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Content moderation and advertising in social media platforms 社交媒体平台的内容管理和广告
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-06-26 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12602
Leonardo Madio, Martin Quinn
{"title":"Content moderation and advertising in social media platforms","authors":"Leonardo Madio, Martin Quinn","doi":"10.1111/jems.12602","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12602","url":null,"abstract":"We study the incentive of an ad‐funded social media platform to curb the presence of unsafe content that entails reputational risk to advertisers. We identify conditions for the platform not to moderate unsafe content and demonstrate how the optimal moderation policy depends on the risk the advertisers face. The platform is likely to undermoderate unsafe content relative to the socially desirable level when both advertisers and users have congruent preferences for unsafe content and to overmoderate unsafe content when advertisers have conflicting preferences for unsafe content. Finally, to mitigate negative externalities generated by unsafe content, we study the implications of a policy that mandates binding content moderation to online platforms and how the introduction of taxes on social media activity and social media platform competition can distort the platform's moderation strategies.","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141505838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reassessing the impact of health IT: Hidden costs and consequences of vendor heterogeneity 重新评估医疗信息技术的影响：供应商异质性的隐性成本和后果
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-06-20 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12600
Jianjing Lin, Mary K. Olson
{"title":"Reassessing the impact of health IT: Hidden costs and consequences of vendor heterogeneity","authors":"Jianjing Lin, Mary K. Olson","doi":"10.1111/jems.12600","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12600","url":null,"abstract":"The government has invested more than $24.8 billion to incentivize the adoption of health information technology in hospitals; however, there is little evidence showing that these investments produced the expected efficiencies, such as cost savings and improved quality of care. We examine whether vendor heterogeneity can help explain this puzzle. Our results show that the effects of electronic medical record (EMR) adoption on hospital costs and quality vary substantially by vendor. Only certain EMR vendors lead to cost savings (ranging between 3.1% and 4.7%) or quality of care improvements (lowering rates of adverse drug events from 0.38 to 1.68 percentage points) for adopting hospitals, while the adoption of other EMR vendors leads to either cost increases, quality of care reductions, or no significant effects. Our results suggest that both quality improvement and cost savings may be improved by a more strategic choice of vendor. The variability in EMR effectiveness by vendor also implies that there was a hidden cost of the government's program to incentivize the adoption of EMRs in hospitals.","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141505837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information campaigns and ecolabels by environmental NGOs: Effective strategies to eliminate environmentally harmful components? 非政府环保组织的宣传活动和生态标签：消除有害环境成分的有效战略？
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-05-29 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12595
Dorothée Brécard, Mireille Chiroleu‐Assouline
{"title":"Information campaigns and ecolabels by environmental NGOs: Effective strategies to eliminate environmentally harmful components?","authors":"Dorothée Brécard, Mireille Chiroleu‐Assouline","doi":"10.1111/jems.12595","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12595","url":null,"abstract":"Environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are increasingly using strategies to encourage firms to eliminate product components (e.g., palm oil) that are harmful to the environment (e.g., rainforests) or to replace them with NGO‐certified sustainable components. Under what conditions do NGOs' information and ecolabeling strategies succeed in eliminating certain harmful components when these components contribute to the intrinsic quality of a product? The paper addresses these questions using a model of two‐dimensional vertical product differentiation in a market with consumers either informed or uninformed about the environmental quality of products and two firms that initially offer a product with the harmful component and a harmful component‐free product. We show that the information campaign plays a crucial and effective role in improving environmental quality, although the optimal share of informed consumers for the NGO is large but not always 100%. Ecolabeling cannot replace the information campaign. It is only a complementary tool to an intensive information campaign. Used together, they can succeed in triggering the substitution of the certified sustainable component for the harmful one.","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141196901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Patent eligibility after Alice: Evidence from USPTO patent examination 爱丽丝之后的专利资格：来自美国专利商标局专利审查的证据
IF 1.2 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-04-11 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12592
Jesse Frumkin, Nicholas A. Pairolero, Asrat Tesfayesus, Andrew A. Toole
{"title":"Patent eligibility after Alice: Evidence from USPTO patent examination","authors":"Jesse Frumkin,&nbsp;Nicholas A. Pairolero,&nbsp;Asrat Tesfayesus,&nbsp;Andrew A. Toole","doi":"10.1111/jems.12592","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12592","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a series of decisions over the last decade, the Supreme Court of the United States altered the classes of inventions that are eligible for patent protection—a body of law called subject matter eligibility. One of the more contentious of these decisions, <i>Alice Corp. versus CLS Bank International (Alice)</i>, questioned the patentability of a broad class of inventions involving abstract ideas, particularly in digital technologies. Exploiting a quasinatural experiment, we find that the <i>Alice</i> decision reduced favorable patent eligibility decisions by 31% and significantly and persistently increased legal uncertainty in patent examination by 26% for a broad set of technologies. Our analysis quantifies how legal decisions can limit patent protection and highlights the need for further research on how greater legal uncertainty affects upstream investments supporting invention and downstream innovations fueling growth.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140566710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Learning-by-doing and contract choice 边干边学与合同选择
IF 1.2 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-04-02 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12589
Katja Greer
{"title":"Learning-by-doing and contract choice","authors":"Katja Greer","doi":"10.1111/jems.12589","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12589","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study examines vertical agreements that occur when suppliers experience learning-by-doing, which makes them more productive over time and poses a competitive threat to their rivals. Consequently, a dominant supplier arranges payments that reference the rival good. This study contributes to the existing literature by showing that the dominant supplier chooses specific contracts to reap optimal benefit from its rival's efficiency gains. These contracts restrict the rival, harm consumers, and reduce welfare when the rival is exceptionally efficient or expects significant improvements through learning-by-doing. Therefore, this study emphasizes the significance of foreseeable innovations and their implications in antitrust proceedings.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140566582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Politics and entry deterrence: Evidence from China's industrial land market 政治与进入威慑：来自中国工业用地市场的证据
IF 1.2 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-03-22 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12591
Chunyang Wang
{"title":"Politics and entry deterrence: Evidence from China's industrial land market","authors":"Chunyang Wang","doi":"10.1111/jems.12591","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12591","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines one million land transactions and firm census data sets to determine the effect of market concentration on entry deterrence in China from 2006 to 2013. We find that a one standard deviation increase in the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index leads to a one standard deviation decrease in local government-designated industrial land sales to nonlocal firms and to a 2.9 standard deviation increase in land cost. Further evidence suggests that firms with high market power lobby their local governments to deter the entry of nonlocal firms.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140217470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
“For the public benefit”: Data policy in platform markets "为了公众利益"：平台市场的数据政策
IF 1.2 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-03-22 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12588
Sarit Markovich, Yaron Yehezkel
{"title":"“For the public benefit”: Data policy in platform markets","authors":"Sarit Markovich,&nbsp;Yaron Yehezkel","doi":"10.1111/jems.12588","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12588","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider the public-good aspect of platform's data collection on users. Data have commercial benefits to the platform, personal benefits to the user, and public benefits to other users. We ask who should decide which data the platform commercializes. We find that the answer depends on the type of heterogeneity in the disutility of data commercialization. When heterogeneity is across users (data items) and the public benefit of data is high (low), it is welfare enhancing to let the platform (users) control the data. Furthermore, dynamic data accumulation strengthens our results.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12588","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140205236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Revenue drift, incentives, and effort allocation in social enterprises 社会企业的收入漂移、激励机制和精力分配
IF 1.2 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-03-21 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12590
Theodor Vladasel, Simon C. Parker, Randolph Sloof, Mirjam van Praag
{"title":"Revenue drift, incentives, and effort allocation in social enterprises","authors":"Theodor Vladasel,&nbsp;Simon C. Parker,&nbsp;Randolph Sloof,&nbsp;Mirjam van Praag","doi":"10.1111/jems.12590","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12590","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Revenue drift, whereby insufficient attention is given to economic, relative to social, goals, threatens social enterprise performance and survival. We argue that financial incentives can address this problem by redirecting employee attention to commercial tasks and attracting workers less inclined to fixate on social tasks. In an online experiment with varying incentive levels, monetary rewards succeed in directing worker effort to commercial tasks; high-powered incentives attract less prosocial employees, but low-powered incentives do not alter workforce composition. Social enterprises combining monetary rewards with a social mission not only attract more workers but are also able to guard against revenue drift.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12590","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140204708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Communicating clean technology: Green premium, competition, and ecolabels 传播清洁技术：绿色溢价、竞争和生态标签
IF 1.2 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-03-07 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12587
Aditi Sengupta
{"title":"Communicating clean technology: Green premium, competition, and ecolabels","authors":"Aditi Sengupta","doi":"10.1111/jems.12587","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12587","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In markets where differences in the environmental performance of competing firms arise due to differences in technology that cannot be altered in the short run and firms have private information about their own current technology, I show that market competition creates a strategic disincentive for adopting ecolabels (even if the cost of adoption is negligible) to directly and credibly communicate this private information to environmentally conscious consumers. Firms adopt ecolabels only if the green premium that buyers are willing to pay is large relative to the production cost advantage of dirty firms; ecolabels reduce market power, increase the market share of clean firms, and reduce expected environmental damage. I analyze firms' strategic (long-run) incentive to invest in the development of clean technology where the outcome of such investment is uncertain. The availability of an ecolabel to directly communicate private information about the final outcome of such an investment enhances the expected net surplus whereas it reduces the ex ante strategic incentive to invest which in turn lowers industry investment in cleaner technology, relative to the case with no ecolabels.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140072227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Make or buy your artificial intelligence? Complementarities in technology sourcing 制造还是购买人工智能？技术采购的互补性
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-03-05 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12586
Charles Hoffreumon, Chris Forman, Nicolas van Zeebroeck
{"title":"Make or buy your artificial intelligence? Complementarities in technology sourcing","authors":"Charles Hoffreumon,&nbsp;Chris Forman,&nbsp;Nicolas van Zeebroeck","doi":"10.1111/jems.12586","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12586","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate firm decisions to adopt artificial intelligence (AI) technology and how adoption is sourced: by purchasing commercial readymade software, by developing or customizing solutions in-house, or both. Using a cross-sectional data set of 3143 firms from across Europe, we examine the extent to which sourcing strategies exhibit complementarity or substitution. We find that adoption of AI using readymade software as a sourcing strategy is now increasingly commonplace, but differs across industrial sectors. Further, complementarities between sourcing strategies are common across sectors, though with some differences in strength and some exceptions. Our results show that sourcing strategies play an important role in shaping AI adoption decisions among firms.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140047724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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