Social Choice and Welfare最新文献

Characterizing the top trading cycles rule for housing markets with lexicographic preferences when externalities are limited. 在外部性有限的情况下，用词典偏好描述住房市场的顶级交易周期规则。

IF 0.8 4区经济学

Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2025-01-01 Epub Date: 2024-11-08 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01556-9

Bettina Klaus

{"title":"Characterizing the top trading cycles rule for housing markets with lexicographic preferences when externalities are limited.","authors":"Bettina Klaus","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01556-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01556-9","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a housing market model with limited externalities where agents care both about their own consumption via demand preferences and about the agent who receives their endowment via supply preferences [we extend the associated lexicographic preference domains introduced in Klaus and Meo (Econ Theory 76:779- 811, 2023)]. If preferences are demand lexicographic, then our model extends the classical Shapley-Scarf housing market (Shapley and Scarf, J Math Econ 1:23-37, 1974) with strict preferences model. Our main result is a characterization of the corresponding top trading cycles (TTC) rule by individual rationality, pair efficiency, and strategy-proofness (Theorem 1), which extends that of Ekici (Theo Econ 19:551-564, 2024) from classical Shapley-Scarf housing markets with strict preferences to our model. Two further characterizations are immediately obtained by strengthening pair efficiency to either Pareto efficiency or pairwise stability (Corollaries 1 and 2). Finally, we show that as soon as we extend the preference domain to include demand lexicographic as well as supply lexicographic preferences (e.g., when preferences are separable), no rule satisfying individual rationality, pair efficiency, and strategy-proofness exists (Theorem 2).","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"65 1","pages":"1-26"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12335408/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144822892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The impact of timing and type of donation decision on charitable giving. 捐赠决策的时机和类型对慈善捐赠的影响。

IF 0.8 4区经济学

Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2025-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-01-31 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01572-9

Marina Chugunova, Andreas Nicklisch, Kai-Uwe Schnapp

引用次数: 0

Allocation without transfers: a welfare-maximizing mechanism under incomplete information 无转移的分配：不完全信息下的福利最大化机制

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-09-19 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01552-z

Ethem Akyol

引用次数: 0

Flexible representative democracy 灵活的代议制民主

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-09-09 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01543-0

Ben Abramowitz, Nicholas Mattei

{"title":"Flexible representative democracy","authors":"Ben Abramowitz, Nicholas Mattei","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01543-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01543-0","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce Flexible Representative Democracy (FRD), a novel hybrid of Representative Democracy and Direct Democracy in which voters can alter the issue-dependent weights of a set of elected representatives. In line with the literature on Interactive Democracy, our model allows the voters to actively determine the degree to which the system is direct versus representative. However, unlike Liquid Democracy, Flexible Representative Democracy uses strictly non-transitive delegations, making delegation cycles impossible, and maintains a fixed set of accountable, elected representatives. We present Flexible Representative Democracy and analyze it using a computational approach with issues that are binary and symmetric. We compare the outcomes of various voting systems using Direct Democracy with majority voting as an ideal baseline. First, we demonstrate the shortcomings of Representative Democracy in our model. We provide NP-Hardness results for electing an ideal set of representatives, discuss pathologies, and demonstrate empirically that common multi-winner election rules for selecting representatives do not perform well in expectation. To analyze the effects of adding delegation to representative voting systems, we begin by providing theoretical results on how issue-specific delegations determine outcomes. Finally, we provide empirical results comparing the outcomes of various voting systems: Representative Democracy, Proxy Voting, and FRD with issue-specific delegations. Our results show that variants of Proxy Voting yield no discernible benefit over unweighted representatives and reveal the potential for Flexible Representative Democracy to improve outcomes as voter participation increases.","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142224781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

An axiomatic characterization of Split Cycle 分裂循环的公理化特征

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-09-06 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01539-w

Yifeng Ding, Wesley H. Holliday, Eric Pacuit

{"title":"An axiomatic characterization of Split Cycle","authors":"Yifeng Ding, Wesley H. Holliday, Eric Pacuit","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01539-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01539-w","url":null,"abstract":"A number of rules for resolving majority cycles in elections have been proposed in the literature. Recently, Holliday and Pacuit (J Theor Polit 33:475–524, 2021) axiomatically characterized the class of rules refined by one such cycle-resolving rule, dubbed Split Cycle: in each majority cycle, discard the majority preferences with the smallest majority margin. They showed that any rule satisfying five standard axioms plus a weakening of Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), called Coherent IIA, is refined by Split Cycle. In this paper, we go further and show that Split Cycle is the only rule satisfying the axioms of Holliday and Pacuit together with two additional axioms, which characterize the class of rules that refine Split Cycle: Coherent Defeat and Positive Involvement in Defeat. Coherent Defeat states that any majority preference not occurring in a cycle is retained, while Positive Involvement in Defeat is closely related to the well-known axiom of Positive Involvement (as in J Pérez Soc Choice Welf 18:601–616, 2001). We characterize Split Cycle not only as a collective choice rule but also as a social choice correspondence, over both profiles of linear ballots and profiles of ballots allowing ties.","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142191037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The character of non-manipulable collective choices between two alternatives 两个备选方案之间不可操控的集体选择的特征

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-09-03 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01546-x

Achille Basile, K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao, Surekha Rao

引用次数: 0

Natural interviewing equilibria in matching settings 匹配设置中的自然面试均衡

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-08-30 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01541-2

Allan Borodin, Joanna Drummond, Kate Larson, Omer Lev

{"title":"Natural interviewing equilibria in matching settings","authors":"Allan Borodin, Joanna Drummond, Kate Larson, Omer Lev","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01541-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01541-2","url":null,"abstract":"A common assumption in matching markets is that both sides fully know their preferences. However, when there are many participants this may be neither realistic nor feasible. Instead, agents may have some partial (perhaps stochastic) information about alternatives and will invest time and resources to better understand the inherent benefits and tradeoffs of different choices. Using the framework of matching medical residents with hospital programs, we study strategic behaviour by residents in a setting where hospitals maintain a publicly known master list of residents (i.e., all hospitals have an identical ranking of all the residents, for example, based on grades) and residents have to decide with which hospitals to interview, before submitting their preferences to the matching mechanism. We first show the existence of pure strategy equilibrium under very general conditions. We then study the setting when residents’ preferences are drawn from a known Mallows distribution. We prove that assortative equilibrium (k top residents interview with k top hospitals, etc.) arises only when residents interview with a small number of programs. Surprisingly, such equilibria (or even weaker notions of assortative interviewing) do not exist when residents can interview with many hospital programs, even when residents’ preferences are very similar. Simulations on possible outcome equilibrium indicate that some residents will pursue a reach/safety strategy.","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142191013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Matching markets with farsighted couples 为市场和有远见的夫妇牵线搭桥

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-08-08 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01544-z

Ata Atay, Sylvain Funck, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch

引用次数: 0

Decentralized pure exchange processes on networks 网络上分散的纯交换过程

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-08-05 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01542-1

Daniele Cassese, Paolo Pin

引用次数: 0

Optimal labor income taxation: the role of the skill distribution 最优劳动所得税：技能分布的作用