Journal of Economics & Management Strategy最新文献

{"title":"Foreclosure and Profit Shifting With Partial Vertical Ownership","authors":"Matthias Hunold,&nbsp;Vasilisa Werner","doi":"10.1111/jems.12621","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12621","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We demonstrate that the incentives of firms that partially own their suppliers or customers to foreclose rivals depend on how the partial owner can extract profit from the target. Compared to a fully vertically integrated firm, a partial owner may obtain only a share of the target's profit but may have significant influence over the target's strategy. We show that the incentives for customer and input foreclosure can be higher, equal, or even lower with partial ownership than with a vertical merger, depending on how the protection of minority shareholders and transfer price regulations affect the scope for profit extraction.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"34 3","pages":"782-793"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12621","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144773951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Correction to “Branding Vertical Product Line Extensions”","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jems.12624","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12624","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Jungbauer, T., and C. Schmid. 2024. “Branding Vertical Product Line Extensions.” <i>Journal of Economics &amp; Management Strategy</i> 33: 909–936. https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12565.</p><p>Article was categorized as “Invited Review” but should be “Original Article”.</p><p>We apologize for this error.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"34 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12624","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144773456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Returns Policy and Anticipated Regret","authors":"Lin Liu,&nbsp;Ramarao Desiraju,&nbsp;Gan Zou","doi":"10.1111/jems.12620","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12620","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Restrictions on returning an undesirable purchase may make consumers feel regret, and they may account for such a potential postpurchase regret when selecting products. This paper incorporates regret-averse consumers into a model of returns policy and compares two policies—a returns policy (which allows consumers to return undesirable purchases) and a no-returns policy (which restricts consumer returns). We explore a canonical shopping setting where the no-returns policy makes mismatched products unreturnable and triggers postpurchase consumer regret, whereas the alternative policy avoids such regret. Intuitively, one would expect businesses to not use the no-returns policy when consumers can anticipate regret. Our stylized analytical model, however, shows that the no-returns policy is not optimal unless it induces regret. In addition, contrary to conventional wisdom on competition in a vertically differentiated market, our results show that the no-returns policy may be related to conceding a high-quality advantage—that is, where a higher-quality firm would charge a higher price, earning a higher profit. Essentially, to raise profit, the no-returns policy serves as an instrument (through anticipated regret) by deliberately repositioning consumers' perceived quality to a lower level. Our results also show that consumers' regret intensity has an inverted-U-shaped relationship with profitability. In addition, we have examined the cases of firms and consumers incurring costs when dealing with returns, repurchasing after returning, and a strategic platform which decides the returns policy; and these analyses help highlight the robustness of our basic model. Echoing the long-noted sentiment from industry experts and academics that, after products are introduced in the market, changing consumers' perceptions of those attributes is admittedly easier than altering actual product characteristics, our analysis suggests an approach to alter perceptions via the choice of a returns policy.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"34 3","pages":"773-781"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144773608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Rise of Remote Work Evidence on Productivity and Preferences From Firm and Worker Surveys","authors":"Alexander Bartik,&nbsp;Zoë Cullen,&nbsp;Ed Glaeser,&nbsp;Michael Luca,&nbsp;Christopher Stanton","doi":"10.1111/jems.12616","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12616","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Drawing on surveys of small business owners and employees, we present three main findings about the evolution of remote work after the onset of COVID-19. First, uptake of remote work was abrupt and widespread in jobs suitable for telework according to the task-based measure from Dingel and Neiman (2020). The initial adoption lead to a persistent shift in work arrangements that both firms and workers forecast would continue into the future. Second, business leaders' perceptions of how remote work affected productivity shifted over time. In early 2020, 70% of small business owners reported a productivity dip due to remote work. By contrast, the median business owner reported a positive productivity impact of remote work by 2021. Third, 21% of workers report being willing to accept a pay cut in excess of 10% if it allowed them to continue working from home, but the median worker in a teleworkable job would not tradeoff any compensation for the option of continued remote work. Taken together, our evidence points to perceived productivity gains and some workers' preferences as reasons for the persistence of remote work in the years following the onset of COVID-19.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"34 3","pages":"759-772"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144774065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Strategic Corporate Purpose","authors":"Rui Albuquerque,&nbsp;Luís Cabral","doi":"10.1111/jems.12619","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12619","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We propose a theory of strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR). Value-maximizing shareholders play an industry CSR game where they can opt for an objective function that extends beyond shareholder value, thus conditioning other strategic firm decisions. The theory provides a formalization of the “doing well by doing good” adage in an industry setting. We develop conditions such that the CSR game is a pure coordination game, which provides a natural and novel theory of strategic leadership in CSR: By committing to a CSR objective function, a first mover leads the industry to a Pareto superior equilibrium. The theory can rationalize recent evidence on correlated industry-wide CSR adoption, and carries implications for competition policy.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"34 3","pages":"743-758"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144773991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Firm Hierarchy and the Market for Knowledge","authors":"Fabio Pieri,&nbsp;Massimiliano Vatiero","doi":"10.1111/jems.12617","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12617","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper sheds light on the role of the market for knowledge in shaping a firm's hierarchy—that is, the span of control and the number of layers. We predict that the larger the extent of the market for knowledge, the larger the span of control and the fewer the layers. We test our predictions using a rich database representing industrial firms in Italy over the period 2004–2017. Our identification strategy employs a difference-in-difference approach that exploits the cross-regional variability in the extent of the local market for knowledge-intensive business services and the cross-industry heterogeneity in the level of technological exposure of industrial firms to such a market. We find that a thicker regional market for knowledge is associated with relatively flatter firms in industries that use knowledge-intensive business services more intensively. The results are confirmed when we use instrumental variables for the extent of the market for knowledge, test the sensitivity of the estimates to omitted variable bias, and perform a series of robustness checks.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"34 3","pages":"714-742"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12617","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144773949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Media Mergers in Nested Markets","authors":"David Martimort,&nbsp;Wilfried Sand-Zantman","doi":"10.1111/jems.12618","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12618","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyze the effect of media mergers in a model that stresses, on the one hand, the fact that media are two-sided platforms willing to attract advertisers and viewers and, on the other hand, that strong competitors have emerged to challenge traditional media on both sides. We show that a merger has two conflicting effects on traditional media's incentives to invest in quality programs and to exploit their market power. When competition is primarily between traditional media, a Business-Stealing Effect dominates, and the merger is detrimental to advertisers and viewers. When the competition is mainly between the traditional media and their new competitors, an Ecosystem Effect dominates, and the merger benefits advertisers and viewers. We extend this setting to discuss the role of financial constraints that might limit investments in the quality of programs and show that the same effects are at play.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"34 3","pages":"696-713"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12618","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144774100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Optimism and Overconfidence of Strategic Decision Makers-Comparing Entrepreneurs and Managers With Employees","authors":"Nadine Chochoiek,&nbsp;Laura Rosendahl Huber,&nbsp;Randolph Sloof","doi":"10.1111/jems.12615","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12615","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Empirical evidence supports the conventional wisdom that entrepreneurs are more optimistic and overconfident than others. However, the same holds true for (top) managers. In a large incentivized survey (<span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>n</mi>\u0000 \u0000 <mo>=</mo>\u0000 \u0000 <mn>2404</mn>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> &lt;math altimg=\"urn:x-wiley:10586407:media:jems12615:jems12615-math-0001\" wiley:location=\"equation/jems12615-math-0001.png\" display=\"inline\" xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML\"&gt;&lt;mrow&gt;&lt;mrow&gt;&lt;mi&gt;n&lt;/mi&gt;&lt;mo&gt;unicode{x0003D}&lt;/mo&gt;&lt;mn&gt;2404&lt;/mn&gt;&lt;/mrow&gt;&lt;/mrow&gt;&lt;/math&gt;</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math>), we directly compare entrepreneurs, managers, and employees on a comprehensive set of measures of optimism and overconfidence. We find that on average entrepreneurs and managers are more optimistic than employees in their dispositional optimism and their explanatory style of past events. However, they do not differ from each other in these respects. For two incentivized measures of overconfidence, we also find no differences between entrepreneurs and managers. Both are equally likely to overestimate their own abilities compared to employees. In terms of overestimating general economic prospects differences with employees are much less pronounced. Exploration of within-group heterogeneities shows that these observations hold true for various subgroups of entrepreneurs and managers. Together these findings tentatively suggest that optimism and overconfidence characterize strategic decision makers more generally, irrespective of whether they bear the full risk of their strategic decisions.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"34 3","pages":"674-695"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12615","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144774015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The “Kill Zone”: When a Platform Copies to Eliminate a Potential Threat","authors":"Massimo Motta,&nbsp;Sandro Shelegia","doi":"10.1111/jems.12614","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12614","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A monopoly platform may prevent a startup which sells a complementary product from developing a competing platform by copying it. Imitation reduces the potential rival's profits from the new platform and thus its incentives to invest. The anticipation of the incumbent's aggressive behavior may also create an “ex ante” effect, by inducing the rival not to challenge the incumbent with a new platform (i.e., not to enter the “kill zone”) and to develop another (noncompeting) product instead. This finding is robust to several extensions.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"34 3","pages":"657-673"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12614","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144774089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Do Firms Gain From Managerial Overconfidence? Managerial Bargaining Power and the Role of Severance Pay","authors":"Clara Graziano,&nbsp;Annalisa Luporini","doi":"10.1111/jems.12613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12613","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyze the effects of optimism and overconfidence when the manager has bargaining power and the compensation package includes severance pay. Optimism implies that the manager overestimates the probability of success, while overconfidence induces the manager to overestimate the increase in the probability of success due to her investment. If the manager can renegotiate the initial contract, the advantage of using severance pay to induce the manager to invest, commonly found in the literature, is reduced by the presence of the biases. Optimism increases severance pay and managerial entrenchement with a negative effect on expected profit. Overconfidence reduces incentive pay, as shown by the previous literature, but its effect on severance pay depends on the intensity of the bias. A moderate overconfidence reduces severance pay and increases expected profit. Conversely, extreme overconfidence increases severance pay and this may offset the beneficial effect on incentive pay. Thus, the attempt to exploit managerial overconfidence to reduce incentive pay may backfire if the manager is replaced. Our model suggests that the large severance payments documented by the empirical literature represent a form of efficient contracting when the optimistic and overconfident manager has bargaining power.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"34 3","pages":"632-656"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12613","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144773994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}