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Branding vertical product line extensions 品牌垂直产品线延伸
4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2023-11-14 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12565
Thomas Jungbauer, Christian Schmid
{"title":"Branding vertical product line extensions","authors":"Thomas Jungbauer, Christian Schmid","doi":"10.1111/jems.12565","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12565","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Firms that sell vertically differentiated products infrequently roll out multiple products at the same time. In fact, it is often a firm already selling a well‐established product that decides to expand up‐ or downwards when such an opportunity arises. A critical decision in this scenario is whether to introduce the new product under an existing brand. In this paper, we develop a game‐theoretic model in which firms expand their product line to cater to a different customer segment, choosing their branding strategy, new product quality, and prices. We find that the firm's optimal branding strategy depends on both the vertical direction of the expansion and the level of competition, and identify a novel interaction effect between these factors. In particular, firms engaged in direct competition employ branding as a commitment device to soften quality competition. When these firms extend their product line upwards, this creates a misalignment between firms' actions and consumer preferences. We also derive conditions under which firms, against conventional wisdom, choose to differentiate their products more when selling them under the same brand. Finally, we characterize the welfare effects of branding in this setting, and argue that our findings are consistent with observations from the car industry.","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134954311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Product variety and design in the age of peer‐to‐peer sharing 点对点共享时代的产品种类和设计
4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2023-11-06 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12563
Yusuke Zennyo
{"title":"Product variety and design in the age of peer‐to‐peer sharing","authors":"Yusuke Zennyo","doi":"10.1111/jems.12563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12563","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The rise of peer‐to‐peer (P2P) sharing, exemplified recently by increased car‐sharing and clothing‐sharing, has altered our consumption style. One can consume goods without owning them. In fact, the ownership of goods can be monetized through P2P rental markets. These changes are regarded as influencing various strategies of manufacturers of goods being shared. Specifically, this paper examines aspects of product variety and design. A stylized model is examined in which a manufacturing firm makes a product variety decision of whether to launch a niche product line in addition to an existing mass product line. Consumers are of two types, including average consumers, who value the niche product less than the mass product, and snob consumers, who evaluate the niche product highly. Results demonstrate that the existence of P2P sharing makes consumers' ownership decisions immaterial, which alleviates difficulties of cannibalization between mass and niche product lines and which therefore encourages firms to widen their product variety. Moreover, to address issues of product design, the model is extended to allow the firm to choose the degree of niche‐serving of the second product line endogenously. Results show that P2P sharing deters a firm from designing a niche for the second product line.","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135634182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Mergers and organizational disruption: Evidence from the US airline industry 合并与组织破坏:来自美国航空业的证据
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2023-10-04 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12560
Julia González, Jorge Lemus, Guillermo Marshall
{"title":"Mergers and organizational disruption: Evidence from the US airline industry","authors":"Julia González,&nbsp;Jorge Lemus,&nbsp;Guillermo Marshall","doi":"10.1111/jems.12560","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12560","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Merger-specific efficiencies alleviate anticompetitive concerns of horizontal mergers. However, organizational challenges inherent in mergers pose a threat to achieving these efficiencies and could negatively impact the merged firm's productivity and market outcomes. We separately measure the organizational and strategic effects of mergers on quality provision using administrative data from the US airline industry, leveraging an industry-specific regulation. We find that organizational challenges (e.g., combining workforces) cause a significant reduction in the quality supplied by a merged firm. In contrast, strategic effects (e.g., market strategy) have a minor impact on quality. Also, we find that a merger can reduce the performance of both merging firms. Our results suggest a merger's organizational challenges create uncertain efficiency gains.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12560","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135590346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Less is more: A theory of minimalist luxury 少即是多:一种极简奢华的理论
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2023-09-24 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12558
Z. Jessie Liu, Pinar Yildirim, Z. John Zhang
{"title":"Less is more: A theory of minimalist luxury","authors":"Z. Jessie Liu,&nbsp;Pinar Yildirim,&nbsp;Z. John Zhang","doi":"10.1111/jems.12558","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12558","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We show theoretically that when high-quality, low-price counterfeits exist and are visibly indistinguishable from authentic products, the status-seeking wealthy may embrace a “less is more” purchasing strategy or what we refer to as the minimalist luxury strategy, to signal their status. These are the wealthy who have a high disutility of shopping for counterfeits. Specifically, in our model, only buyers know the authenticity of their own purchases. Because of this information asymmetry, these wealthy buyers may purposefully restrain from consuming luxury goods as a sacrifice of functional utility to stand out, a signaling strategy that the rest are not willing to mimic. Thus, “less” functional utility allows those status-seeking wealthy to enjoy “more” symbolic utility that the society bestows on their perceived status. This minimalist luxury strategy is in sharp contrast to Veblen's conspicuous consumption strategy, as well as to the maximalist luxury strategy proposed by Liu et al. We derive this minimalist luxury equilibrium, discuss how signaling in our context can differ from that of Veblen and Liu et al., and explore its managerial implications for the luxury goods industry.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135925721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategic automation and decision-making authority 战略自动化和决策权
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2023-09-18 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12557
Mustafa Dogan, Alexandre Jacquillat, Pinar Yildirim
{"title":"Strategic automation and decision-making authority","authors":"Mustafa Dogan,&nbsp;Alexandre Jacquillat,&nbsp;Pinar Yildirim","doi":"10.1111/jems.12557","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12557","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies how automation impacts the structure of decision-making in organizations. We develop a theoretical model of a firm, where a principal makes a decision about how much to prioritize the new product development division when the division is led by a manager who holds private information specific to this division and has misaligned preferences with the principal. The principal chooses whether to decentralize this decision by delegating it to the manager, resulting in more informed but unbiased decision. In this setting, we investigate how automation which reduces operational variability may alter this choice of organizational structure. The findings from our analysis show that firms deploy automation resources differently depending on their organizational structure: centralized firms choose to automate divisions that face more uncertainty, while decentralized firms do the opposite. Moreover, increasing access to automation results in higher centralization of decision-making in firms. In the extensions, we show that the strategic use of automation reduces the informativeness of intrafirm communication, and also, that automation can be a strategic substitute to monetary contracts.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135202825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Partial ownership, control, and investment in vertical relationships 垂直关系中的部分所有权、控制权和投资
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2023-09-06 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12559
Nadav Levy
{"title":"Partial ownership, control, and investment in vertical relationships","authors":"Nadav Levy","doi":"10.1111/jems.12559","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12559","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines whether partial ownership of a trading partner can alleviate hold-up problems and promote relationship-specific investments. Unlike a silent financial interest, which does not give the owner control over the partner and promotes both parties' investments, partial control over the partner could reduce the partner's investment and lead the owner to overinvest, thereby decreasing the joint surplus. The inability of the owner to restrain himself from abusing his control limits the effectiveness of partial ownership. An analysis of the control environment should be part of the empirical analysis of partial ownership and the assessment of its potential benefits by competition authorities.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12559","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135202488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Augmenting physicians with artificial intelligence to transform healthcare: Challenges and opportunities 用人工智能辅助医生，改变医疗保健：挑战与机遇
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12555
Ritu Agarwal, Michelle Dugas, Guodong (Gordon) Gao
{"title":"Augmenting physicians with artificial intelligence to transform healthcare: Challenges and opportunities","authors":"Ritu Agarwal,&nbsp;Michelle Dugas,&nbsp;Guodong (Gordon) Gao","doi":"10.1111/jems.12555","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12555","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We reflect on the progress and prospects of artificial intelligence (AI)-powered transformation in healthcare from the perspective of front-line clinical professionals responsible for care delivery. While there is considerable optimism about the potential of AI, critical gaps in understanding remain that represent fruitful opportunities for economics and management scholars. We outline the ways in which the strengths of AI can compensate for key limitations of physicians. We then focus on productive use of AI by physicians, highlighting the need for a deeper understanding of human-AI teaming. We argue that productive teaming requires research on two critical issues: trust in AI and the redesign of clinical workflow to optimally accommodate artificial and human intelligence synergistically.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131329973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Monopoly pricing with dual-capacity constraints 双容量约束下的垄断定价
IF 1.9 4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12556
Robert Somogyi
{"title":"Monopoly pricing with dual-capacity constraints","authors":"Robert Somogyi","doi":"10.1111/jems.12556","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jems.12556","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies the price-setting behavior of a monopoly facing two capacity constraints: one on the number of its consumers, and the other on the amount of products it can sell. The characterization of the firm's optimal pricing and optimal customer mix as a function of its two capacities reveals a rich structure. In contrast to the results under one-dimensional capacity constraints with constant marginal cost of production, a firm may optimally respond to an exogenous reduction in one of its capacities by decreasing one of its prices. Moreover, neglecting the existence of the second capacity constraint can reverse some policy interventions' effects on consumer welfare. In particular, easing a regulatory restriction on one of the constraints may harm the average consumer.</p>","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jems.12556","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126525016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does sunk‐cost affect prices? Evidence from the US airline industry 沉没成本会影响价格吗?来自美国航空业的证据
4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2023-06-29 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12554
Long Shi, Qihong Liu, Myongjin Kim
{"title":"Does sunk‐cost affect prices? Evidence from the US airline industry","authors":"Long Shi, Qihong Liu, Myongjin Kim","doi":"10.1111/jems.12554","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12554","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In contrast to the extensive literature on behavior bias by individuals, studies on behavior bias by firms have been relatively scarce. We explore the possibility of the latter in the context of US airlines, where fuel hedging leads to lump sum gains or losses which may impact airlines' pricing decisions. Our results show that the (sunk) hedging gains or losses affect airlines' ticket prices. In particular, a 10% reduction in airlines' reported fuel costs (due to hedging gains) leads to a 2.2% reduction in ticket prices. Moving onto nonprice decisions, we find that hedging gains lead airlines to use larger aircraft and reduce the airtime of their flights, yet have no impact on the number of routes and flights which the airlines operate. Our results provide empirical evidence that fixed/sunk costs can affect firms' prices and nonprice decisions, establish a link between financial market and product market competition, and have important welfare/policy and managerial implications.","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135100096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bundling of authority and accountability in organizations 组织中权力和责任的捆绑
4区 管理学
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2023-06-27 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12553
Susheng Wang
{"title":"Bundling of authority and accountability in organizations","authors":"Susheng Wang","doi":"10.1111/jems.12553","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12553","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Decision‐making authority is often bundled with accountability. Decision makers are usually made accountable for failure. We propose an incomplete‐contract approach to investigate four accountability systems: personal accountability, no accountability, collective accountability, and reverse accountability. We consider an organization defined by three assignments: income, authority, and accountability. These assignments are endogenously and jointly determined in equilibrium. Our main findings are: (1) authority and accountability are usually, but not always, bundled in equilibrium; (2) personal accountability and collective accountability are equally efficient, and no accountability and reverse accountability are equally efficient; (3) no accountability can be optimal if the authority is quite capable; (4) control tends to be assigned to managers whose personal benefit from and the marginal cost of control are relatively small; and (5) reverse accountability is generally inferior to personal accountability, but it can be optimal if the authority is quite capable and her marginal cost and personal benefit from control are sufficiently small.","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135454077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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