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The effect of competition on the demand for skilled labor: Matching with externalities in the NBA 竞争对熟练劳动力需求的影响：NBA 中的外部性匹配
IF 1.2 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-02-27 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12582
Joseph Kuehn
{"title":"The effect of competition on the demand for skilled labor: Matching with externalities in the NBA","authors":"Joseph Kuehn","doi":"10.1111/jems.12582","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12582","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I study how heterogeneity in competition can affect the demand for skilled labor in a way that generates a dispersion in productivity across otherwise similar firms. This is explored in the setting of professional basketball where heterogeneity in competition is easily measured. I develop and estimate a matching model with externalities, where the value of a match between a firm and worker depends on the entire allocation of matches. I find that competition has a significant effect on hiring decisions in the National Basketball Association, resulting in a clustering of talent among rivals. A counterfactual shows that competition in the league's playoff format explains 17.59% of the widely observed gap in talent between the league's two conferences.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"33 3","pages":"539-581"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140026513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Organization of production and income inequality 生产组织与收入不平等
IF 1.2 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-02-27 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12583
Luis Medrano-Adán, Vicente Salas-Fumás, Javier Sanchez-Asin
{"title":"Organization of production and income inequality","authors":"Luis Medrano-Adán,&nbsp;Vicente Salas-Fumás,&nbsp;Javier Sanchez-Asin","doi":"10.1111/jems.12583","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12583","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper contributes to the literature that postulates a relationship between income inequality and the relative importance of “market” and “organization” in the direction of resources. The paper emphasizes that both are endogenous; therefore, the empirical associations observed in the empirical data between inequality measures and production organization variables cannot be interpreted as indicative of causal relationships. The paper solves for the composition and size of occupational groups, the distribution of firm size, and the distribution of income as market equilibrium outcomes of an occupational choice economy, and performs a comparative static analysis. We find that the interaction between cross-economy differences in the distribution of general skills in the labor force and the loss of control in the supervision of workers by managers can explain the empirical regularities observed in the relationship between the organization of production (distribution of firm size) and income inequality (distribution of labor income). This explanation of the empirical regularities differs from others proposed in the literature, such as those based on institutional constraints or the market power of firms.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"33 3","pages":"582-604"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140025013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Insourcing versus outsourcing in a vertical structure 纵向结构中的内包与外包
IF 1.2 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-02-26 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12585
Dongsoo Shin, Roland Strausz
{"title":"Insourcing versus outsourcing in a vertical structure","authors":"Dongsoo Shin,&nbsp;Roland Strausz","doi":"10.1111/jems.12585","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12585","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study an agency model with vertical hierarchy—the principal, the prime-agent and the subagent. The principal faces a project that needs both agents' services. Due to costly communication, the principal receives a report only from the prime-agent, who receives a report from the subagent. The principal can directly incentivize each agent by setting individual transfers (insourcing), or sets only one overall transfer to an independent organization in which the prime-agent hires the subagent (outsourcing). We show that insourcing is always optimal when the principal can perfectly process the prime-agent's report. When the principal's information process is limited, however, outsourcing can be the prevailing mode of operation. In addition, insourcing under limited information process is prone to collusion between the agents, whereas no possibility of collusion arises with outsourcing.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"33 3","pages":"509-538"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12585","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140025012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Effort complementarity and role assignments in group contests 小组竞赛中的努力互补和角色分配
IF 1.2 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-02-21 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12580
Katsuya Kobayashi
{"title":"Effort complementarity and role assignments in group contests","authors":"Katsuya Kobayashi","doi":"10.1111/jems.12580","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12580","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study characterizes role assignments in maximizing a group's winning probability under the influence of the complementarity of group members' efforts in a group contest, in contrast to prize and multiple resource allocations. We use a constant elasticity of substitution effort aggregator function to parameterize the complementarity. While the prize and resource allocation rules depend on the complementarity, the assignment rule does not when multiple roles are assignable to a single group member: All roles are assigned only to the most productive group member. However, when only a single role per group member is assignable, the assignment rule depends on the complementarity: Roles from greater to less importance are assigned to group members in descending order of their productivity under strong complementarity; only the most important role is assigned to the most productive group member and the others have no effect under weak complementarity.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"33 3","pages":"483-508"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139950273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The business revolution: Economy-wide impacts of artificial intelligence and digital platforms 商业革命：人工智能和数字平台对整个经济的影响
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-02-20 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12581
Hanna Halaburda, Jeffrey Prince, D. Daniel Sokol, Feng Zhu
{"title":"The business revolution: Economy-wide impacts of artificial intelligence and digital platforms","authors":"Hanna Halaburda,&nbsp;Jeffrey Prince,&nbsp;D. Daniel Sokol,&nbsp;Feng Zhu","doi":"10.1111/jems.12581","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12581","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this essay, we identify several themes of the digital business transformation, with a particular focus on the economy-wide impacts of artificial intelligence and digital platforms. In doing so, we highlight specific industries, beyond just the high-profile “Big Tech” firms, where the digital business revolution is having, or promises to have, significant impact. The papers in this special issue (flagged with bold font below) provide a deeper analysis of the themes and applications we touch on here.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"33 2","pages":"269-275"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12581","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139950275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Taking firms' margin targets seriously in a model of competition in supply functions 在供应职能竞争模型中认真对待企业的利润目标
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-02-08 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12577
Denis Claude, Mabel Tidball
{"title":"Taking firms' margin targets seriously in a model of competition in supply functions","authors":"Denis Claude, Mabel Tidball","doi":"10.1111/jems.12577","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12577","url":null,"abstract":"This article deals with the integration of industry-level markup targets into oligopoly theory. It proposes a behavioral competition model in which firms use the average cost-plus price to determine their supplies. Specifically, firms are assumed to increase (resp., decrease) their supplies as the market price rises over (resp., falls below) this reference price. The equilibrium market outcome lies between those corresponding to Bertrand and Cournot competition. It depends on the industry's margin target, which determines the slope of firms' supply functions. The more significant the markup target is, the lower are the firms' equilibrium supplies at any price level and the higher is the equilibrium market price. An industry-wide commitment to targeting a markup thus reduces competition in equilibrium. The reduction in competition is more pronounced than when firms commit to linear supply functions.","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139760616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Behavior-based pricing and signaling of product quality 基于行为的定价和产品质量信号
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-02-06 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12578
Jianpei Li, Wanzhu Zhang
{"title":"Behavior-based pricing and signaling of product quality","authors":"Jianpei Li, Wanzhu Zhang","doi":"10.1111/jems.12578","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12578","url":null,"abstract":"In a two-period model with repeat purchase, we compare the profit and social welfare effects of behavior-based pricing (BBP) and uniform pricing in a monopoly under quality uncertainty. We offer the novel insight that BBP increases the price elasticity of imitation demand and lowers the signaling cost relative to uniform pricing, and becomes a potentially profitable strategy even when the monopolist cannot commit to future prices. Moreover, the profitability of BBP does not arise at the expense of consumer surplus. Either upward or downward price distortion with the use of BBP signals high quality, depending on the seller's commitment power. With more accurate tracking technology, the monopolist may forsake signaling for better consumer information.","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"139-140 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139760513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
AI adoption in America: Who, what, and where 人工智能在美国的应用：何人、何事、何地
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-01-24 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12576
Kristina McElheran, J. Frank Li, Erik Brynjolfsson, Zachary Kroff, Emin Dinlersoz, Lucia Foster, Nikolas Zolas
{"title":"AI adoption in America: Who, what, and where","authors":"Kristina McElheran,&nbsp;J. Frank Li,&nbsp;Erik Brynjolfsson,&nbsp;Zachary Kroff,&nbsp;Emin Dinlersoz,&nbsp;Lucia Foster,&nbsp;Nikolas Zolas","doi":"10.1111/jems.12576","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12576","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the early adoption and diffusion of five artificial intelligence (AI)-related technologies (automated-guided vehicles, machine learning, machine vision, natural language processing, and voice recognition) as documented in the 2018 Annual Business Survey of 850,000 firms across the United States. We find that fewer than 6% of firms used any of the AI-related technologies we measure, though most very large firms reported at least some AI use. Weighted by employment, average adoption was just over 18%. AI use in production, while varying considerably by industry, was found in every sector of the economy and clustered with emerging technologies, such as cloud computing and robotics. Among dynamic young firms, AI use was highest alongside more-educated, more-experienced, and younger owners, including owners motivated by bringing new ideas to market or helping the community. AI adoption was also more common in startups displaying indicators of high-growth entrepreneurship, including venture capital funding, recent product and process innovation, and growth-oriented business strategies. Early AI adoption was far from evenly distributed: a handful of “superstar” cities and emerging hubs led startups' adoption of AI. These patterns of early AI use foreshadow economic and social impacts far beyond this limited initial diffusion, with the possibility of a growing “AI divide” if early patterns persist.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"33 2","pages":"375-415"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12576","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139645376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Supply contracts under partial forward ownership 部分远期所有权下的供应合同
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-01-14 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12574
Matthias Hunold, Frank Schlütter
{"title":"Supply contracts under partial forward ownership","authors":"Matthias Hunold, Frank Schlütter","doi":"10.1111/jems.12574","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12574","url":null,"abstract":"With forward ownership, an upstream supplier internalizes the effect of its supply contracts on the downstream firms, which is so far understood to decrease prices. We show that, instead, downstream prices generally increase if firms use two-part tariffs. The price-increasing effect of forward ownership occurs with both observable and secret two-part tariffs, albeit for different economic reasons. The results arise under both quantity and price competition as well as for different belief refinements. Partial forward ownership can be more profitable and more harmful for consumers than a full vertical merger between an upstream and a downstream firm.","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139499468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do competitive bonuses ruin cooperation in heterogeneous teams? 竞争性奖金会破坏异质团队中的合作吗？
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-01-11 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12573
E. Glenn Dutcher, Regine Oexl, Dmitry Ryvkin, Timothy C. Salmon
{"title":"Do competitive bonuses ruin cooperation in heterogeneous teams?","authors":"E. Glenn Dutcher, Regine Oexl, Dmitry Ryvkin, Timothy C. Salmon","doi":"10.1111/jems.12573","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12573","url":null,"abstract":"A debate among practicing managers is whether to use cooperative or competitive incentives for team production. While competitive incentives may drive individual effort higher, they may also lead to less help and more sabotage, with unclear consequences overall, especially when team members' abilities differ. Using a lab experiment, we examine how increasing competitive incentives affects performance as team composition changes. We find that competitive incentives generally under-perform noncompetitive incentives and a larger bonus does not generate enough effort to compensate for a loss in help. Our results help understand better how to balance out individual versus team rewards and how firms could structure teams when employees have heterogeneous abilities.","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139499802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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