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Decentralized pure exchange processes on networks 网络上分散的纯交换过程
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-08-05 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01542-1
Daniele Cassese, Paolo Pin
{"title":"Decentralized pure exchange processes on networks","authors":"Daniele Cassese, Paolo Pin","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01542-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01542-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We define a class of pure exchange Edgeworth trading processes that under minimal assumptions converge to a stable set in the space of allocations, and characterise the Pareto set of these processes. Choosing a specific process belonging to this class, that we define <i>fair trading</i>, we analyse the trade dynamics between agents located on a weighted network. We determine the conditions under which there always exists a one-to-one map between the set of networks and the set of limit points of the dynamics, and derive an analog of the Second Welfare Theorem for networks. This result is used to explore what is the effect of the network topology on the trade dynamics and on the final allocation.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141932610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal labor income taxation: the role of the skill distribution 最优劳动所得税：技能分布的作用
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-07-25 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01540-3
Dingquan Miao
{"title":"Optimal labor income taxation: the role of the skill distribution","authors":"Dingquan Miao","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01540-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01540-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I analyze the role of the distribution of skills in shaping optimal nonlinear income tax schedules. I use theoretical skill distributions as well as empirical skill distributions for 14 OECD countries. I find that a more dispersed log-normal skill distribution implies a more progressive optimal tax schedule. Optimal marginal tax rates should be lower throughout if a greater number of unskilled agents cluster at the bottom, and the scheme is more progressive if a greater number of agents locate at the top. I also highlight how the impact of the skill distribution is affected by the form of the social welfare function and the utility function. The findings using empirical skill distributions suggest that the results are sensitive to the type of statistical estimator used to estimate the skill distribution.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"94 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141779680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Preference heterogeneity over the aspects of individual well-being: towards the construction of an applied well-being index 个人福祉各方面的偏好异质性：构建应用福祉指数
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-07-19 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01537-y
Adi Arad, Steven Laufer, Zohar Or Sharvit, Yaniv Reingewertz, Michael Hartal
{"title":"Preference heterogeneity over the aspects of individual well-being: towards the construction of an applied well-being index","authors":"Adi Arad, Steven Laufer, Zohar Or Sharvit, Yaniv Reingewertz, Michael Hartal","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01537-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01537-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Measuring the well-being of individuals is a significant challenge for social scientists, policy makers, and suppliers of social programming, since well-being consists of many dimensions that are difficult to measure, both individually and collectively. Moreover, the relative contribution of each of the various aspects to overall well-being is unknown. We try to answer this challenge using the methodology of Benjamin et al. (Am Econ Rev 104(9):2698–2735, 2014) and using a survey that measures preferences over 27 aspects of individual well-being. We provide estimates of these preferences for a representative sample of the Israeli population. We also document heterogeneity in preferences for respondents with different current levels of well-being and for different demographic groups. For some aspects of well-being, we provide evidence of decreasing marginal utility. For other aspects, we find evidence for what appears to be an increasing marginal utility but we argue that it likely reflects an endogenous determination of the level of well-being. We discuss the policy implications of our findings and how our results could be aggregated to a well-being index that could be used to evaluate and compare the effects of different policy interventions.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"71 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141744478","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Probabilistic models of profiles for voting by evaluation 通过评估进行投票的概况概率模型
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-07-09 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01535-0
Antoine Rolland, Jean-Baptiste Aubin, Irène Gannaz, Samuela Leoni
{"title":"Probabilistic models of profiles for voting by evaluation","authors":"Antoine Rolland, Jean-Baptiste Aubin, Irène Gannaz, Samuela Leoni","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01535-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01535-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Considering voting rules based on evaluation inputs rather than preference rankings modifies the paradigm of probabilistic studies of voting procedures. This article proposes several simulation models for generating evaluation-based voting inputs. These models can cope with dependent and non identical marginal distributions of the evaluations received by the candidates. A last part is devoted to fitting these models to real data sets.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141574344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Padding and pruning: gerrymandering under turnout heterogeneity 填充与修剪：投票异质性下的选区划分
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-07-09 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01536-z
Andrei Gomberg, Romans Pancs, Tridib Sharma
{"title":"Padding and pruning: gerrymandering under turnout heterogeneity","authors":"Andrei Gomberg, Romans Pancs, Tridib Sharma","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01536-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01536-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Padding is the practice of adding nonvoters (e.g., noncitizens or disenfranchised prisoners) to an electoral district in order to ensure that the district meets the size quota prescribed by the one man, one vote doctrine without affecting the voting outcome in the district. We show how padding— and its mirror image, pruning—, can lead to arbitrarily large deviations from the socially optimal composition of elected legislatures. We solve the partisan districter’s optimal padding problem.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141574341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Partitionable choice functions and stability 可分割选择函数和稳定性
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-07-09 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01534-1
Umut Dur, Thayer Morrill, William Phan
{"title":"Partitionable choice functions and stability","authors":"Umut Dur, Thayer Morrill, William Phan","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01534-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01534-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider the two-sided many-to-one matching problem and introduce a class of preferences reflecting natural forms of complementarities. For example, academic departments hire seniors and then supporting juniors, teams recruit different roles and specialties, starting with the critical ones, and firms hire workers at various levels, starting with the executives. The key feature is that a firm can partition workers into types and prioritize certain types before others. Despite this partitionability requirement of choice functions being weaker than substitutes—an essential condition concerning the existence of a stable assignment—we show that it still guarantees the existence of a stable assignment and is further a maximal domain for such.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"65 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141574342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Generalized welfare lower bounds and strategyproofness in sequencing problems 排序问题中的广义福利下界和策略防错
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-07-09 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01531-4
Sreoshi Banerjee, Parikshit De, Manipushpak Mitra
{"title":"Generalized welfare lower bounds and strategyproofness in sequencing problems","authors":"Sreoshi Banerjee, Parikshit De, Manipushpak Mitra","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01531-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01531-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In an environment with private information, we study the class of sequencing problems with welfare lower bounds. The “generalized welfare lower bound” represents some of the lower bounds that have been previously studied in the literature. Every agent is offered a protection in the form of a minimum guarantee on their utilities. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition to identify an outcome efficient and strategyproof mechanism that satisfies generalized welfare lower bound. We then characterize the entire class of mechanisms that satisfy outcome efficiency, strategyproofness and generalized welfare lower bound. These are termed as “relative pivotal mechanisms”. Our paper proposes relevant theoretical applications namely; ex-ante initial order, identical costs bound and expected cost bound. We also give insights on the issues of feasibility and/or budget balance.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141574343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the optimality of policy choices in the face of biased beliefs, retrospective voting and the down-up problem 论面对偏差信念、追溯投票和上行问题时政策选择的最优性
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-06-24 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01533-2
Carlos Seixas, Diogo Lourenço
{"title":"On the optimality of policy choices in the face of biased beliefs, retrospective voting and the down-up problem","authors":"Carlos Seixas, Diogo Lourenço","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01533-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01533-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Previous literature has shown that voters’ biased beliefs regarding policy outcomes incentivize the selection of seemingly better, but socially worse, policies. It has also shown that voters’ tendency to gauge an incumbent’s competence by the present state of the economy (retrospective voting) could counteract biased beliefs. In this article, we argue that, when the advantageous consequences of a measure of policy only accrue with considerable lag (the down-up problem), retrospective voting instead amplifies the effects of biased beliefs. Still, we find that it may nevertheless be optimal for an incumbent to select good long-term policies if the incumbent is strongly motivated by the success of the chosen policies. Finally, we investigate the robustness of these conclusions by considering an incumbent bias, limited accountability, and the introduction of incentive and threshold contracts.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"73 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141511811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Patent package structures and sharing rules for royalty revenue 专利包结构和专利使用费收入分享规则
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-06-20 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01532-3
Takaaki Abe, Emiko Fukuda, Shigeo Muto
{"title":"Patent package structures and sharing rules for royalty revenue","authors":"Takaaki Abe, Emiko Fukuda, Shigeo Muto","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01532-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01532-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The role of patent pools—one-stop systems that gather patents from multiple patent holders and offer them to users as a package—is gaining research attention. To bolster the scarce stream of the literature that has addressed how a patent pool agent distributes royalty revenues among patent holders, we conduct an axiomatic analysis of sharing rules for royalty revenue derived from patents managed by a patent pool agent. In our framework, the patent pool agent organizes the patents into some packages, which we call a package structure. By using the hypergraph formulation developed by van den Nouweland et al. (Int J Game Theory 20:255–268, 1992), we analyze sharing rules that consider the package structure. In our study, we propose a sharing rule and show that it is the unique rule that satisfies efficiency, fairness, and independence requirements. In addition, we analyze sharing rules that enable a patent pool agent to organize a revenue-maximizing and objection-free profile.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141511813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Sequential school choice with public and private schools 公立和私立学校的顺序性择校
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-06-20 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01527-0
Tommy Andersson, Umut Dur, Sinan Ertemel, Onur Kesten
{"title":"Sequential school choice with public and private schools","authors":"Tommy Andersson, Umut Dur, Sinan Ertemel, Onur Kesten","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01527-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01527-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate sequential two-stage admission systems with public and private schools. A sequential notion of truthfulness, called straightforwardness, is introduced. Contrary to one-stage systems, sequentiality leads to a trade-off between the existence of a straightforward equilibrium and non-wastefulness. We identify the unique set of rules for two-stage systems that guarantees the existence of a straightforward equilibrium and reduces waste. Existing admission systems in Türkiye and Sweden are analyzed within our general framework.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"181 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141511812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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