关于帕累托效率和贝叶斯激励相容性的一般不可能性定理

IF 0.5 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-03-14 DOI:10.1007/s00355-024-01515-4

{"title":"关于帕累托效率和贝叶斯激励相容性的一般不可能性定理","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01515-4","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>This paper studies a general class of social choice problems in which agents’ payoff functions (or types) are privately observable random variables, and monetary transfers are not available. We consider cardinal social choice functions which may respond to agents’ preference intensities as well as preference rankings. We show that a social choice function is ex ante Pareto efficient and Bayesian incentive compatible if and only if it is dictatorial. The result holds for arbitrary numbers of agents and alternatives, and under a fairly weak assumption on the joint distribution of types, which allows for arbitrary correlations and asymmetries.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"72 9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility\",\"authors\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s00355-024-01515-4\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>This paper studies a general class of social choice problems in which agents’ payoff functions (or types) are privately observable random variables, and monetary transfers are not available. We consider cardinal social choice functions which may respond to agents’ preference intensities as well as preference rankings. We show that a social choice function is ex ante Pareto efficient and Bayesian incentive compatible if and only if it is dictatorial. The result holds for arbitrary numbers of agents and alternatives, and under a fairly weak assumption on the joint distribution of types, which allows for arbitrary correlations and asymmetries.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47663,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Social Choice and Welfare\",\"volume\":\"72 9 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-03-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Social Choice and Welfare\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01515-4\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Social Choice and Welfare","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01515-4","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本文研究了一类社会选择问题，在这类问题中，代理人的报酬函数（或类型）是私人可观测的随机变量，而且不存在货币转移。我们考虑的社会选择函数既可以对代理人的偏好强度做出反应，也可以对偏好排序做出反应。我们证明，当且仅当社会选择函数是独裁的时候，它才是事前有效的、贝叶斯激励相容的。这一结果适用于任意数量的代理人和替代品，并且在类型联合分布的一个相当弱的假设下成立，该假设允许任意的相关性和不对称性。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility

Abstract

This paper studies a general class of social choice problems in which agents’ payoff functions (or types) are privately observable random variables, and monetary transfers are not available. We consider cardinal social choice functions which may respond to agents’ preference intensities as well as preference rankings. We show that a social choice function is ex ante Pareto efficient and Bayesian incentive compatible if and only if it is dictatorial. The result holds for arbitrary numbers of agents and alternatives, and under a fairly weak assumption on the joint distribution of types, which allows for arbitrary correlations and asymmetries.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Social Choice and Welfare Multiple-

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

11.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： Social Choice and Welfare explores all aspects, both normative and positive, of welfare economics, collective choice, and strategic interaction. Topics include but are not limited to: preference aggregation, welfare criteria, fairness, justice and equity, rights, inequality and poverty measurement, voting and elections, political games, coalition formation, public goods, mechanism design, networks, matching, optimal taxation, cost-benefit analysis, computational social choice, judgement aggregation, market design, behavioral welfare economics, subjective well-being studies and experimental investigations related to social choice and voting. As such, the journal is inter-disciplinary and cuts across the boundaries of economics, political science, philosophy, and mathematics. Articles on choice and order theory that include results that can be applied to the above topics are also included in the journal. While it emphasizes theory, the journal also publishes empirical work in the subject area reflecting cross-fertilizing between theoretical and empirical research. Readers will find original research articles, surveys, and book reviews.Officially cited as: Soc Choice Welf