151","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70151","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>A growing body of scholarship views corruption not merely as a failure of monitoring and enforcement but as a resilient informal institution sustained by social perceptions—and misperceptions. When citizens believe others tolerate or engage in corruption, resisting it becomes a collective action problem, allowing corruption to perpetuate itself. Using a large-scale survey experiment in China, this study tests whether correcting exaggerated perceptions of social tolerance for corruption can help break this cycle. We find that providing information about the actual (low) level of tolerance significantly strengthens anti-corruption attitudes and intentions, especially among those who mistakenly believed a majority tolerated corruption. However, this effect is weakened when paired with punishment cues, suggesting that enforcement information can crowd out the motivational force of norm-based messages. Our findings demonstrate both the potential and the limits of norm-based informational interventions and offer implications for anti-corruption messaging in comparable contexts.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.0,"publicationDate":"2026-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148943530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Three Configurations of In-House Government Consulting: Public-Value Purpose and Organizational Viability","authors":"Sean Safford","doi":"10.1111/gove.70150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70150","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Governments have created in-house consulting organizations to reduce dependence on external firms and retain public capability and control. Yet organizations grouped under this label pursue different forms of public value that require different designs. This article distinguishes three reasons for a dedicated unit: retaining control over consequential work, capturing returns from problems that recur across government, and mobilizing expertise dispersed across public and adjacent institutions. It develops three corresponding configurations—Strategic Transformation, Scalable Solutions, and Expertise Platform—and shows how choices about work, staffing, knowledge, authority, client relationships, financing, and evaluation must fit together. Documentary comparison of eight units in five countries grounds the analysis. The cases show that viability depends on whether work renews the conditions needed for subsequent work and that evaluation must reflect configuration and stage. Internalization is therefore organization-building, not the reversal of a procurement decision: a unit creates public value only when work reproduces the conditions on which that value depends.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.0,"publicationDate":"2026-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70150","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148784937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Bureaucratic Paradox of Citizen Agency: Institutional Crowding-Out in Government-Catalyzed Co-Production in Shanghai, China","authors":"Huanming Wang, Xiaoyun Sun, Bing Ran","doi":"10.1111/gove.70149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70149","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Public service co-production is often framed as a means of creating public value, yet its dynamics are complex when citizen-led participation is catalyzed by strong public institutions. This mixed-methods study examines government-catalyzed, citizen-centric co-production in Shanghai, China, where the state provides institutional support, policy legitimacy, and infrastructure while citizens undertake much of the work of deliberation, coordination, and implementation. Drawing on 246 interviews and survey data from 1476 residents involved in community new infrastructure projects, we examine how citizen trust, public-service-oriented motivation, and perceived co-production efficacy are associated with process and outcome value creation, and how perceived institutional settings condition these relationships. The findings show that citizen cognitive factors are positively associated with value creation, while stronger perceived institutional settings can negatively moderate these relationships. Recursive qualitative analysis suggests two mechanisms that help interpret this pattern: formal rigidity may crowd out citizen agency in the co-production process, while informal social density may generate lock-in effects that weaken the translation of trust into substantive outcomes. The study contributes to co-production and institutional theory by specifying the boundary conditions under which institutional support becomes over-institutionalization. Effective co-production requires not less government, but strong enabling support at the initiation stage combined with greater local discretion, participatory rule revision, and flexible enforcement.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.0,"publicationDate":"2026-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70149","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148753068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Senior Bureaucrats, Coalitions and the Quality of Government: Accounting for Effective Governance in Fragmented Settings","authors":"André Borges, Arnaldo Mauerberg Jr.","doi":"10.1111/gove.70148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70148","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Debates over the consequences of party and cabinet fragmentation for government performance remain unsettled. While some scholars argue that coalition governments foster instability and rent-seeking, others contend that they enhance accountability and inclusion. This article argues that the effects of cabinet fragmentation depend on the rules of recruitment and promotion of the senior civil service. Using data from the Quality of Government Expert Survey covering 89 democracies, we examine how fragmentation interacts with both bureaucratic politicization and bureaucratic career systems. The results show that fragmentation amplifies the negative effects of politicized senior appointments, although we find limited evidence that fragmentation itself reduces the quality of government under high politicization. By contrast, fragmented cabinets are associated with more effective governance in the presence of career-based structures characterized by internal recruitment of senior bureaucrats and long-term careers. The findings highlight the importance of bureaucratic career structures for effective governance in multiparty systems.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.0,"publicationDate":"2026-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70148","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148647640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}