Social Choice and Welfare最新文献_第2页

Padding and pruning: gerrymandering under turnout heterogeneity 填充与修剪：投票异质性下的选区划分

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-07-09 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01536-z

Andrei Gomberg, Romans Pancs, Tridib Sharma

引用次数: 0

Partitionable choice functions and stability 可分割选择函数和稳定性

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-07-09 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01534-1

Umut Dur, Thayer Morrill, William Phan

引用次数: 0

Generalized welfare lower bounds and strategyproofness in sequencing problems 排序问题中的广义福利下界和策略防错

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-07-09 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01531-4

Sreoshi Banerjee, Parikshit De, Manipushpak Mitra

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On the optimality of policy choices in the face of biased beliefs, retrospective voting and the down-up problem 论面对偏差信念、追溯投票和上行问题时政策选择的最优性

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-06-24 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01533-2

Carlos Seixas, Diogo Lourenço

引用次数: 0

Patent package structures and sharing rules for royalty revenue 专利包结构和专利使用费收入分享规则

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-06-20 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01532-3

Takaaki Abe, Emiko Fukuda, Shigeo Muto

引用次数: 0

Sequential school choice with public and private schools 公立和私立学校的顺序性择校

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-06-20 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01527-0

Tommy Andersson, Umut Dur, Sinan Ertemel, Onur Kesten

引用次数: 0

Selection closedness and scoring correspondences 选择封闭性和评分对应

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-06-03 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01529-y

Semih Koray, Talat Senocak

{"title":"Selection closedness and scoring correspondences","authors":"Semih Koray, Talat Senocak","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01529-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01529-y","url":null,"abstract":"Universal self-selectivity of a social choice function (SCF) F defined in Koray (Econometrica 68:981–995, 2000) implies that F is either dictatorial or anti-dictatorial. In an attempt to escape this impossibility, here we weaken self-selectivity of an SCF by introducing the notion of selection-closedness pertaining to families of SCFs. As in the self-selectivity setting, a society, which is to make a choice from a set A of alternatives, is also to choose the choice rule that will be employed in making that choice. Self-selectivity of an SCF F requires that F outrivals all available SCFs by selecting itself from among them if it is also used in choosing the choice rule, where the societal preferences on the available SCFs are induced from those on the set A of alternatives in a consequentialist way. Given a collection ({mathscr {F}}) of SCFs and a nonempty finite set ({mathcal {A}}) of available SCFs containing also members of ({mathscr {F}},) an SCF in ({mathscr {F}} cap {mathcal {A}}) is now not required any more to select itself from ({mathcal {A}},) but it suffices that it selects some member of ({mathscr {F}}) for ({mathscr {F}}) to be selection-closed. It is shown that a proper subset of the collection of all neutral SCFs is selection-closed if and only if all its members are either dictatorships or anti-dictatorships. We further weaken the notion of selection-closedness to an extent that not only enables us to escape the impossibility result, but also equips us with a yardstick to compare correspondences as to whether or not their singleton valued refinements form a weakly selection-closed family. A rich family of scoring correspondences with strict scoring vectors are shown to pass the test of weak selection-closedness, while the Pareto and Condorcet correspondences fail.","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"70 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141256656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Dynamically rational judgment aggregation 动态合理的判断汇总

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-05-15 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01516-3

Franz Dietrich, Christian List

{"title":"Dynamically rational judgment aggregation","authors":"Franz Dietrich, Christian List","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01516-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01516-3","url":null,"abstract":"Judgment-aggregation theory has always focused on the attainment of rational collective judgments. But so far, rationality has been understood in static terms: as coherence of judgments at a given time, defined as consistency, completeness, and/or deductive closure. This paper asks whether collective judgments can be dynamically rational, so that they change rationally in response to new information. Formally, a judgment aggregation rule is dynamically rational with respect to a given revision operator if, whenever all individuals revise their judgments in light of some information (a learnt proposition), then the new aggregate judgments are the old ones revised in light of this information, i.e., aggregation and revision commute. We prove an impossibility theorem: if the propositions on the agenda are non-trivially connected, no judgment aggregation rule with standard properties is dynamically rational with respect to any revision operator satisfying some basic conditions. Our theorem is the dynamic-rationality counterpart of some well-known impossibility theorems for static rationality. We also explore how dynamic rationality might be achieved by relaxing some of the conditions on the aggregation rule and/or the revision operator. Notably, premise-based aggregation rules are dynamically rational with respect to so-called premise-based revision operators.","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141060697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Private provision of public goods under price uncertainty: a comment 价格不确定情况下私人提供公共产品：评论

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-05-09 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01526-1

Etienne Billette de Villemeur, Sebastián Cea-Echenique, Conrado Cuevas

引用次数: 0

Fair group decisions via non-deterministic proportional consensus 通过非确定性比例共识做出公平的小组决策

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-05-04 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01524-3

Jobst Heitzig, Forest W. Simmons, Sara M. Constantino

{"title":"Fair group decisions via non-deterministic proportional consensus","authors":"Jobst Heitzig, Forest W. Simmons, Sara M. Constantino","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01524-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01524-3","url":null,"abstract":"Are there group decision methods which (i) give everyone, including minorities, an equal share of effective decision power even when voters act strategically, (ii) promote consensus and equality, rather than polarization and inequality, and (iii) do not favour the status quo or rely too much on chance? We describe two non-deterministic group decision methods that meet these criteria, one based on automatic bargaining over lotteries, the other on conditional commitments to approve compromise options. Using theoretical analysis, agent-based simulations and a behavioral experiment, we show that these methods prevent majorities from consistently suppressing minorities, which can happen in deterministic methods, and keeps proponents of the status quo from blocking decisions, as in other consensus-based approaches. Our simulations show that these methods achieve aggregate welfare comparable to common voting methods, while employing chance judiciously, and that the welfare costs of fairness and consensus are small compared to the inequality costs of majoritarianism. In an incentivized experiment with naive participants, we find that a sizable fraction of participants prefers to use a non-deterministic voting method over Plurality Voting to allocate monetary resources. However, this depends critically on their position within the group. Those in the majority show a strong preference for majoritarian voting methods.","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140881477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0