在外部性有限的情况下,用词典偏好描述住房市场的顶级交易周期规则。

IF 0.8 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2025-01-01 Epub Date: 2024-11-08 DOI:10.1007/s00355-024-01556-9
Bettina Klaus
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们考虑一个具有有限外部性的住房市场模型,其中代理人既通过需求偏好关心自己的消费,也通过供应偏好关心获得禀赋的代理人[我们扩展了克劳斯和梅奥(经济学理论76:779- 811,2023)中引入的相关词典偏好域]。如果偏好是需求字典型的,那么我们的模型将经典的Shapley-Scarf住房市场(Shapley and Scarf, J Math Econ 1:23-37, 1974)扩展为严格的偏好模型。我们的主要结果是通过个体理性、配对效率和策略证明性(定理1)来描述相应的顶部交易周期(TTC)规则,这将Ekici (Theo Econ 19:51 -564, 2024)的结果从具有严格偏好的经典Shapley-Scarf住房市场扩展到我们的模型。通过将配对效率增强为帕累托效率或配对稳定性(推论1和推论2),可以立即得到两个进一步的表征。最后,我们证明,只要我们将偏好域扩展到包括需求字典偏好和供应字典偏好(例如,当偏好是可分离的),就不存在满足个人理性、配对效率和策略证明性的规则(定理2)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Characterizing the top trading cycles rule for housing markets with lexicographic preferences when externalities are limited.

We consider a housing market model with limited externalities where agents care both about their own consumption via demand preferences and about the agent who receives their endowment via supply preferences [we extend the associated lexicographic preference domains introduced in Klaus and Meo (Econ Theory 76:779- 811, 2023)]. If preferences are demand lexicographic, then our model extends the classical Shapley-Scarf housing market (Shapley and Scarf, J Math Econ 1:23-37, 1974) with strict preferences model. Our main result is a characterization of the corresponding top trading cycles (TTC) rule by individual rationality, pair efficiency, and strategy-proofness (Theorem 1), which extends that of Ekici (Theo Econ 19:551-564, 2024) from classical Shapley-Scarf housing markets with strict preferences to our model. Two further characterizations are immediately obtained by strengthening pair efficiency to either Pareto efficiency or pairwise stability (Corollaries 1 and 2). Finally, we show that as soon as we extend the preference domain to include demand lexicographic as well as supply lexicographic preferences (e.g., when preferences are separable), no rule satisfying individual rationality, pair efficiency, and strategy-proofness exists (Theorem 2).

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
11.10%
发文量
56
期刊介绍: Social Choice and Welfare explores all aspects, both normative and positive, of welfare economics, collective choice, and strategic interaction. Topics include but are not limited to: preference aggregation, welfare criteria, fairness, justice and equity, rights, inequality and poverty measurement, voting and elections, political games, coalition formation, public goods, mechanism design, networks, matching, optimal taxation, cost-benefit analysis, computational social choice, judgement aggregation, market design, behavioral welfare economics, subjective well-being studies and experimental investigations related to social choice and voting. As such, the journal is inter-disciplinary and cuts across the boundaries of economics, political science, philosophy, and mathematics. Articles on choice and order theory that include results that can be applied to the above topics are also included in the journal. While it emphasizes theory, the journal also publishes empirical work in the subject area reflecting cross-fertilizing between theoretical and empirical research. Readers will find original research articles, surveys, and book reviews.Officially cited as: Soc Choice Welf
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