{"title":"Award citation: The Charles H. Levine Memorial Book Prize, 2024","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/gove.12883","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12883","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143114139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Commodifying Public Utilities: EU's New Governance Prescriptions for Rail and Water","authors":"Darragh Golden, Imre Szabó, Roland Erne","doi":"10.1111/gove.12909","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12909","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the mid-2000s, the Single Market Program and European Monetary Union lost momentum, as public services advocates increasingly succeeded in tempering attempts to liberalize public utilities through legislative amendments and Court of Justice rulings. After the 2008 crisis, however, the EU's shift to a new economic governance (NEG) regime provided EU executives with a new tool to advance their objectives. Unlike EU directives, <i>country-specific</i> NEG prescriptions require neither the approval of the European Parliament nor their transposition into law, making it more difficult for social forces to contest them. Our analysis of NEG prescriptions for public utilities in two sectors (rail and water) and four countries (Germany, Ireland, Italy, Romania) across 10 years (2009–2019) shows that the shift to NEG provided EU executives with new extra-parliamentarian and extra-juridical tools that allowed them to revive their stalled commodification agenda; at the price of accentuating the EU's democratic and justice deficits.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.12909","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143114140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Symphony of Evolution: Unraveling Infrastructure Public–Private Partnerships Collaboration Networks Through Participant Characteristics","authors":"Guangdong Wu, Kejia Zhou, Zhibin Hu, Ge Wang, Bingsheng Liu, Wei Zhang","doi":"10.1111/gove.12911","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12911","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Using collaborative governance theory and stochastic actor-oriented models (SAOMs), this study examines the co-evolution of networks and participant characteristics in 1505 infrastructure PPP projects involving 3225 participants across 35 large and medium-sized Chinese cities. The results show that collaborative networks are highly structured and exhibit small-world characteristics. Furthermore, in the evolving landscape of China's PPPs, the collaboration network has shifted into three governance patterns: government-SOEs (State-owned enterprises) driven, SOEs-consulting driven, and SOEs dominant. In addition, results reveal that network evolution is promoted by transitive triads, the similarity of organizational size, and geographic proximity, while it is hindered by outdegree, similarities of organizational age and type. The findings provide insights for partner selection and the involvement of governments in public service delivery and the development of governance strategies.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142851510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Venue-Making","authors":"Christian Breunig, K. Jonathan Klüser","doi":"10.1111/gove.12910","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12910","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Venue-making describes the process of turning political issues into political institutions. Both public policy and institutionalist scholars have addressed the puzzle of when and how new political institutions arise. We draw on both perspectives, arguing that the interaction between interest groups and government ultimately determines whether an issue remains within the existing institutional setting or if a new venue is made. A repeated stag hunt game illuminates the challenges of this interaction: interest groups and government need to coordinate the move from an old to a new venue by amplifying the issue and creating new institutional structures simultaneously. Because the switch from subsystem politics to venue-making is rewarding but also risky, several mechanisms, including signaling, sustained interaction, and inspection, encourage cooperation. Our research design provides an analysis of three case studies in a fixed institutional context of unified Germany. A first case process-traces how political issues about digitalization emerged and became institutionalized. A second, off-path case shows the short-lived attempt to centralize administrative competences in the domain of energy policy underscores the crucial role of interest groups. The third case explains the ultimately futile attempt to create a new Ministry of Immigration.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143362564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Howard H. Wang, Edmund W. Cheng, Xi Chen, Hai Liang
{"title":"How institutionalized feedback works: Online citizen complaints and local government responsiveness in China","authors":"Howard H. Wang, Edmund W. Cheng, Xi Chen, Hai Liang","doi":"10.1111/gove.12907","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12907","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The prevailing view that authoritarian regimes primarily respond to threats of instability is challenged by our research, which posits that such regimes also take citizen complaints seriously, even when they do not pose a direct threat. Based on 238,835 citizen claims from China's largest national online petition platform from 2020 to 2021 and 793,119 citizen claims from Wuhan's local petition website, this study reveals that online complaints result in greater governmental responsiveness, compared to non-complaints. This institutionalized feedback mechanism is driven by a mix of factors: the upper-level officials' expectation for negative feedback, combined with bureaucrats' efforts to preserve themselves and avoid punitive consequences. Our findings thus enhance the understanding of what drives authoritarian responsiveness and signal a caution that an overreliance on managing complaints may deepen a stability-maintenance mechanism, potentially impeding substantial reform.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.12907","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143423658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Projects, government, and public policy. By Stanisław Gasik, New York: CRC Press. 2023. pp. 377. £42.39. ISBN: 9781003321606","authors":"Sinta Novia, Rayson Virtuosi, Winata Masniari Samosir, Fatchul Chobir","doi":"10.1111/gove.12904","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12904","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143424266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gabriela Spanghero Lotta, Barbara Piotrowska, Nadine Raaphorst
{"title":"Introduction “street-level bureaucracy, populism, and democratic backsliding”","authors":"Gabriela Spanghero Lotta, Barbara Piotrowska, Nadine Raaphorst","doi":"10.1111/gove.12906","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12906","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This special issue investigates the impact of populism and democratic backsliding on street-level bureaucracy (SLB) across various countries and contexts. The cooccurrence of populism and democratic erosion significantly alters public administration, particularly affecting public sector employees responsible for policy implementation. This issue explores how populist strategies differ in their application to SLBs as compared to the Civil Service, the distinctive challenges SLBs encounter due to populism and democratic backsliding, and the pressures exacerbated during crises. By examining studies from Brazil, Mexico, Poland, Czechia, Hungary, Switzerland, and the United States, the papers highlight the interplay between political pressures and frontline service delivery. The findings underscore the necessity of understanding the relationship between democratic backsliding, populism, and SLBs, proposing a research agenda to further explore these dynamics and their implications for public administration and policy implementation.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"37 S1","pages":"5-19"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142561692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cross-domain policy feedback effects on mass publics","authors":"Peijie Wang, Youlang Zhang","doi":"10.1111/gove.12905","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12905","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Scholars have extensively explored policy feedback effects on mass publics. However, research exploring how one policy's implementation affects public preferences for another remains limited. This study proposes a novel cross-domain policy feedback framework, emphasizing functional and normative interdependence as two mechanisms yielding cross-domain resource and interpretive effects. We use multiple sets of nationally representative survey data and archival records from China, a context deeply rooted in filial piety culture. We employ a fuzzy regression discontinuity design and multilevel regressions to explore the effects of the one-child policy on public preferences for old-age support. The findings indicate that individuals subjected to more stringent enforcement exhibit increased support for the government assuming the responsibility for old-age support. These changes largely stem from the reduction in their actual and desired number of children. The findings have significant implications for mass feedback research and reform efforts regarding population planning and public pension systems.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143423904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Lobbying global venues: Sitting in or speaking out?","authors":"Elise Antoine","doi":"10.1111/gove.12903","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12903","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Understanding interest groups' participation in global policy processes is critical not least because of an increasing shift in policy-making powers to global institutions. This paper contributes to existing research by examining advocacy efforts at the global level and proposing a novel argument linking the degree of policy complexity and the amount of groups' resources to lobbying strategies. Specifically, it argues that interest groups invest in both inside (“sitting in”) and outside (“speaking up”) lobbying strategies when the policy at stake is complex and they have more resources. This theory is tested using extensive and novel data spanning interest groups' lobbying efforts on global Internet privacy regulation.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.12903","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143423715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Steven J. Balla, Andrew Wan, Zhoudan Xie, Yat To Yeung, Geng Zhai
{"title":"Notice the comment? Chinese government responsiveness to public participation in the policymaking process","authors":"Steven J. Balla, Andrew Wan, Zhoudan Xie, Yat To Yeung, Geng Zhai","doi":"10.1111/gove.12901","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12901","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate government responsiveness in the notice and comment process, a prominent instrument of consultative authoritarianism through which policy is made in contemporary China. We conduct an extensive data collection effort, assembling draft policies, public comments, and government responses for more than one thousand instances of notice and comment policymaking over a 17-year period. Our statistical analysis demonstrates both the promise and limitations of consultative authoritarianism in the context of the notice and comment process. Government responsiveness in salient policy areas and to lengthy and critical comments demonstrates that public scrutiny matters to policymakers. These patterns are consistent with the notion that autocrats seek to remain in power not only through repression but also by bolstering exchanges of information between state and society. Central government ministries, however, are relatively unresponsive, indicating that significant aspects of policymaking are not characterized by robust attention to public sentiment and information.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"38 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143423714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}