A theory of socially inefficient patent holdout

IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Gerard Llobet, Jorge Padilla
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

This paper proposes a framework to analyze holdout in patent licensing negotiations. We show that when the validity of a patent is probabilistic, a potential downstream user has incentives to shun to pay the price offered by a patent holder to license the technology and risk being brought to court. These incentives are exacerbated when jurisdictions are local, and the downstream producer can approach courts sequentially. The informational spillovers across trials imply that this firm often finds optimal to go to court aiming to invalidate the patent in a jurisdiction due to the knock-on effect on future jurisdictions. This process results in excessive litigation compared to when the jurisdiction is global. The distortions from sequential litigation are likely to be aggravated when final competition is accounted for or when patent injunctions are not allowed.

一种社会低效专利抵制理论
本文提出了一个分析专利许可谈判中拒不让步的框架。我们表明,当专利的有效性是概率性的时,潜在的下游用户有动机避免支付专利持有人为许可该技术而提供的价格,并面临被诉诸法庭的风险。当司法管辖区是地方性的,下游生产商可以依次向法院提起诉讼时,这些激励措施就会加剧。审判中的信息溢出意味着,由于对未来司法管辖区的连锁效应,该公司通常会找到在某个司法管辖区内旨在使专利无效的最佳途径。与管辖权为全球性时相比,这种程序会导致过多的诉讼。当考虑到最终竞争或不允许专利禁令时,顺序诉讼的扭曲可能会加剧。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.30%
发文量
43
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