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Communicating clean technology: Green premium, competition, and ecolabels 传播清洁技术：绿色溢价、竞争和生态标签
IF 1.2 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-03-07 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12587
Aditi Sengupta
{"title":"Communicating clean technology: Green premium, competition, and ecolabels","authors":"Aditi Sengupta","doi":"10.1111/jems.12587","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12587","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In markets where differences in the environmental performance of competing firms arise due to differences in technology that cannot be altered in the short run and firms have private information about their own current technology, I show that market competition creates a strategic disincentive for adopting ecolabels (even if the cost of adoption is negligible) to directly and credibly communicate this private information to environmentally conscious consumers. Firms adopt ecolabels only if the green premium that buyers are willing to pay is large relative to the production cost advantage of dirty firms; ecolabels reduce market power, increase the market share of clean firms, and reduce expected environmental damage. I analyze firms' strategic (long-run) incentive to invest in the development of clean technology where the outcome of such investment is uncertain. The availability of an ecolabel to directly communicate private information about the final outcome of such an investment enhances the expected net surplus whereas it reduces the ex ante strategic incentive to invest which in turn lowers industry investment in cleaner technology, relative to the case with no ecolabels.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"33 3","pages":"605-629"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140072227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Make or buy your artificial intelligence? Complementarities in technology sourcing 制造还是购买人工智能？技术采购的互补性
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-03-05 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12586
Charles Hoffreumon, Chris Forman, Nicolas van Zeebroeck
{"title":"Make or buy your artificial intelligence? Complementarities in technology sourcing","authors":"Charles Hoffreumon,&nbsp;Chris Forman,&nbsp;Nicolas van Zeebroeck","doi":"10.1111/jems.12586","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12586","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate firm decisions to adopt artificial intelligence (AI) technology and how adoption is sourced: by purchasing commercial readymade software, by developing or customizing solutions in-house, or both. Using a cross-sectional data set of 3143 firms from across Europe, we examine the extent to which sourcing strategies exhibit complementarity or substitution. We find that adoption of AI using readymade software as a sourcing strategy is now increasingly commonplace, but differs across industrial sectors. Further, complementarities between sourcing strategies are common across sectors, though with some differences in strength and some exceptions. Our results show that sourcing strategies play an important role in shaping AI adoption decisions among firms.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"33 2","pages":"452-479"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140047724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The effect of competition on the demand for skilled labor: Matching with externalities in the NBA 竞争对熟练劳动力需求的影响：NBA 中的外部性匹配
IF 1.2 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-02-27 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12582
Joseph Kuehn
{"title":"The effect of competition on the demand for skilled labor: Matching with externalities in the NBA","authors":"Joseph Kuehn","doi":"10.1111/jems.12582","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12582","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I study how heterogeneity in competition can affect the demand for skilled labor in a way that generates a dispersion in productivity across otherwise similar firms. This is explored in the setting of professional basketball where heterogeneity in competition is easily measured. I develop and estimate a matching model with externalities, where the value of a match between a firm and worker depends on the entire allocation of matches. I find that competition has a significant effect on hiring decisions in the National Basketball Association, resulting in a clustering of talent among rivals. A counterfactual shows that competition in the league's playoff format explains 17.59% of the widely observed gap in talent between the league's two conferences.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"33 3","pages":"539-581"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140026513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Organization of production and income inequality 生产组织与收入不平等
IF 1.2 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-02-27 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12583
Luis Medrano-Adán, Vicente Salas-Fumás, Javier Sanchez-Asin
{"title":"Organization of production and income inequality","authors":"Luis Medrano-Adán,&nbsp;Vicente Salas-Fumás,&nbsp;Javier Sanchez-Asin","doi":"10.1111/jems.12583","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12583","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper contributes to the literature that postulates a relationship between income inequality and the relative importance of “market” and “organization” in the direction of resources. The paper emphasizes that both are endogenous; therefore, the empirical associations observed in the empirical data between inequality measures and production organization variables cannot be interpreted as indicative of causal relationships. The paper solves for the composition and size of occupational groups, the distribution of firm size, and the distribution of income as market equilibrium outcomes of an occupational choice economy, and performs a comparative static analysis. We find that the interaction between cross-economy differences in the distribution of general skills in the labor force and the loss of control in the supervision of workers by managers can explain the empirical regularities observed in the relationship between the organization of production (distribution of firm size) and income inequality (distribution of labor income). This explanation of the empirical regularities differs from others proposed in the literature, such as those based on institutional constraints or the market power of firms.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"33 3","pages":"582-604"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140025013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Insourcing versus outsourcing in a vertical structure 纵向结构中的内包与外包
IF 1.2 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-02-26 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12585
Dongsoo Shin, Roland Strausz
{"title":"Insourcing versus outsourcing in a vertical structure","authors":"Dongsoo Shin,&nbsp;Roland Strausz","doi":"10.1111/jems.12585","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12585","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study an agency model with vertical hierarchy—the principal, the prime-agent and the subagent. The principal faces a project that needs both agents' services. Due to costly communication, the principal receives a report only from the prime-agent, who receives a report from the subagent. The principal can directly incentivize each agent by setting individual transfers (insourcing), or sets only one overall transfer to an independent organization in which the prime-agent hires the subagent (outsourcing). We show that insourcing is always optimal when the principal can perfectly process the prime-agent's report. When the principal's information process is limited, however, outsourcing can be the prevailing mode of operation. In addition, insourcing under limited information process is prone to collusion between the agents, whereas no possibility of collusion arises with outsourcing.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"33 3","pages":"509-538"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12585","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140025012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Effort complementarity and role assignments in group contests 小组竞赛中的努力互补和角色分配
IF 1.2 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-02-21 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12580
Katsuya Kobayashi
{"title":"Effort complementarity and role assignments in group contests","authors":"Katsuya Kobayashi","doi":"10.1111/jems.12580","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12580","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study characterizes role assignments in maximizing a group's winning probability under the influence of the complementarity of group members' efforts in a group contest, in contrast to prize and multiple resource allocations. We use a constant elasticity of substitution effort aggregator function to parameterize the complementarity. While the prize and resource allocation rules depend on the complementarity, the assignment rule does not when multiple roles are assignable to a single group member: All roles are assigned only to the most productive group member. However, when only a single role per group member is assignable, the assignment rule depends on the complementarity: Roles from greater to less importance are assigned to group members in descending order of their productivity under strong complementarity; only the most important role is assigned to the most productive group member and the others have no effect under weak complementarity.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"33 3","pages":"483-508"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139950273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The business revolution: Economy-wide impacts of artificial intelligence and digital platforms 商业革命：人工智能和数字平台对整个经济的影响
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-02-20 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12581
Hanna Halaburda, Jeffrey Prince, D. Daniel Sokol, Feng Zhu
{"title":"The business revolution: Economy-wide impacts of artificial intelligence and digital platforms","authors":"Hanna Halaburda,&nbsp;Jeffrey Prince,&nbsp;D. Daniel Sokol,&nbsp;Feng Zhu","doi":"10.1111/jems.12581","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12581","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this essay, we identify several themes of the digital business transformation, with a particular focus on the economy-wide impacts of artificial intelligence and digital platforms. In doing so, we highlight specific industries, beyond just the high-profile “Big Tech” firms, where the digital business revolution is having, or promises to have, significant impact. The papers in this special issue (flagged with bold font below) provide a deeper analysis of the themes and applications we touch on here.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"33 2","pages":"269-275"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12581","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139950275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Product innovation and export strategy 产品创新和出口战略
IF 1.2 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-02-15 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12579
Kevin Randy Chemo Dzukou, Sabine Duvaleix, Karine Latouche
{"title":"Product innovation and export strategy","authors":"Kevin Randy Chemo Dzukou,&nbsp;Sabine Duvaleix,&nbsp;Karine Latouche","doi":"10.1111/jems.12579","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12579","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper analyses the relationship between innovation and export performance. More specifically, we highlight the effect of the introduction of new products on the quality and prices charged by firms in international markets. We develop a model to explain the mechanism underlying the relationship between innovation and product quality. Using a unique database of new product launches combined with data on production and trade in the French dairy industry, we tested this mechanism in several ways. Our results show that the export prices charged by the firms increase after the introduction of a new product in a given market. We also show that the projected quality of the new product increases after its introduction in a given market. This confirms the quality-upgrading effect of innovation at the product level.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"34 1","pages":"193-221"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139775162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Taking firms' margin targets seriously in a model of competition in supply functions 在供应职能竞争模型中认真对待企业的利润目标
IF 1.2 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-02-08 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12577
Denis Claude, Mabel Tidball
{"title":"Taking firms' margin targets seriously in a model of competition in supply functions","authors":"Denis Claude,&nbsp;Mabel Tidball","doi":"10.1111/jems.12577","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12577","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article deals with the integration of industry-level markup targets into oligopoly theory. It proposes a behavioral competition model in which firms use the average cost-plus price to determine their supplies. Specifically, firms are assumed to increase (resp., decrease) their supplies as the market price rises over (resp., falls below) this reference price. The equilibrium market outcome lies between those corresponding to Bertrand and Cournot competition. It depends on the industry's margin target, which determines the slope of firms' supply functions. The more significant the markup target is, the lower are the firms' equilibrium supplies at any price level and the higher is the equilibrium market price. An industry-wide commitment to targeting a markup thus reduces competition in equilibrium. The reduction in competition is more pronounced than when firms commit to linear supply functions.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"34 1","pages":"174-192"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12577","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139760616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Behavior-based pricing and signaling of product quality 基于行为的定价和产品质量信号
IF 1.2 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-02-06 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12578
Jianpei Li, Wanzhu Zhang
{"title":"Behavior-based pricing and signaling of product quality","authors":"Jianpei Li,&nbsp;Wanzhu Zhang","doi":"10.1111/jems.12578","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12578","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a two-period model with repeat purchase, we compare the profit and social welfare effects of behavior-based pricing (BBP) and uniform pricing in a monopoly under quality uncertainty. We offer the novel insight that BBP increases the price elasticity of imitation demand and lowers the signaling cost relative to uniform pricing, and becomes a potentially profitable strategy even when the monopolist cannot commit to future prices. Moreover, the profitability of BBP does not arise at the expense of consumer surplus. Either upward or downward price distortion with the use of BBP signals high quality, depending on the seller's commitment power. With more accurate tracking technology, the monopolist may forsake signaling for better consumer information.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"34 1","pages":"139-173"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139760513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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