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Social Choice and Welfare最新文献

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Berge equilibrium, altruism and social welfare 伯格均衡、利他主义和社会福利
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-03-28 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01514-5
Hans Haller
{"title":"Berge equilibrium, altruism and social welfare","authors":"Hans Haller","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01514-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01514-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Welfare and other properties of Berge equilibria are investigated. In particular, we address the questions to what extent Berge equilibrium can select from multiple Nash equilibria; can serve as a substitute for Nash equilibria; can Pareto improve upon Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, some of the recent results on the relation between Berge equilibria and Kantian equilibria are summarized.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140323865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Forms of new democracy 新民主的形式
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-03-27 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01505-y
Hans Gersbach
{"title":"Forms of new democracy","authors":"Hans Gersbach","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01505-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01505-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the third decade of the 21st century, digitization and artificial intelligence, global events, challenges from authoritarian states, and difficulties of particular democracies to function properly confront democracy with a new series of challenges and opportunities that will force it to reinvent itself. The last decades have produced an accelerating flow of ideas for new forms of democracy. We survey a long period in the quest for such new forms and point to next inventions for such forms. We suggest to experiment with new ways for democracy to extend the choice of democratic processes that can be implemented in real-life situations, with the beneficial side-effect that democracy might remain the only sustainable structure for self-governing societies.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140323596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dynamic proportional rankings 动态比例排名
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-03-20 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01498-8
{"title":"Dynamic proportional rankings","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01498-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01498-8","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>Proportional ranking rules aggregate approval-style preferences of agents into a collective ranking such that groups of agents with similar preferences are adequately represented. Motivated by the application of live Q&amp;A platforms, where submitted questions need to be ranked based on the interests of the audience, we study a dynamic extension of the proportional rankings setting. In our setting, the goal is to maintain the proportionality of a ranking when alternatives (i.e., questions)—not necessarily from the top of the ranking—get selected sequentially. We propose generalizations of well-known ranking rules to this setting and study their monotonicity and proportionality properties. We also evaluate the performance of these rules experimentally, using realistic probabilistic assumptions on the selection procedure.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140204937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Christian Klamler’s ”A distance measure for choice functions” [Social Choice and Welfare 30 (2008) 419–425]: a correction Christian Klamler 的 "选择函数的距离测量"[《社会选择与福利》30 (2008) 419-425]：更正
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-03-14 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01497-9
{"title":"Christian Klamler’s ”A distance measure for choice functions” [Social Choice and Welfare 30 (2008) 419–425]: a correction","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01497-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01497-9","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>An extensive choice over <em>X</em> is a function assigning to any subset <em>S</em> of <em>X</em> a possibly empty subset of <em>S</em>. Klamler (Soc Choice Welf 30:419–425, 2008) shows that the operation of symmetric difference induces a metric on the family of extensive choices over <em>X</em>, and this metric is characterized by five axioms <span>A1</span>–<span>A5</span>. We provide counterexamples to Klamler’s result, suggest a slight modification of axioms <span>A4</span> and <span>A5</span> to obtain a correct characterization, and finally observe that axiom <span>A4</span> is redundant.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140147047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility 关于帕累托效率和贝叶斯激励相容性的一般不可能性定理
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-03-14 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01515-4
{"title":"A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01515-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01515-4","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>This paper studies a general class of social choice problems in which agents’ payoff functions (or types) are privately observable random variables, and monetary transfers are not available. We consider cardinal social choice functions which may respond to agents’ preference intensities as well as preference rankings. We show that a social choice function is ex ante Pareto efficient and Bayesian incentive compatible if and only if it is dictatorial. The result holds for arbitrary numbers of agents and alternatives, and under a fairly weak assumption on the joint distribution of types, which allows for arbitrary correlations and asymmetries.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"72 9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140147311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Axiomatization of some power indices in voting games with abstention 弃权投票博弈中某些权力指数的公理化
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-03-13 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01517-2
Joseph Siani, Bertrand Tchantcho, Bill Proces Tsague
{"title":"Axiomatization of some power indices in voting games with abstention","authors":"Joseph Siani, Bertrand Tchantcho, Bill Proces Tsague","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01517-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01517-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Power measures are used to quantify the influence of members of a democratic institution. We consider voting games with abstention or (3,2) games, which are decision-making processes in which voting options include yes, no and abstention. The power indices that we study are based on the notions of minimal and shift minimal winning tripartitions. We define and characterize the Deegan–Packel and shift Deegan–Packel power indices in the class of (3,2) games. Furthermore, owing to the parameterization result obtained by Freixas et al. (Discret Appl Math 255:21–39, 2019), we provide computational formulae of these indices in the class of I-complete (3,2) games. These formulae allow us to determine the power of each player in a game, regardless of the number of minimal and/or shift minimal winning tripartitions of the game.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"2016 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140116298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Overbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems 一揽子分配问题中的过高出价和过低出价
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-03-09 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01506-5
Marina Núñez, Francisco Robles
{"title":"Overbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems","authors":"Marina Núñez, Francisco Robles","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01506-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01506-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the problem of allocating packages of different objects to a group of bidders. A rule is overbidding-proof if no bidder has incentives to bid above his actual valuations. We prove that if an efficient rule is overbidding-proof, then each winning bidder pays a price between his winning bid and what he would pay in a Vickrey auction for the same package. In counterpart, the set of rules that satisfy underbidding-proofness always charge a price below the corresponding Vickrey price. A new characterization of the Vickrey allocation rule is provided with a weak form of strategy-proofness. The Vickrey rule is the only rule that satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, overbidding-proofness and underbidding-proofness. Our results are also valid on the domains of monotonic valuations and of single-minded bidders. Finally a family of overbidding rules is introduced that price the assigned packages at a fixed average of the Vickrey price and the pay-as-bid price.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140097131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do conservative central bankers weaken the chances of conservative politicians? 保守派中央银行家是否会削弱保守派政治家的机会？
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-03-08 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01509-2
{"title":"Do conservative central bankers weaken the chances of conservative politicians?","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01509-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01509-2","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>In this paper, we challenge the claim that a conservative central bank strengthens the likelihood of a conservative government. In contrast, if an election is based on the comparative advantages of the candidates, an inflation-averse central banker can deter the chances of a conservative candidate because once inflation is removed, its comparative advantage in the fight against inflation disappears. We develop a theory based on a policy-mix game with electoral competition, predicting that a tighter monetary policy reduces the chances of a conservative (i.e., inflation-adverse) party while enhancing the chances for a liberal party. To test these predictions, we examine monthly data of British political history between 1987 and 2015, and show that an increase in the interest rate in the 10 months preceding a national election decreases the popularity of a Tory government. Our analysis on a panel of six OECD countries reveals that a pre-election increase of 1 percentage point in the main targeted interest rate rises the popularity of liberal parties by around 3.43 percentage points relative to its trend.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"65 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140070998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Collective or individual rationality in the Nash bargaining solution: efficiency-free characterizations 纳什讨价还价方案中的集体理性或个人理性：无效率特征
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-03-04 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01513-6
Kensei Nakamura
{"title":"Collective or individual rationality in the Nash bargaining solution: efficiency-free characterizations","authors":"Kensei Nakamura","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01513-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01513-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the classical bargaining problem, we propose a very mild axiom of individual rationality, which we call <i>possibility of utility gain</i>. This requires that for at least one bargaining problem, there exists at least one player who reaches a higher utility level than their disagreement utility. This paper shows that the Nash solution (Nash in Econometrica 18(2):155–162, 1950) is characterized by <i>possibility of utility gain</i> and continuity with respect to feasible sets together with Nash’s axioms except <i>weak Pareto optimality</i>. We also show that in Nash’s theorem, <i>weak Pareto optimality</i> can be replaced by <i>conflict-freeness</i> (introduced by Rachmilevitch in Math Soc Sci 76(C):107–109, 2015). This demands that when the agreement most preferred by all players is feasible, this should be chosen. Furthermore, we provide alternative and unified proofs for other efficiency-free characterizations of the Nash solution. This clarifies the role of each axiom in the related results.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"268 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140037978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Approval-based voting with mixed goods 混合商品的认可型投票
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-02-27 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01511-8
{"title":"Approval-based voting with mixed goods","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01511-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01511-8","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>We consider a voting scenario in which the resource to be voted upon may consist of both indivisible and divisible goods. This setting generalizes both the well-studied model of multiwinner voting and the recently introduced model of cake sharing. Under approval votes, we propose two variants of the extended justified representation (EJR) notion from multiwinner voting, a stronger one called <em>EJR for mixed goods (EJR-M)</em> and a weaker one called <em>EJR up to</em> 1 <em>(EJR-1)</em>. We extend three multiwinner voting rules to our setting—GreedyEJR, the method of equal shares (MES), and proportional approval voting (PAV)—and show that while all three generalizations satisfy EJR-1, only the first one provides EJR-M. In addition, we derive tight bounds on the proportionality degree implied by EJR-M and EJR-1, and investigate the proportionality degree of our proposed rules.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"49 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139980324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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