动态合理的判断汇总

IF 0.5 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Franz Dietrich, Christian List
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引用次数: 0

摘要

判断-聚合理论一直关注理性集体判断的实现。但迄今为止,理性一直被静态地理解为:在特定时间内判断的一致性,定义为一致性、完整性和/或演绎封闭性。本文提出的问题是,集体判断是否可以是动态理性的,即集体判断会随着新信息的出现而发生理性变化。从形式上看,如果所有个体都根据某些信息(一个所学命题)来修改自己的判断,那么新的综合判断就是根据这些信息修改过的旧判断,也就是说,综合判断和修改判断是相通的,那么相对于给定的修改算子而言,判断综合规则就是动态合理的。我们证明了一个不可能性定理:如果议程上的命题是非三维关联的,那么相对于任何满足一些基本条件的修正算子而言,任何具有标准属性的判断聚合规则都不是动态合理的。我们的定理是一些著名的静态合理性不可能性定理的动态合理性对应定理。我们还探讨了如何通过放宽聚合规则和/或修正算子的某些条件来实现动态合理性。值得注意的是,相对于所谓的基于前提的修正算子,基于前提的聚合规则是动态合理的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Dynamically rational judgment aggregation

Dynamically rational judgment aggregation

Judgment-aggregation theory has always focused on the attainment of rational collective judgments. But so far, rationality has been understood in static terms: as coherence of judgments at a given time, defined as consistency, completeness, and/or deductive closure. This paper asks whether collective judgments can be dynamically rational, so that they change rationally in response to new information. Formally, a judgment aggregation rule is dynamically rational with respect to a given revision operator if, whenever all individuals revise their judgments in light of some information (a learnt proposition), then the new aggregate judgments are the old ones revised in light of this information, i.e., aggregation and revision commute. We prove an impossibility theorem: if the propositions on the agenda are non-trivially connected, no judgment aggregation rule with standard properties is dynamically rational with respect to any revision operator satisfying some basic conditions. Our theorem is the dynamic-rationality counterpart of some well-known impossibility theorems for static rationality. We also explore how dynamic rationality might be achieved by relaxing some of the conditions on the aggregation rule and/or the revision operator. Notably, premise-based aggregation rules are dynamically rational with respect to so-called premise-based revision operators.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
11.10%
发文量
56
期刊介绍: Social Choice and Welfare explores all aspects, both normative and positive, of welfare economics, collective choice, and strategic interaction. Topics include but are not limited to: preference aggregation, welfare criteria, fairness, justice and equity, rights, inequality and poverty measurement, voting and elections, political games, coalition formation, public goods, mechanism design, networks, matching, optimal taxation, cost-benefit analysis, computational social choice, judgement aggregation, market design, behavioral welfare economics, subjective well-being studies and experimental investigations related to social choice and voting. As such, the journal is inter-disciplinary and cuts across the boundaries of economics, political science, philosophy, and mathematics. Articles on choice and order theory that include results that can be applied to the above topics are also included in the journal. While it emphasizes theory, the journal also publishes empirical work in the subject area reflecting cross-fertilizing between theoretical and empirical research. Readers will find original research articles, surveys, and book reviews.Officially cited as: Soc Choice Welf
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