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Employee bonding and turnover efficiency 员工关系和离职效率
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2022-09-12 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12499
Jonathan R. Peterson
{"title":"Employee bonding and turnover efficiency","authors":"Jonathan R. Peterson","doi":"10.1111/jems.12499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12499","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study explores how bonding contracts improve employee attraction and retention. These bonds are payment schemes tied to employment duration, such as the vesting of pensions and stock options. This study presents an employee turnover model in which only the worker knows their taste for their current job. This taste gives the current employer monopsonistic power, resulting in deadweight loss from excessive turnover. Bonding contracts serve as a commitment device for future wages and eliminate such deadweight loss, but only when the roles of bondholders and wage setters are separate. Firms that do this are more competitive to new hires. This model offers several empirical findings regarding a variety of common bonding practices.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"32 1","pages":"223-244"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50130480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On sellers' cooperation in hybrid marketplaces 论混合市场中的卖家合作
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2022-09-12 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12498
Michele Bisceglia, Jorge Padilla
{"title":"On sellers' cooperation in hybrid marketplaces","authors":"Michele Bisceglia,&nbsp;Jorge Padilla","doi":"10.1111/jems.12498","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12498","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Hybrid marketplaces, such as Amazon's and Zalando's stores or Apple's and Google's app stores, which distribute their own products and services in competition with those of third-party sellers, play a significant and growing role in the Internet economy. This paper shows that, other things equal, such platforms would maximize their profits if they lowered the fees charged to sellers and the prices charged to consumers in response to cooperation agreements between third-party sellers: horizontal mergers or collusive agreements. It also shows that such cooperation can be pro-competitive when the platform is a vertically integrated gatekeeper, adopts the agency business model, is a close competitor to the third-party sellers it hosts, and observes (or correctly anticipates) the third-party sellers' agreement. The discussion here is of significant policy relevance, since third-party sellers in online marketplaces may find it easier to collude and may respond to the bargaining power of certain gatekeeper platforms by merging their activities.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"32 1","pages":"207-222"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12498","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50130448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Knowledge diffusion and morality: Why do we freely share valuable information with Strangers? 知识传播与道德：为什么我们要自由地与陌生人分享有价值的信息？
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2022-09-07 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12496
Charles Ayoubi, Boris Thurm
{"title":"Knowledge diffusion and morality: Why do we freely share valuable information with Strangers?","authors":"Charles Ayoubi,&nbsp;Boris Thurm","doi":"10.1111/jems.12496","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12496","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article offers a model integrating heterogeneously moral preferences to overcome the seemingly irrational tendency of individuals to freely share data and knowledge. We build on recent literature showing that moral preferences are favored by evolution theoretically, and have a strong explanatory power empirically, to model individual sharing behavior. Our analysis highlights the limit of financial incentives and the importance of promoting a sharing culture by enhancing awareness. Shedding light on how people respond not only to financial but also moral motives, we contribute to the ongoing policy debate on the design of effective open science policies.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"32 1","pages":"75-99"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12496","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50138235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Can asymmetric punishment deter endogenous bribery 不对称惩罚能否遏制内生贿赂
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2022-08-05 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12495
Lin Hu, Mandar Oak
{"title":"Can asymmetric punishment deter endogenous bribery","authors":"Lin Hu,&nbsp;Mandar Oak","doi":"10.1111/jems.12495","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12495","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies the effects of asymmetric punishment of bribery on both bribery and compliance with regulations. The bribe amount is decided via Nash bargaining and regulatory compliance and whistle-blowing are strategic decisions. Moreover, investigations of bribery and noncompliance occur in a manner that may be interdependent. We show that, under symmetric punishment, inducing whistle-blowing has no effect on the frequency of bribery. When the bribery and noncompliance investigations are independent, a switch from symmetric to asymmetric punishment either makes no difference or induces more nonharassment bribery. Only when bribery detection increases the chance of noncompliance detection and asymmetric punishment leads to whistle-blowing for both types of entrepreneurs, can the shift succeed in reducing noncompliance. The result is robust to the case where legalization of bribe-giving is not feasible for nonharassment bribes.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"32 1","pages":"3-21"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12495","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50121465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
National pricing with local quality competition 国家定价与地方质量竞争
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2022-07-26 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12494
Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen, Bjørn Olav Johansen, Odd Rune Straume
{"title":"National pricing with local quality competition","authors":"Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen,&nbsp;Bjørn Olav Johansen,&nbsp;Odd Rune Straume","doi":"10.1111/jems.12494","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12494","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the incentives of national retail chains to adopt national (uniform) prices across local markets that differ in size and competition intensity. In addition to price, the chains may also compete along a quality dimension, and quality is always set locally. We show that absent quality competition, the chains will never use national pricing. However, if quality competition is sufficiently strong there exist equilibria where at least one of the chains adopts national pricing. We also identify cases in which national pricing benefits (harms) all consumers, even in markets where such a pricing strategy leads to higher (lower) prices.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"32 1","pages":"48-74"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12494","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50121290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Upstream market structure and downstream partial ownership 上游市场结构和下游部分所有权
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2022-07-25 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12493
Jie Shuai, Mengyuan Xia, Chenhang Zeng
{"title":"Upstream market structure and downstream partial ownership","authors":"Jie Shuai,&nbsp;Mengyuan Xia,&nbsp;Chenhang Zeng","doi":"10.1111/jems.12493","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12493","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Existing studies on partial ownership usually overlook the effects of vertically related markets. Our paper highlights the importance of the upstream market on downstream firms' incentives to acquire partial ownership and the consequent welfare implications. In the main model, we assume that there are three firms in the downstream market, two of which may form a partial ownership arrangement. We find several results that are in contrast to those in the literature. First, the two firms will engage in partial ownership if the upstream market is an oligopoly (triopoly or duopoly). Second, partial ownership may raise total production, consumer surplus, and social welfare. This happens when the upstream market consists of a duopoly and the two firms involved in partial ownership are supplied by different suppliers. Third, the outsider, commonly known as a free rider in the literature, may become a victim of partial ownership. Our results are robust to several extensions, including a general <math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>n</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $n$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math>-firm framework, product differentiation, and uniform pricing by upstream firms. We also provide the conditions under which the curvature of the demand function and the convexity of the cost function motivate firms to form partial ownership.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"32 1","pages":"22-47"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50143700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Supplier selection and contract enforcement: Evidence from performance bonding 供应商选择和合同执行:来自履约担保的证据
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2022-07-13 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12492
Leonardo M. Giuffrida, Gabriele Rovigatti
{"title":"Supplier selection and contract enforcement: Evidence from performance bonding","authors":"Leonardo M. Giuffrida,&nbsp;Gabriele Rovigatti","doi":"10.1111/jems.12492","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12492","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyze an important but little-studied institution for balancing supply risk in the management of procurement operations: performance bonding. By adding the surety as a third party that guarantees contract fulfillment between supplier and buyer, performance bonding aims to streamline the purchasing process by influencing both contractor selection in the bidding phase and contract enforcement during project execution. Using the data on US government procurement from 2005 to 2015 and exploiting an exogenous variation in the threshold for its application to construction contracts, we find that performance bonding improves contract outcomes by 10.5% and 3.7% in terms of delays and extra costs, respectively. Net of bond premia, which by law are included in the award amounts, this effect translates into savings of about 4% in the budget for federal construction projects and 16% for mid-size projects. We provide suggestive evidence on the effectiveness of selection and monitoring by sureties as driving channels.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"31 4","pages":"980-1019"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12492","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114076654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Endogeneity in pharmaceutical knowledge generation: An instrument-free copula approach for Poisson frontier models 医药知识生成的内生性:泊松前沿模型的无仪器联结方法
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2022-06-27 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12491
Rouven E. Haschka, Helmut Herwartz
{"title":"Endogeneity in pharmaceutical knowledge generation: An instrument-free copula approach for Poisson frontier models","authors":"Rouven E. Haschka,&nbsp;Helmut Herwartz","doi":"10.1111/jems.12491","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12491","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study provides an assessment of the R&amp;D–patent relation of European pharmaceutical firms that are not flawed by endogeneity biases. Firms invest in R&amp;D and generate latent knowledge which then manifests in observable patent outcomes through a Poisson model. The process of turning R&amp;D into knowledge is described by a production process subject to inefficiency and endogeneity. To estimate a Poisson stochastic frontier model, the suggested novel copula-based approach directly accounts for the dependence between the endogenous regressors and the inefficiency component. Hence, its implementation does not require any instrumental variables. Simulation results underline that the proposed estimator outperforms conventional instrumental variable estimators. Neglecting endogeneity leads to a substantial underestimation of the R&amp;D elasticity of patents generated in the European pharmaceutical industry.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"31 4","pages":"942-960"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12491","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122763318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Challenging the incumbent: Entry in markets with captive consumers and taste heterogeneity 挑战在位者:进入消费者不受控制、口味各异的市场
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2022-06-15 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12490
Christian Oertel, Armin Schmutzler
{"title":"Challenging the incumbent: Entry in markets with captive consumers and taste heterogeneity","authors":"Christian Oertel,&nbsp;Armin Schmutzler","doi":"10.1111/jems.12490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12490","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyze entry of a firm with a new and differentiated product into a market with two properties: An existing incumbent has a captive consumer base, and all consumers have heterogeneous tastes. The interaction between the share of captive consumers and the degree of taste heterogeneity leads to nonmonotone effects of both parameters on entry: The captive share can have an inverse-U relation with entry profits, and higher taste heterogeneity (i.e., less product substitutability) can impede entry in the presence of captive consumers.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"31 4","pages":"961-979"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12490","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"137688774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Price effects of calling out market power: A study of the COVID-19 oil price shock 呼唤市场力量的价格效应:COVID-19油价冲击研究
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2022-05-19 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12485
Aaron Barkley, David P. Byrne, Xiaosong Wu
{"title":"Price effects of calling out market power: A study of the COVID-19 oil price shock","authors":"Aaron Barkley,&nbsp;David P. Byrne,&nbsp;Xiaosong Wu","doi":"10.1111/jems.12485","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12485","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Governments often make public announcements that call into question firms' misuse of market power. Yet little is known about how firms respond to them. We study gasoline retailers' price responses to antitrust announcements shaming them for price gouging during the COVID-19 pandemic. We identify price effects using a high-frequency event-study leveraging unique real-time station-level price data and well-identified, discrete antitrust announcements. We find evidence of announcement effects that depend on firms' preannouncement margins and hence exposure to being publicly shamed. Public statements by antitrust questioning firms' misuse of market power can indeed contain signals that affect equilibrium outcomes.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":"31 4","pages":"923-941"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9347766/pdf/JEMS-9999-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40676597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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