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Quality discrimination in healthcare markets 医疗市场的质量歧视
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2023-12-20 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12572
Rosa-Branca Esteves, Ziad Ghandour, Odd Rune Straume
{"title":"Quality discrimination in healthcare markets","authors":"Rosa-Branca Esteves, Ziad Ghandour, Odd Rune Straume","doi":"10.1111/jems.12572","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12572","url":null,"abstract":"Recent advances in healthcare information technologies allow healthcare providers to more accurately track patient characteristics and predict the future treatment costs of previously treated patients, which increases the scope for providers to quality discriminate across different patient types. We theoretically analyze the potential implications of such quality discrimination in a duopoly setting with profit-maximizing hospitals, fixed prices, and heterogeneous patients. Our analysis shows that the ability to quality discriminate tends to intensify competition and lead to higher quality provision, which benefits patients but makes the hospitals less profitable. Nevertheless, the effect on social welfare is a priori ambiguous, since quality discrimination also leads to an inefficient allocation of patients across hospitals.","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138825567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The rise of empirical online platform research in the new millennium 新千年实证在线平台研究的兴起
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2023-12-18 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12571
Hsing Kenneth Cheng, D. Daniel Sokol, Xinyu Zang
{"title":"The rise of empirical online platform research in the new millennium","authors":"Hsing Kenneth Cheng,&nbsp;D. Daniel Sokol,&nbsp;Xinyu Zang","doi":"10.1111/jems.12571","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12571","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Online platforms have emerged as a dominant business model in numerous industries in the new millennium. In light of the substantial and burgeoning body of empirical platform research, this article synthesizes extant studies and identifies the evolution of underlying research methodologies and topics. Building upon a database of 860 empirical online platform papers in premier journals during the first two decades of the new millennium, this article presents a categorization framework based on the online platform type (including search platforms, e-commerce platforms, online communities, and mobile platforms) and research perspective (including platform participants, platform orchestrators, and platform ecosystems). We provide a critical review of noteworthy trends and highlight directions for future research in each category of the proposed framework. A comprehensive bibliometric analysis is then conducted to visualize and track scholarship in empirical online platform research. Lastly, we adopt an interdisciplinary lens to synthesize our critical review of empirical online platform research into lessons and research opportunities that emerge from multiple disciplines.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"33 2","pages":"416-451"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12571","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138825565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Free riding, democracy, and sacrifice in the workplace: Evidence from a real-effort experiment 工作场所的免费搭车、民主和牺牲：来自实际努力实验的证据
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2023-12-11 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12570
Kenju Kamei, Katy Tabero
{"title":"Free riding, democracy, and sacrifice in the workplace: Evidence from a real-effort experiment","authors":"Kenju Kamei, Katy Tabero","doi":"10.1111/jems.12570","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12570","url":null,"abstract":"Teams are increasingly popular decision-making and work units in firms. This paper uses a novel real-effort experiment to show that (a) some teams in the workplace reduce their members' private benefits to achieve a group optimum in a social dilemma and (b) such endogenous choices by themselves enhance their work productivity (per-work-time production)—a phenomenon called the “dividend of democracy.” In the experiment, worker subjects are randomly assigned to a team of three, and they then jointly solve a collaborative real-effort task under a revenue-sharing rule in their group with two other teams, while each individual worker can privately and independently shirk by playing a Tetris game. Strikingly, teams exhibit significantly higher productivity (per-work-time production) when they can decide whether to reduce the return from shirking by voting than when the policy implementation is randomly decided from above, irrespective of the policy implementation outcome. This means that democratic culture directly affects behavior. On the other hand, the workers under democracy also increase their shirking, presumably due to enhanced fatigue owing to the stronger productivity. Despite this, democracy does not decrease overall production thanks to the enhanced work productivity.","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"69 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138579182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Confidence management in contests 竞赛中的信心管理
IF 1.2 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2023-12-06 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12569
Shanglyu Deng, Hanming Fang, Qiang Fu, Zenan Wu
{"title":"Confidence management in contests","authors":"Shanglyu Deng,&nbsp;Hanming Fang,&nbsp;Qiang Fu,&nbsp;Zenan Wu","doi":"10.1111/jems.12569","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12569","url":null,"abstract":"<p>An incumbent employee competes against a new hire for bonuses or promotions. The incumbent's perception of the new hire's ability distribution is biased. This bias can result in overconfidence or underconfidence. We show that debiasing may be counterproductive in incentivizing efforts. We then explore whether a firm that values employees’ efforts should disclose an informative signal about the new hire's type and we characterize the conditions under which transparency or opacity is optimal for the firm. We further consider four extensions to the model. Our results contribute to the extensive discussion of confidence management and organizational transparency in firms.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"33 4","pages":"1007-1028"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138548046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Under the shadow of the future: Gender-specific reactions to (un)certain future interactions 在未来的阴影下:对(不)某些未来互动的性别特定反应
IF 1.2 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2023-12-03 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12568
Janina Kleinknecht, Clara Ulmer
{"title":"Under the shadow of the future: Gender-specific reactions to (un)certain future interactions","authors":"Janina Kleinknecht,&nbsp;Clara Ulmer","doi":"10.1111/jems.12568","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12568","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Expectations are a key element of strategic environments. As it has already been shown that men's performance in current competitions is affected by the expected future opponents' strength, we investigate whether women are overshadowed by future competitors as well. We use data from professional tennis, replicate the results for men and compare it with women's behavior. Extending previous research, we focus on the role of uncertainty in this context, particularly, whether behavior differs when individuals have to form expectations instead of having accurate information. Our results suggest that individuals perform worse in competitions if the expected future opponent is stronger. We find gender-specific behavior when analyzing uncertainty as a potential source: Women's current performance does not depend on the future competitor's strength when they know her for sure, whereas they are overshadowed when having to form expectations. In contrast, men are negatively affected by the future competitor's strength when they know him and when they need to form expectations. Moreover, women (men) rather  seem to be sensitive to direct (more distant) incentives. These findings might be transferred to information revelation in promotion contests to help highly qualified individuals, especially women, climb the career ladder.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"33 4","pages":"976-1006"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12568","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138506872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Sales-based compensation and collusion with heterogeneous firms 基于销售的薪酬和与异质公司的勾结
IF 1.2 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2023-11-20 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12567
Jeongwoo Lee, Douglas C. Turner
{"title":"Sales-based compensation and collusion with heterogeneous firms","authors":"Jeongwoo Lee,&nbsp;Douglas C. Turner","doi":"10.1111/jems.12567","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12567","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Pricing and output decisions are often delegated to managers compensated on the basis of sales. Prior literature has shown that when firms are homogeneous, the delegation of pricing or output decisions to managers, compensated on the basis of sales, does not facilitate collusion. We show that when firms are heterogeneous, either in marginal cost or product quality, sales-based compensation can facilitate collusion under both price and quantity competition. As a result, compensating managers on the basis of sales can increase firm profits and reduce consumer welfare. Additionally, we find that owners can strategically design managerial compensation structures to incentivize collusion between rival managers.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"33 4","pages":"958-975"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138506870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Championing and shaming in a credence good market: Which one to use? 在信誉良好的市场中，拥护和羞辱:使用哪一个?
IF 1.2 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2023-11-17 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12566
Alexandre Volle, Patrick González
{"title":"Championing and shaming in a credence good market: Which one to use?","authors":"Alexandre Volle,&nbsp;Patrick González","doi":"10.1111/jems.12566","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12566","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyze the performance of the <i>championing</i> and <i>shaming</i> inquiries by a Nongovernmental Organization in a signaling game played by a monopoly that sells a credence good to an uninformed consumer. Championing (shaming) means certifying (uncovering) a firm that sells a high (low) quality product. An inquiry alters the whole information structure of the signaling game. It provides redundant hard information in a separating equilibrium but it lowers the set of separating prices. We show that a high-quality producer and the consumers welcome this inquiry in a pooling equilibrium as it enhances their expected payoffs. They prefer a championing over a shaming inquiry when the likelihood of a high-quality producer is low. A championing inquiry may lower the consumer's expected payoff if it is run before the monopoly sets its price since the consumer may prefer paying a low pooling price for a credence good rather than a high price for a certified high-quality good.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"33 4","pages":"937-957"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138506871","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The role of registering trademarks on firms' innovation: Evidence from Chinese firms 注册商标对企业创新的作用：来自中国企业的证据
IF 1.2 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2023-11-14 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12562
Yili Liu, Puyang Sun, Yong Zhao
{"title":"The role of registering trademarks on firms' innovation: Evidence from Chinese firms","authors":"Yili Liu,&nbsp;Puyang Sun,&nbsp;Yong Zhao","doi":"10.1111/jems.12562","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12562","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Firms are used to registering trademarks for intellectual property protection which ultimately increases their innovations. Using a novel data set tracking firm-level trademark registrations of Chinese listed firms between 2005 and 2017, this article sheds light on the role of a firm's first trademark in its patents and the related provision's implication in the developing world. We implement a difference-in-difference model to find approximately a 30% increase in the number of a firm's patents after its first trademark application. Moreover, we take advantage of the latest amendment of China's <i>Trademark Law</i> in 2013 as an exogenous shock to investigate the influence of law protection on trademark-induced innovations. The results suggest a strengthened effect of first trademark applications on patent numbers after the 2013 amendment.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"33 4","pages":"845-876"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134953664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Two-sided productivity heterogeneity, firm boundaries, and assortative matching 双面生产力异质性、企业边界和同类匹配
IF 1.2 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2023-11-14 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12564
Kaniṣka Dam, Daniel Ripperger-Suhler, Konstantinos Serfes
{"title":"Two-sided productivity heterogeneity, firm boundaries, and assortative matching","authors":"Kaniṣka Dam,&nbsp;Daniel Ripperger-Suhler,&nbsp;Konstantinos Serfes","doi":"10.1111/jems.12564","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12564","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider a market where each firm is created by the combination of two complementary assets that are heterogeneous in their productivity. After assets match endogenously, their owners choose between two ownership structures: centralized organization (integration) and arm's length organization (nonintegration). Our main focus is on the interplay between productivity heterogeneity and firm boundary decisions. When firms choose between distinct ownership structures, the standard single-crossing condition that guarantees positive assortative matching may fail to hold. We provide a novel condition—the <i>congruent marginal contributions</i> property—which guarantees monotone matching with respect to asset productivity. Furthermore, we provide conditions under which integration at the bottom of the productivity ladder is the market equilibrium; an organizational pattern that has been largely unexplored by the theoretical and empirical literature. We investigate the effect of model primitives on the equilibrium distribution of output. Moreover, our model offers interesting testable implications regarding firm boundary decisions.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"33 4","pages":"877-908"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134953707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Postsearch uncertainty, product heterogeneity, and price divergence 搜索后的不确定性、产品异质性和价格差异
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2023-11-14 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12561
Yijuan Chen, Xiangting Hu, Sanxi Li
{"title":"Postsearch uncertainty, product heterogeneity, and price divergence","authors":"Yijuan Chen,&nbsp;Xiangting Hu,&nbsp;Sanxi Li","doi":"10.1111/jems.12561","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12561","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We develop a consumer search model in which consumers may remain uncertain about product quality even <i>after</i> inspecting the product. We first consider the postsearch uncertainty regarding <i>vertical</i> quality, and characterize the separating equilibrium in which firms with different quality levels charge different prices. If quality information is not sufficiently transparent after the search, then prices between the low- and the high-quality products can either diverge or converge as the search cost decreases, depending on the degrees of horizontal and vertical product differentiation. We further extend the model to include the postsearch uncertainty about the <i>horizontal</i> match value and to endogenize the firm's quality choice.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"33 1","pages":"175-202"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134957776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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