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Consistent social ranking solutions 一致的社交排名解决方案
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-01-23 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01502-1
Takahiro Suzuki, Masahide Horita
{"title":"Consistent social ranking solutions","authors":"Takahiro Suzuki, Masahide Horita","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01502-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01502-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The performance of coalitions is an important measure for evaluating individuals. Sport players, researchers, and firm workers are often judged with their team performances. The social ranking solution (SRS) is a function that maps the ranking on the set of all feasible coalitions (the domain of coalitions) into the ranking of individuals. Importing the axiom of consistency from voting theory, we study consistent SRSs under the variable domains of coalitions. We suppose that there are several domains of coalitions (e.g., a set of research teams made up of only young researchers and a set of research teams including senior researchers), and the individuals are required to be evaluated consistently on each domain of coalition. Such a situation is typical because all the logically possible coalitions are often too huge to deal with. We obtain a new characterization of the lexicographic excellence solution (LES) and its dual (DLES): they are the only SRSs satisfying consistency, neutrality, weak coalitional anonymity, and complete dominance. This characterization is expected to provide a new ground for determining the impacts of individuals based on the lexicographic comparisons of their team performances.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139553132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The interdependence of social deliberation and judgment aggregation 社会审议与判断汇总的相互依存关系
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-01-20 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01501-2
Hendrik Siebe
{"title":"The interdependence of social deliberation and judgment aggregation","authors":"Hendrik Siebe","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01501-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01501-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Imagine that the judgments of some individuals on some issues are aggregated into collective judgments. Social deliberation about the issues prior to aggregation can lead to improved judgments, at both the individual and the collective level. In this paper I argue that the epistemic justification for a social deliberation design depends on the chosen judgment aggregation rule, and <i>vice versa</i>. This claim consists of two parts. First, the epistemic superiority of one deliberation design over another or over the absence of any deliberation depends on which procedure is subsequently used to aggregate individual judgments. Second, the epistemic superiority of one aggregation procedure over another depends on how the preceding social deliberation was designed. In short, the choice of deliberation design and of aggregation rule are intertwined. This claim is substantiated by two models. Both models display a tragic rise in competence: social deliberation raises individual competence while reducing collective competence. Here, individual and social epistemology come interestingly apart.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139518670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Truthful cake sharing 如实分享蛋糕
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-01-16 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01503-0
Xiaohui Bei, Xinhang Lu, Warut Suksompong
{"title":"Truthful cake sharing","authors":"Xiaohui Bei, Xinhang Lu, Warut Suksompong","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01503-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01503-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The classic cake cutting problem concerns the fair allocation of a heterogeneous resource among interested agents. In this paper, we study a public goods variant of the problem, where instead of competing with one another for the cake, the agents all share the same subset of the cake which must be chosen subject to a length constraint. We focus on the design of truthful and fair mechanisms in the presence of strategic agents who have piecewise uniform (i.e., approval) utilities over the cake. On the one hand, we show that the leximin solution is excludably truthful (meaning it is truthful when it can block each agent from accessing parts of the cake that the agent does not claim to desire) and moreover maximizes the guaranteed normalized egalitarian welfare among all excludably truthful and position oblivious mechanisms. On the other hand, we demonstrate that the maximum Nash welfare solution is excludably truthful for two agents (as it coincides with leximin in that case) but not in general. We also provide an impossibility result on truthfulness when blocking is not allowed, and adapt notions of representation to our setting.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139499865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Quintilian School in the history of Social Choice: an early tentative step from plurality rule to pairwise comparisons 社会选择史上的昆体良学派：从复数规则到成对比较的早期试探性步骤
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-01-07 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01499-7
Jorge Urdánoz, Josep M. Colomer
{"title":"The Quintilian School in the history of Social Choice: an early tentative step from plurality rule to pairwise comparisons","authors":"Jorge Urdánoz, Josep M. Colomer","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01499-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01499-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"4 9","pages":"1-13"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139380359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Robustness to manipulations in school choice 学校选择操纵的稳健性
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-01-07 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01504-z
Alexander Nesterov, Olga Rospuskova, Sofia Rubtcova
{"title":"Robustness to manipulations in school choice","authors":"Alexander Nesterov, Olga Rospuskova, Sofia Rubtcova","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01504-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01504-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"2 3","pages":"1-30"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139380165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
United for change: deliberative coalition formation to change the status quo. 团结一心促变革：组建商议联盟改变现状。
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-01-01 Epub Date: 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01561-y
Edith Elkind, Davide Grossi, Ehud Shapiro, Nimrod Talmon
{"title":"United for change: deliberative coalition formation to change the status quo.","authors":"Edith Elkind, Davide Grossi, Ehud Shapiro, Nimrod Talmon","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01561-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01561-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>We study a setting in which a community wishes to identify a strongly supported proposal from a space of alternatives, in order to change the status quo. We describe a deliberation process in which agents dynamically form coalitions around proposals that they prefer over the status quo. We formulate conditions on the space of proposals and on the ways in which coalitions are formed that guarantee deliberation to succeed, that is, to terminate by identifying a proposal with the largest possible support. Our results provide theoretical foundations for the analysis of deliberative processes such as the ones that take place in online systems for democratic deliberation support.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"63 3-4","pages":"717-746"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11573847/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142683217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Animals and social welfare 动物与社会福利
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-12-22 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01495-x
Romain Espinosa
{"title":"Animals and social welfare","authors":"Romain Espinosa","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01495-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01495-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"31 12","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138945887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
To be fair: claims have amounts and strengths 公平地说：索赔有数量和强度之分
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-12-09 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01494-y
Stefan Wintein
{"title":"To be fair: claims have amounts and strengths","authors":"Stefan Wintein","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01494-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01494-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>John Broome (Proc Aristot Soc 91:87–101, 1990) has developed an influential theory of fairness, which has generated a thriving debate about the nature of fairness. In its initial conception, Broomean fairness is limited to a comparative notion. More recent commentators such as Hooker (Ethical Theory Moral Pract 8:329–52, 2005), Saunders (Res Publica 16:41–55, 2010), Lazenby (Utilitas 26:331–345, 2014), Curtis (Analysis 74:47–57, 2014) have advocated, for different reasons, to also take into account non-comparative fairness. Curtis’ (Analysis 74:47-57, 2014) theory does just that. He also claims that he furthers Broome’s theory by saying precisely what one must do in order to be fair. However, Curtis departs from Broome’s (Proc Aristot Soc 91:87-101, 1990) requirement that claims are satisfied in proportion to their <i>strength</i>. He neglects claim-strengths altogether and identifies claims with their <i>amount</i>. As a result, the theory of Curtis has limited scope. I present a theory of fairness that fulfils all three desiderata: it incorporates non-comparative fairness, it recognizes that claims have both amounts and strengths, and it tells us precisely what one must do in order to be fair.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138564061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Labor market efficiency: output as the measure of welfare 劳动力市场的效率：以产出衡量福利
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-12-08 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01496-w
Behrang Kamali Shahdadi
{"title":"Labor market efficiency: output as the measure of welfare","authors":"Behrang Kamali Shahdadi","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01496-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01496-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the matching of workers to firms in which workers choose an observable and contractable effort after the match. If there are complementarities between a worker’s ability and a firm’s technology, positive assortative matching (PAM) is the only matching in any equilibrium and is the unique efficient matching. We investigate the effect of a policy that changes the matching of firms to workers from any matching to PAM, such as implementing a centralized clearing house. We characterize two sets of sufficient conditions on the production and cost functions under which the total output and welfare both increase. Under the first set of conditions, the increase in total output is an upper bound for the efficiency gain. In contrast, under the second set of conditions, the increase in total output is a lower bound for the efficiency gain. We identify a third set of conditions under which the total output decreases while welfare increases.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"86 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138561667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cross invariance, the Shapley value, and the Shapley–Shubik power index 交叉不变性，Shapley值，和Shapley - shubik幂指数
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-11-25 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01490-2
Chun-Ting Chen, Wei-Torng Juang, Ching-Jen Sun
{"title":"Cross invariance, the Shapley value, and the Shapley–Shubik power index","authors":"Chun-Ting Chen, Wei-Torng Juang, Ching-Jen Sun","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01490-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01490-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper we propose a simple axiom which, along with the axioms of additivity (transfer) and dummy player, characterizes the Shapley value (the Shapley–Shubik power index) on the domain of TU (simple) games. The new axiom, cross invariance, demands payoff invariance on symmetric players across “quasi-symmetric games,” that is, games where excluding null players, all players are symmetric. Additionally, we demonstrate that the axiom of additivity can be replaced by a new axiom called strong monotonicity, or it can be completely dropped if a stronger version of cross invariance is employed. We also show that the weighted Shapley values can be characterized using a weighted variant of cross invariance. Efficiency is derived rather than assumed in our characterizations. This fresh perspective contributes to a deeper understanding of the Shapley value and its applicability.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"11 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138503900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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