Donato Di Carlo, Lorenzo Moretti, Manuela Moschella
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What's in a Polity? Political Institutions and Varieties of Economic Interventionism in the United States and the European Union
This article examines the political foundations of industrial policy amid the return of state economic interventionism. Comparing the United States' Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the European Union's Green Deal Industrial Plan (GDIP), it shows that contrasting industrial policy strategies were ultimately shaped by differences in the two polities' legislative rules. In both cases, geopolitical pressures sparked renewed interest in green industrial policymaking. However, procedural mechanisms for majoritarian decision-making in the U.S. Senate enabled the government to overcome partisan veto players and compelled the design of the IRA as a budgetary instrument centered on fiscal subsidies. By contrast, unanimity requirements in the EU's joint decision-making system prevented the Commission from overcoming Member State veto players in the Council, precluding supranational fiscal instruments and resulting in a regulation-based, decentralized approach via national state aid. The findings contribute to the burgeoning debates on the return of industrial policy and state activism by showing how political institutions contribute to shaping not only the scope but also the form of economic interventionism within different polities.
期刊介绍:
Governance provides a forum for the theoretical and practical discussion of executive politics, public policy, administration, and the organization of the state. Published in association with International Political Science Association''s Research Committee on the Structure & Organization of Government (SOG), it emphasizes peer-reviewed articles that take an international or comparative approach to public policy and administration. All papers, regardless of empirical focus, should have wider theoretical, comparative, or practical significance.