基于行为的定价和产品质量信号

IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Jianpei Li, Wanzhu Zhang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在一个重复购买的两期模型中,我们比较了在质量不确定的情况下,基于行为的定价(BBP)和统一定价在垄断中的利润和社会福利效应。我们发现,相对于统一定价,BBP 增加了模仿需求的价格弹性,降低了信号传递成本,即使在垄断者无法承诺未来价格的情况下,BBP 仍有可能成为一种有利可图的策略。此外,BBP 的盈利能力并不以牺牲消费者剩余为代价。使用 BBP 时,无论是向上还是向下的价格扭曲都是高质量的信号,这取决于卖方的承诺能力。有了更精确的跟踪技术,垄断者可能会为了获得更好的消费者信息而放弃信号传递。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Behavior-based pricing and signaling of product quality
In a two-period model with repeat purchase, we compare the profit and social welfare effects of behavior-based pricing (BBP) and uniform pricing in a monopoly under quality uncertainty. We offer the novel insight that BBP increases the price elasticity of imitation demand and lowers the signaling cost relative to uniform pricing, and becomes a potentially profitable strategy even when the monopolist cannot commit to future prices. Moreover, the profitability of BBP does not arise at the expense of consumer surplus. Either upward or downward price distortion with the use of BBP signals high quality, depending on the seller's commitment power. With more accurate tracking technology, the monopolist may forsake signaling for better consumer information.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.30%
发文量
43
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