When Nature Strikes: Which Regimes Exploit Natural Disasters for Fiscal Expansion?

Abstract

This study examines how different types of regimes use performance-based legitimation after severe natural disasters. While prior research has evaluated emergency relief, broader fiscal responses remain understudied. Drawing on legitimation theory, we argue that all regimes seek to secure legitimacy, but hybrid regimes are more likely to expand public spending to ensure their political survival. Analyzing data from 166 countries from 1960 to 2018, we find significant post-disaster fiscal expansion in hybrid regimes (particularly those with weaker opposition and higher fiscal capacity), but not democracies or autocracies. We investigate three case studies that largely support these findings: the 1985 Algarrobo earthquake (Chile under autocracy), the 1974 Hurricane Fifi-Orlene (Honduras under a hybrid regime), and the 1999 İzmit earthquake (Turkey during democracy).