{"title":"Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Assessing the Democratic Accountability of Europe's New Industrial Policy","authors":"Sebastian Diessner, Christy A. Petit","doi":"10.1111/gove.70081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70081","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article asks “who controls the controllers” now that the European Commission—long responsible for controlling the conduct of industrial policy in the EU's internal market—increasingly pursues its own industrial policy objectives. We draw on delegation theory to establish why the Commission should be held accountable for its industrial policy-making and, based on a distinction between procedural and substantive accountability, develop a simple typology of accountability outcomes that helps us distinguish between full accountability, partial accountability, and unaccountability in the realm of industrial policy. To assess empirically whether and how the Commission has been held accountable in its pursuit of industrial policy, we leverage a new dataset that tracks Commission follow-ups—both in writing and in terms of policy actions—to 432 points raised in own-initiative reports by the European Parliament's Committee on Industry, Research and Energy between 2019 and 2024. Our analysis suggests that the Commission has been far more responsive in “words” than in “actions”, which carries implications for our understanding of executive-legislative relations and democratic accountability not only in industrial policy but also in other EU policy domains.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70081","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145572095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Regulatory Means for Interventionist Ends: GBER and the Transformation of the EU State Aid Regime","authors":"Fabio Bulfone, Donato Di Carlo, Timo Seidl","doi":"10.1111/gove.70084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70084","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Despite its new-found penchant for market interventionism, the European Union (EU) is often portrayed as lacking the fiscal and administrative capacity to conduct industrial policy. The EU can regulate markets, the conventional wisdom goes, but not steer them in specific directions. In this article, we challenge the notion that regulation and industrial policy are inherently antithetical, arguing instead that the Commission uses its regulatory authority over state aid to indirectly steer member states' industrial policies. We theorize and empirically investigate this <i>rules-as-tools</i> approach to industrial policy through an in-depth, multi-method case study on the transformation of the EU's state aid regime, with a focus on the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER). Combining original interviews, topic modeling, document analysis, and descriptive statistics, we demonstrate that the Commission has long used state aid regulation not only to restrict but also redirect state aid. Increasingly, it employs these rules to encourage selective interventions in the economy—particularly those supporting the twin transitions of digitalization and decarbonization.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70084","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145580747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Award Citation: The Charles H. Levine Memorial Book Prize, 2025","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/gove.70083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70083","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145522135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Social Consequence of Bureaucratic Oversight: Evidence From the Great Chinese Famine","authors":"Ning He","doi":"10.1111/gove.70079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70079","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Existing literature shows that increasing political oversight of bureaucrats can improve the quality of government service delivery. Yet when the state is mainly concerned with maximizing revenue extraction from society, increasing bureaucratic oversight may result in social loss. I illustrate this argument with evidence from the Great Chinese Famine, drawing on panel data covering over 2000 counties. I show that weather shocks, which increased central-local information asymmetry on local grain production, reduced the central state's capability to effectively monitor local bureaucrats' effort in grain extraction. This informational barrier to oversight led to greater local autonomy in setting grain extraction quotas. During the famine, this autonomy allowed county officials to relax the execution of excessive grain extraction targets from above, thereby reducing the mortality costs of the state's grain extraction policy. This finding highlights the perils of bureaucratic control in authoritarian states.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70079","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145521819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Amalie Trangbæk, Erik-Jan van Dorp, Heidi Houlberg Salomonsen, Paul ’t Hart
{"title":"Unwritten Rules of the Game in the Danish and Dutch Core Executives","authors":"Amalie Trangbæk, Erik-Jan van Dorp, Heidi Houlberg Salomonsen, Paul ’t Hart","doi":"10.1111/gove.70082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70082","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>What allows ministers and senior civil servants to survive, or even thrive, in their political-administrative contexts? Based upon a multi-sited ethnography, this article identifies the unwritten “rules of the game” among elite political and administrative actors in the Danish and Dutch core executives and analyzes their beliefs about how to survive and thrive at the apex of executive government. The analysis is grounded in core executive research and seeks to advance our understanding of the beliefs and practices that shape the behavior of government elites. Our decentered approach to qualitative inquiry allows us to identify a high degree of overlap between how Danish and Dutch core executive actors understand the unwritten rules of the systems they inhabit. This suggests that despite formal structural differences between core executive systems, they perhaps differ significantly less in practice, as the beliefs and behaviors of ministers and senior public servants are more alike than classic accounts would suggest.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145521599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Maya Chanel Nuñez, Cameron Arnzen, Hannah Rosenstein, Jonathan Collins, Susan Moffitt
{"title":"Administrative Designs and Access to Political Arenas in Public Education","authors":"Maya Chanel Nuñez, Cameron Arnzen, Hannah Rosenstein, Jonathan Collins, Susan Moffitt","doi":"10.1111/gove.70086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70086","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>What administrative and political features render spaces of political action publicly accessible? Drawing on Schattschneider's core elements of visibility and scope, we offer a framework to identify administrative features that are crucial to democratic accessibility and apply this framework to American public school board meetings. We analyze online access to school board meeting information through original data retrieved from more than 11,000 U.S. school districts. We find that the availability of information about school board meetings systematically varies across districts' administrative, geographic, and political attributes. Through comparative case studies of four school districts from 2019 to 2022, our analysis identifies ways administrative procedures further shape venue access and how group mobilization can facilitate greater access in the context of onerous administrative procedures. Our results elucidate how public access to policymaking venues depends on governmental and group investments: both state and civil society contribute to a venue's democracy.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145469948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reputational Management in Advisory Agencies: The Case of the STOA Unit","authors":"Valentina Amuso","doi":"10.1111/gove.70051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70051","url":null,"abstract":"<p>While research has examined how reputation shapes regulatory agencies' behavior, comparatively less attention has been paid to advisory bodies. Yet, these entities engage in forms of indirect regulation that illuminate key modalities of the EU regulatory state. In particular, advisory bodies engaging in technology assessment and anticipatory governance can play a significant part in shaping nascent policymakers' preferences by highlighting the potential impacts of emerging technologies and innovation. Consequently, effective reputation management is critical to these agencies' influence. We begin to explore those considerations by examining the Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA) Unit at the European Parliament. Our findings suggest that the STOA Unit prioritizes reputation types that showcase its competence. Heightened reputational threats are met with a stronger focus on performative reputation and lower emphasis on regulatory stringency for the policy options considered. This last point highlights how agencies' assessments of external threats and domain can influence their approach to reputation management.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70051","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145469698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Government Officials' Perceptions of Legitimate Governance Arrangements—Does a Representative Orientation Matter?","authors":"Stefan Sjöblom","doi":"10.1111/gove.70080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70080","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Government officials are key actors in managing processes of institutional design and reorganization in increasingly emergent and diversified public structures. This study expands on a framework for assessing the predictive strength of key legitimacy dimensions on officials' governance preferences. The framework is applied to officials' preferences for third-party and collaborative governance arrangements. The study is based on data from a for-purpose designed survey conducted among Finnish top-level government officials. The findings show that officials' governance preferences are strongly contingent on their perceptions of political rules as well as procedural norms pertinent to the representative structures they serve. The article thus contributes to the field of governance research with a focus on the interface between representative government and governance structures. Furthermore, the applied legitimacy framework proved fruitful for addressing the problem of indeterminacy that characterizes many legitimacy concepts. The approach has considerable comparative potentials for predicting governance preferences but also effects of legitimacy perceptions in a wider sense.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70080","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145469631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Navigating the Accountability Paradoxes of Financial Resource Abundance in the Post-Pandemic Public Service Delivery","authors":"Deborah Agostino","doi":"10.1111/gove.70078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70078","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper investigates the accountability paradoxes that emerge when public administrations operate under conditions of financial resource abundance and explores how these paradoxes are managed in practice. Focusing on Italian universities in the wake of Next Generation EU (NGEU) funding, the study applies paradox theory to reconceptualize accountability as a dynamic, processual, and relational phenomenon. The findings reveal that rather than reducing complexity, financial abundance amplifies and transforms accountability pressures into persistent, multidimensional paradoxes. Through qualitative analysis, three core accountability paradoxes are identified, along with the coping strategies universities use to navigate them. The results show that accountability paradoxes are never solved, but they require a dynamic adaptation and negotiation among competing demands. The study advances the literature on public sector accountability by highlighting the challenges and opportunities of public service delivery in resource-rich environments.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70078","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145469517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Fabrizio Di Mascio, Giuseppe Lucio Gaeta, Marzia Ippolito, Vivian Spyropoulou
{"title":"Populism and the Strength of Freedom of Information Laws: Insights From European Countries (2000–2022)","authors":"Fabrizio Di Mascio, Giuseppe Lucio Gaeta, Marzia Ippolito, Vivian Spyropoulou","doi":"10.1111/gove.70069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70069","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper investigates whether populist parties serve as a corrective to democratic deficiencies by enhancing access to information, or if they represent a threat to transparency, thereby undermining democratic accountability. The research employs a dual-method approach that combines quantitative and qualitative analyses. The quantitative analysis draws on a novel dataset measuring the strength of Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation across 11 European countries from 2000 to 2022. To deepen these findings, the study incorporates an in-depth qualitative analysis of Hungary—a country characterized by the dominant position in government of a right-wing populist party. Results reveal that the effect of populist parties on access to information is contingent upon their degree of access to government power and their ideological orientation.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gove.70069","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145384980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}