A model for dual health care market with congestion differentiation

IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Damien Besancenot, Karine Lamiraud, Radu Vranceanu
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The French market for specialist physician care has a dual legal structure: physicians must exclusively work in sector 1 and charge regulated fees or in sector 2, where they can freely set their fees. Patient out-of-pocket payments in sector 2 are partially covered by private insurance. The primary differentiating factor between both sectors is the number of patients per specialist, which in turn directly affects the overall quality of the service provided. We built an equilibrium model to analyze both specialists' decisions about which sector to work in, and patients' choice of physician and therefore sector. More specifically, the model allowed us to study the effect of changes in prices and economy-wide patient-to-specialist ratios on profits and patients' utility associated with the services provided in each sector.

Abstract Image

具有拥挤区分的双重医疗保健市场模型
法国专科医生护理市场有双重法律结构:医生必须只在第一部门工作并收取监管费用,或者在第二部门工作,在那里他们可以自由设定费用。第二区的患者自付费用部分由私人保险承保。这两个部门之间的主要区别因素是每个专家的患者数量,这反过来又直接影响所提供服务的整体质量。我们建立了一个平衡模型来分析专家关于在哪个部门工作的决定,以及患者对医生和部门的选择。更具体地说,该模型使我们能够研究价格和整个经济体患者与专家比率的变化对利润和患者在每个部门提供的服务的效用的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.30%
发文量
43
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