不完全信息的二次融资

IF 0.5 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-02-24 DOI:10.1007/s00355-024-01512-7

Luis Mota Freitas, Wilfredo L. Maldonado

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引用次数: 0

摘要

四元资金是一种公共物品提供机制，它满足理想的理论特性，如完全信息下的效率，并在实际应用中越来越受欢迎。我们在个人偏好信息不完全的情况下对这一机制进行了评估，并证明这一结果只有在刀刃条件下才成立。我们还估算了该机制在各种情况下的低效率，并描述了低效率随人口数量增加而增加的情况。我们展示了如何利用这些发现来估计不完全信息下各种情况下机制的低效率。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

Quadratic funding with incomplete information

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Quadratic funding with incomplete information

Quadratic funding is a public good provision mechanism that satisfies desirable theoretical properties, such as efficiency under complete information, and has been gaining popularity in practical applications. We evaluate this mechanism in a setting of incomplete information regarding individual preferences, and show that this result only holds under knife-edge conditions. We also estimate the inefficiency of the mechanism in a variety of settings, and characterize circumstances in which inefficiency increases with population size. We show how these findings can be used to estimate the mechanism’s inefficiency in a wide range of situations under incomplete information.

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来源期刊

Social Choice and Welfare Multiple-

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

11.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： Social Choice and Welfare explores all aspects, both normative and positive, of welfare economics, collective choice, and strategic interaction. Topics include but are not limited to: preference aggregation, welfare criteria, fairness, justice and equity, rights, inequality and poverty measurement, voting and elections, political games, coalition formation, public goods, mechanism design, networks, matching, optimal taxation, cost-benefit analysis, computational social choice, judgement aggregation, market design, behavioral welfare economics, subjective well-being studies and experimental investigations related to social choice and voting. As such, the journal is inter-disciplinary and cuts across the boundaries of economics, political science, philosophy, and mathematics. Articles on choice and order theory that include results that can be applied to the above topics are also included in the journal. While it emphasizes theory, the journal also publishes empirical work in the subject area reflecting cross-fertilizing between theoretical and empirical research. Readers will find original research articles, surveys, and book reviews.Officially cited as: Soc Choice Welf