European union funding of interest groups: Reassessing the balancing function and the promotion of good organizational practices

Abstract

The question of the legitimacy of government funding of interest groups as a democratic practice has been extensively discussed by scholars. On the one hand, research suggests that well‐resourced interest groups are better equipped to capture European Union (EU) funds, raising some questions regarding the elitist character of the EU system of interest representation. On the other hand, EU funds have been found to address imbalances in the system of interest representation by directing funding streams toward underrepresented citizen groups. The present study contributes to this open discussion, by 1) analyzing to which extent findings from previous studies can be replicated with a more nuanced research design and by employing the largest existing dataset on interest groups and EU funding, and by 2) testing new hypotheses inspired by an alternative theoretical focus to mainstream approaches: associative democracy. To do so, we use data from the Comparative Interest Group Survey, a dataset of almost 2500 organizations across eight EU countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Portugal, Slovenia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Poland) and at the EU level. Our results offer two main contributions. By replicating recent studies, our findings nuance conclusions drawn this far regarding existing biases in the EU system of interest representation: it is true that rich and experienced interest groups are more likely to obtain EU funding. However, EU funding is also more likely to be allocated to NGOs, especially when they operate in business‐dominated policy areas. Moreover, we find that EU funds are not as concentrated in EU‐15 member states as previously thought. Finally, inspired by associative democracy, we show that EU funding is more often allocated where good practices are in place. These include membership representation as core function and membership influence over internal decision‐making processes.