Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions最新文献_第2页

Legislative Pork-Barrel Funding and Public Policy Outcomes: The Role of Local-Level Factors 立法拨款与公共政策成果：地方层面因素的作用

IF 4 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-07-29 DOI: 10.1111/gove.70145

Luna Viana, Alketa Peci

{"title":"Legislative Pork-Barrel Funding and Public Policy Outcomes: The Role of Local-Level Factors","authors":"Luna Viana, Alketa Peci","doi":"10.1111/gove.70145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70145","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The growing legislative influence over budget allocations through pork-barrel funding raises concerns that this type of distributive policy may undermine effectiveness. We examine Brazil's mandatory pork-barrel system to assess whether funding availability affects health outcomes and how local conditions shape these effects. We focus on municipalities' abilities to attract resources (“funding concentration”) and their autonomy over investment decisions (“funding flexibility”), with expectations conditioned by administrative capacity. Using panel data on 4114 Brazilian municipalities (2015–2021) and controlling for endogeneity and selection bias, we find that pork-barrel funding is associated with higher short-term rates of preventable hospitalizations. These effects dissipate over time but reveal how political-electoral dynamics shape implementation. Such dynamics undermine the expected benefits of administrative capacity, suggesting that political oversight patterns condition policy outcomes. Evidence on funding concentration indicates that, in contexts of politically allocated funding, administrative capacity may facilitate the rapid execution of concentrated, electoral-driven allocations, which can amplify inefficiencies. These findings highlight the importance of aligning legislative budget governance with local administrative capacity to mitigate the risks of funding fragmentation and ensure more effective governance of distributive policies.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.0,"publicationDate":"2026-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148616610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Human Capital for the Knowledge Economy: Upskill Journeys in Advanced Capitalist Democracies. By Niccolò Durazzi, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2026 £84.00 (hardback); £58.99 (ebook) 知识经济的人力资本：先进资本主义民主国家的技能提升之旅。Niccolò Durazzi著，牛津：牛津大学出版社，2026年，84.00英镑（精装本）；£58.99(电子书)

IF 4 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-07-28 DOI: 10.1111/gove.70147

Igor Guardiancich

引用次数: 0

Mapping Institutional Hybridity and State Capacity in Polycentric Governance: Modes of Coordination and Performance in Polycentric Governance: Disentangling Complexity. By Andreas Thiel, Elizabeth Baldwin, Mark Stephan, and Sergio Villamayor-Tomas (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2025. 206 pp 映射多中心治理中的制度混杂性和国家能力：多中心治理中的协调与绩效模式：解开复杂性。作者：安德烈亚斯·蒂尔、伊丽莎白·鲍德温、马克·斯蒂芬和塞尔吉奥·维拉马约-托马斯（编），牛津大学出版社，2025年。206页

IF 4 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-07-24 DOI: 10.1111/gove.70146

Jichuan Sheng

引用次数: 0

Breaking Out of Low-Effort Traps: Bureaucratic Leadership by Persuasion 突破低努力陷阱：说服式的官僚领导

IF 4 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-07-19 DOI: 10.1111/gove.70139

Martin Haus

引用次数: 0

Subnational Resilience During Crisis: How Brazilian Municipalities Responded to COVID-19 and Public Health Budget Cuts 危机期间的国家以下韧性：巴西市政当局如何应对COVID-19和公共卫生预算削减

IF 4 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-07-16 DOI: 10.1111/gove.70144

Michael Touchton, Natasha Borges Sugiyama, Brian Wampler

{"title":"Subnational Resilience During Crisis: How Brazilian Municipalities Responded to COVID-19 and Public Health Budget Cuts","authors":"Michael Touchton, Natasha Borges Sugiyama, Brian Wampler","doi":"10.1111/gove.70144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70144","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Concern over democratic resilience has grown in recent years, as observers identify threats including populist leadership, weak institutions, flawed elections, rising inequality, and polarization. Yet many democracies appear more resilient than anticipated. In the face of dual crises—a severe pandemic and austerity-driven budget cuts—how might democratic regimes promote human development and high living standards? We answer this question by examining the extent to which subnational democracy provides insulation from national crises, drawing on Brazilian municipal responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and sharp cuts to public health funding. We pose two competing hypotheses: <i>Deterioration</i>—that the pandemic and budget austerity are associated with inferior social outcomes (e.g., rising infant and maternal mortality); and <i>Resilience</i>—that robust local democratic institutions and municipal state capacity would be associated with superior social outcomes during the crises. Through a unique dataset covering Brazil’s 5570 municipalities from 2006—2022, we find evidence of subnational democratic governance generating resilient health outcomes in crisis periods as well as in normal times. Municipalities with three democratic pathways—institutionalized participatory governance, citizenship-enhancing social programs, and rights-based state capacity—sustain better performance in infant and maternal health outcomes. These results show that the long, slow construction of subnational democratic institutions can support lower mortality rates and more resilient social performance during periods of national crisis.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.0,"publicationDate":"2026-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148533813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Institutional Backsliding Under Liberal Democratic Backsliding: Central Bank Independence Reversal in Türkiye 自由民主倒退下的制度倒退：日本央行独立性的逆转

IF 4 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-07-10 DOI: 10.1111/gove.70141

Caner Bakir

{"title":"Institutional Backsliding Under Liberal Democratic Backsliding: Central Bank Independence Reversal in Türkiye","authors":"Caner Bakir","doi":"10.1111/gove.70141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70141","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Despite the importance of research strands in identifying the micro-mechanisms underpinning illiberal governance and democratic backsliding under populist or patrimonial rule in both liberal and illiberal democracies, the implications of <i>populist-patrimonial interventions</i> by strong political leaders aiming for <i>institutional backsliding</i> have not been studied in detail. Drawing on a within-case temporal comparison of erosion of central bank independence in Turkiye under the prolonged rule of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, this article focuses on the backsliding of legal-rational institutional logic (e.g., loyalty to legal and professional rules and practices such as impersonality, neutrality, professionalism, and meritocracy) that informs political leader and bureaucrat interactions and their replacement with patrimonial institutional logic (e.g., absolute personal loyalty to a leader). It argues that the disruptive (defensive) institutional work of populist-patrimonial strongman (insiders) is most likely to be effective in achieving institutional backsliding (maintenance) in public administration when the political regime structure, its main institutions, and agential-level factors motivate and empower his prolonged, consistent, and persistent disruptive (defensive) institutional work.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.0,"publicationDate":"2026-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70141","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148466746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Informational Crowding-Out? Targeted Transparency, Environmental Nonprofits, and Public Concern in China 信息排挤?中国的目标透明度、环境非营利组织与公众关注

IF 4 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-07-04 DOI: 10.1111/gove.70142

Liuqing Ren, Renhe Wang

{"title":"Informational Crowding-Out? Targeted Transparency, Environmental Nonprofits, and Public Concern in China","authors":"Liuqing Ren, Renhe Wang","doi":"10.1111/gove.70142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70142","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Transparency is often assumed to strengthen accountability by reducing information asymmetries between governments and citizens. Yet when transparency is designed primarily for hierarchical monitoring rather than societal oversight, its broader societal effects remain unclear. This study examines how a state-led targeted transparency reform and the organizational strength of environmental civil society jointly shape public concern about pollution in China. Exploiting the staggered rollout of the National Air Quality Monitoring Stations and drawing on a unique panel dataset on environmental nonprofits and public concern from 2011 to 2019, we find that targeted transparency significantly increases public concern about air pollution, and that cities with stronger environmental civil society also exhibit higher levels of concern. However, the two effects are not additive: once the state becomes the dominant provider of credible pollution information, the marginal effect of environmental nonprofits declines. The findings suggest that transparency can heighten public attention while narrowing the informational role of nonprofit organizations. More broadly, the study shows that targeted transparency can reshape the distribution of informational authority between the state and civil society.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.0,"publicationDate":"2026-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148386708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Regulatory Governance in the Era of Populist Ascendancy: A Tug-of-War Between Independent Public Authorities and Central Government in Greece 民粹主义优势时代的监管治理：希腊独立公共当局与中央政府之间的拉锯战

IF 4 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-07-02 DOI: 10.1111/gove.70143

Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos

{"title":"Regulatory Governance in the Era of Populist Ascendancy: A Tug-of-War Between Independent Public Authorities and Central Government in Greece","authors":"Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos","doi":"10.1111/gove.70143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70143","url":null,"abstract":"<p>While independent public authorities in Greece have mushroomed over time, they have to an extent been unable to fulfill their mission, owing to a context of acute political party polarization and political distrust in which these authorities operate. Governments have initially tended to support the establishment of independent authorities, but later to disapprove of their initiatives. Relations between the authorities and the government have evolved in different time periods before and particularly after the Greek economic crisis, notably during the pro-austerity coalition governments of 2010–2014, the populist coalition government of 2015–2019 and the single-party center-right government in power since 2019. A tension between acknowledging the role of independent authorities and keeping authorities at bay marked these periods. The tension was caused by populist distrust of independent authorities, but also by the distrust of non-populist governments toward independent authorities as well as the tendency of a few independent authorities to play the role of opposition in lieu of an effective parliamentary opposition to government. In Greece the relations between governments and independent authorities have become a never-ending tug-of-war, showing the limits of trying to fix ailing democracies through the establishment of non-majoritarian institutions.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.0,"publicationDate":"2026-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70143","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148386234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

When Compromise Becomes Standoff: Joint Implementation and the Case of the European Public Prosecutor's Office 当妥协变成僵局：联合执行和欧洲检察官办公室的案例

IF 4 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-06-25 DOI: 10.1111/gove.70138

Adina Akbik, Ana Bobic, Christian Freudlsperger, Marta Migliorati

{"title":"When Compromise Becomes Standoff: Joint Implementation and the Case of the European Public Prosecutor's Office","authors":"Adina Akbik, Ana Bobic, Christian Freudlsperger, Marta Migliorati","doi":"10.1111/gove.70138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70138","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article explores endogenous problems of joint implementation in multi-level systems. Focusing on the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO), we theorize a causal mechanism of conflict deferral, whereby contentious negotiations are resolved through deliberately ambiguous legislation that postpones conflict to the implementation stage. Under conditions of joint implementation, where multiple authorities exercise interdependent enforcement powers, such ambiguity produces standoffs: situations of overlapping and incompatible jurisdictional claims over the same implementing action. Empirically, we apply theory-testing process tracing to two conflicts involving the EPPO: vertical conflicts over competence between EU and national authorities, and horizontal conflicts in cross-border investigations. Drawing on official documents, case law, and interviews, we show how legislative compromises locked in unresolved conflicts that systematically resurfaced during implementation. The article advances research on joint implementation by specifying the micro-mechanisms linking legislative conflict to implementation dysfunctions and by conceptualizing standoff as a distinct implementation outcome in multi-level governance.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.0,"publicationDate":"2026-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70138","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148324373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Safety Tether: How China Manages Civil Society Through Lawfare 安全系绳：中国如何通过法律手段管理公民社会

IF 4 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-06-19 DOI: 10.1111/gove.70137

Timothy Hildebrandt, Blake Miller

引用次数: 0