Does political corruption reduce pro-social behavior by bureaucrats? Lab experimental evidence from Bangladesh

Abstract

Numerous studies assess how politicians control and shape bureaucracy. Yet, how politicians' behavior affects the norms and behaviors of bureaucrats through role modeling has not been studied. This is a curious omission, in light of evidence that social norms shape bureaucratic behavior. Through a lab experiment with over 900 bureaucrats in Bangladesh, we explore whether political corruption affects bureaucrats' pro-social behavior and whether this effect is particularly pronounced for corruption of the current government, as a particularly relevant social norm referent. Using a political corruption prime, we present evidence that those bureaucrats who recall episodes of the current government's political corruption when prompted to think about political corruption donate significantly lower real monetary amounts to charity. By contrast, we do not find clear effects of political corruption by other actors. Our findings underscore the importance of political leaders as role models for bureaucrats and the damage that political corruption may inflict on pro-social behavior in bureaucracies.