Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions最新文献_第3页

How Centralization Benefits Public Provision and Local Political Trust: The Case of Taiwan 中央集权如何促进公共供给与地方政治信任：以台湾为例

IF 4 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-06-19 DOI: 10.1111/gove.70140

Matthew Yi-Hsiu Lee

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引用次数: 0

When Bureaucrats Deviate: Mission Motivation, Autonomy, and Policy Implementation in Thai District Governance 当官僚偏离：泰国地方治理的使命动机、自治与政策执行

IF 3.1 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-06-02 DOI: 10.1111/gove.70136

Dan Honig, Eleanor F. Woodhouse

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引用次数: 0

Do Medical Health Ministers Make Different Health System Choices? 医疗卫生部长会做出不同的卫生系统选择吗？

IF 3.1 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-05-29 DOI: 10.1111/gove.70135

Marcello Antonini, Joan Costa-Font, Nicolas Marchi, Debra Winberg

{"title":"Do Medical Health Ministers Make Different Health System Choices?","authors":"Marcello Antonini, Joan Costa-Font, Nicolas Marchi, Debra Winberg","doi":"10.1111/gove.70135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70135","url":null,"abstract":"Healthcare decision-making is a highly specialized domain of government, particularly at the central or federal level, which may partly explain why medical professionals are sometimes appointed to ministerial roles within government cabinets. However, does a minister with medical expertise in healthcare make a difference in the outcomes and outputs of a health system? We examine original data on the medical doctor (MD) backgrounds of health ministers in Western countries to disentangle these effects. Drawing on longitudinal evidence from a long panel of OECD countries over 21 years, and a differences in differences design we find that, although MD ministers do not increase overall healthcare spending, they do engage in some level of strategic budget reallocation by spending 11%–14% more on preventative care such as vaccines, irrespective of political leanings, though results are weaker under coalition governments. Notably, we find some evidence that MD ministers reduce overall mortality and increase the density of physicians in European Union (EU) countries and nurses in small countries.","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2026-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70135","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148166937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

IF 3.1 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-05-19

引用次数: 0

IF 3.1 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-05-04

引用次数: 0

IF 3.1 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-04-29

引用次数: 0

IF 3.1 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-04-29

引用次数: 0

IF 3.1 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-04-24

引用次数: 0

IF 3.1 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-04-17

引用次数: 0

IF 3.1 3区管理学

Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2026-04-16

引用次数: 0