两个备选方案之间不可操控的集体选择的特征

IF 0.5 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Achille Basile, K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao, Surekha Rao
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们考虑了一些不可操控的社会选择函数类别,这些函数在一个至少有两个备选方案的集合中,其取值范围最多为两个。我们提供了每一类函数的函数形式。这种函数形式是一种特征描述,它明确描述了该特定类别的社会选择函数如何选择与某一特征相对应的集体选择。我们使用 "特征 "这一新概念对这些特征进行了统一表述。根据社会选择函数的类别,对特征的选择给出了该类所有社会选择函数的函数形式。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

The character of non-manipulable collective choices between two alternatives

The character of non-manipulable collective choices between two alternatives

We consider classes of non-manipulable social choice functions with range of cardinality at most two within a set of at least two alternatives. We provide the functional form for each of the classes we consider. This functional form is a characterization that explicitly describes how a social choice function of that particular class selects the collective choice corresponding to a profile. We provide a unified formulation of these characterizations using the new concept of “character”. The choice of the character, depending on the class of social choice functions, gives the functional form of all social choice functions of the class.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
11.10%
发文量
56
期刊介绍: Social Choice and Welfare explores all aspects, both normative and positive, of welfare economics, collective choice, and strategic interaction. Topics include but are not limited to: preference aggregation, welfare criteria, fairness, justice and equity, rights, inequality and poverty measurement, voting and elections, political games, coalition formation, public goods, mechanism design, networks, matching, optimal taxation, cost-benefit analysis, computational social choice, judgement aggregation, market design, behavioral welfare economics, subjective well-being studies and experimental investigations related to social choice and voting. As such, the journal is inter-disciplinary and cuts across the boundaries of economics, political science, philosophy, and mathematics. Articles on choice and order theory that include results that can be applied to the above topics are also included in the journal. While it emphasizes theory, the journal also publishes empirical work in the subject area reflecting cross-fertilizing between theoretical and empirical research. Readers will find original research articles, surveys, and book reviews.Officially cited as: Soc Choice Welf
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