Allocation without transfers: a welfare-maximizing mechanism under incomplete information

IF 0.5 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Ethem Akyol
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper studies the allocation of multiple copies of indivisible objects to agents with multi-object demands in the absence of monetary transfers. We look for a welfare-maximizing ordinal mechanism in an incomplete information setting where agents’ preferences are privately known. Our main finding establishes the significant welfare gains of the so-called Ranking mechanism. When each agent’s type (values for objects) is independently drawn from an exchangeable distribution, the Ranking mechanism yields higher interim utility for all agents compared to any symmetric equilibrium of any other symmetric ordinal mechanism, regardless of the agents’ cardinal values.

无转移的分配:不完全信息下的福利最大化机制
本文研究了在没有货币转移的情况下,向有多物品需求的代理人分配多份不可分割物品的问题。在代理人的偏好为私人所知的不完全信息环境中,我们寻找一种福利最大化的顺序机制。我们的主要发现证实了所谓的排名机制能带来显著的福利收益。当每个代理人的类型(对物品的价值)都是从可交换的分布中独立抽取时,与任何其他对称序数机制的对称均衡相比,排名机制能为所有代理人带来更高的中期效用,而与代理人的卡片价值无关。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
11.10%
发文量
56
期刊介绍: Social Choice and Welfare explores all aspects, both normative and positive, of welfare economics, collective choice, and strategic interaction. Topics include but are not limited to: preference aggregation, welfare criteria, fairness, justice and equity, rights, inequality and poverty measurement, voting and elections, political games, coalition formation, public goods, mechanism design, networks, matching, optimal taxation, cost-benefit analysis, computational social choice, judgement aggregation, market design, behavioral welfare economics, subjective well-being studies and experimental investigations related to social choice and voting. As such, the journal is inter-disciplinary and cuts across the boundaries of economics, political science, philosophy, and mathematics. Articles on choice and order theory that include results that can be applied to the above topics are also included in the journal. While it emphasizes theory, the journal also publishes empirical work in the subject area reflecting cross-fertilizing between theoretical and empirical research. Readers will find original research articles, surveys, and book reviews.Officially cited as: Soc Choice Welf
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